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Glossary of Terms 
 
Observer – The subject of the situation. The person feeling empathy for another. 
Target – The object of the situation. The person in need whom the observer is feeling empathy for.  
 
Agency – The extent to which the observer believes that (s)he is able to change the target’s 
situation. How much (s)he feels able to provide help.  
Blame – The extent to which the observer blames the target for his or her situation. How much (s)he 
believes that the target is responsible.  
Empathic responding – Positive emotional responding towards another in need, including feelings of 
empathy and sympathy.  
Empathy - An emotional response similar to the observer’s perception and understanding of the 
target’s emotions, with recognition that the source of the emotion is not the observer’s 
own. 
Morality – The extent to which the observer believes that what has happened to the target is 
morally wrong.  
Perceived Need – The extent to which the observer believes that the target is in need. How much 
(s)he thinks the target needs help. 
Perceived Power – The perceived power difference between the observer and target. How much the 
observer feels that (s)he is a more powerful person than the target. 
Self-interest – The extent to which the observer believes that his/her own needs are more 
important than the target’s (in the current situation).  
Similarity – The extent to which the observer believes that the target is similar to himself/herself. 
This can be inferred on any number of factors (e.g., personality, appearance, cultural 
likeness, or social circumstances) 
Sympathy – An observer’s feelings of worry or concern for the target’s welfare.  









There are several shortcomings in the empathy literature that have led to an incomplete 
understanding of this important social emotion. Specifically, definitions of the term lack 
consistency, and the majority treatment of empathy as a trait capacity has overshadowed our 
understanding of empathy as a state variable, and of the relationships between context-
dependent cognitions and empathic responding. The purpose of this thesis is to present 
research into the resolution of these issues. A new conceptualisation of empathy was first 
developed, based upon a consideration of the published literature. The cognitive antecedents 
of empathy (agency, blame, perceived power, cognitive empathy, similarity, valuing, 
perceived need, morality, self-interest, and mood) were then identified and reviewed. As no 
scale existed to target these variables, a new scale was developed (the Cognitive Antecedents 
of Empathic Responding Scale [CAERS]). In Study 1 the face validity of the CAERS was 
established, and the internal reliability of the scale was improved in Study 2. In Study 3, 
participants‟ (n = 177) cognitions towards a high school bullying victim were measured, 
finding that that some antecedents (i.e., perceived need, valuing, cognitive empathy, 
similarity, self-interest, and morality) were more influential on empathic responding than 
others. The results of Study 4 showed that participants‟ (n = 83) cognitions (especially 
morality, valuing, agency, and blame) towards an individual depicted in a charity 
advertisement influenced how much empathy they felt for that target and how likely they 
were to donate to that charity. In Study 5, a one-trial prisoner‟s dilemma (n = 100) was used 
to demonstrate that self-interest is also an important factor to consider. A new model of the 
antecedents of empathic responding was developed from these results, which will serve as a 
useful starting point for those wishing to enhance the way we encourage empathy in others, 
especially those working in forensic, healthcare, and charitable contexts.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Rationale 
Empathy is an essential component of human interaction (Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright 2004, Van Boven et al. 2013), inseparable from social intelligence (Björkqvist, 
Österman, and Kaukiainen 2000), and has been deemed “the basic process in all social 
interaction” (Dymond 1949: 127). Many decades have been spent debating the definition of 
empathy (which shall be covered in Chapter 2) but, at a basic level, empathy concerns one‟s 
emotional response to an emotional stimulus. It allows us to understand and replicate the 
emotional states of others, promoting a particular course of action. Such emotions have 
evolutionary roots, with empathy aiding social species to care for offspring and other group 
members through the strengthening of social bonds, promoting group safety and nurturing 
(see Decety 2011).  
Of particular importance is the fact that empathy is relevant to a wide range of social 
contexts. Empathy is said to promote altruistic behaviour (e.g., Batson 1991), and has been 
suggested to be crucial for the formation of therapeutic relationships (Reynolds and Scott 
1999). Similarly, empathy is important for the delivery of effective healthcare by minimising 
patient distress (Olson 1995) and enabling hope and confidence in the patient (see von Dietze 
and Orbe 2000). On the other hand, a lack of empathy has commonly been associated with 
offending behaviour (Jolliffe and Farrington 2004, 2007), which remains a pervasive problem 
in most (if not all) societies and cultures. Empathy is clearly an important area of research 
and practice across many different fields of interest, in fact in almost any situation where 
human interaction occurs.  
Nevertheless, despite a wide range of applications and extensive research, empathy 
remains a poorly understood concept. For example, it has been noted on multiple occasions 
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(to name a few: Coplan 2011, Batson et al. 2005, Decety and Jackson 2004, de Vignemont 
and Singer 2006, Eisenberg et al. 1991, Feshbach 1978) that despite the century long 
existence of the term, debate on how to define empathy is still commonplace in the literature. 
A further issue is that there has been a majority focus in the literature on empathy as a trait 
variable. Such a focus implies that an individual exhibits a specified capacity for empathy, 
and that this capacity remains stable across all situations encountered. Variations in empathy 
levels according to trait individual differences have been demonstrated in many studies (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004, Blair 2005), which perhaps explains the majority focus 
on trait capacities for empathy. However, other authors (see Chapter 3) have shown that 
empathy can vary according to context (i.e., as a state variable). Such state approaches have 
been eclipsed by the trait perspective in the research literature, which has resulted in a lack of 
understanding of how empathy functions across contexts. As a result, we lack suitable 
measurement tools that can identify contextually dependent empathy deficits (Pithers 1999). 
Certain other issues with the measurement of empathy exist within the literature. In 
particular, empathy is often merged with related terms such as sympathy, defined as “feelings 
of sorrow or concern for another's welfare” (Eisenberg and Miller 1987: 92). Authors rarely 
make it clear whether their measures pertain to empathy or sympathy, and as such we do not 
have a clear understanding of either term. Therefore, efforts are needed to more clearly 
disentangle the antecedents and outcomes of empathy and sympathy, to improve our 
understanding, and to determine whether we should continue focussing on empathy in 
intervention/education (as this term has received the greatest interest thus far), or whether 
sympathy might be a more appropriate target. 
Some (e.g., Barnett and Mann 2013a, Brown et al. 2013) have suggested that the 
variation of empathy/sympathy according to context may result from an individual‟s 
cognitions about the situation. Cognitions can cause blocks to „normal‟ empathic responding, 
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or enhance empathic responding. For example, it has been demonstrated that attributions of 
blame can cause individuals to feel less empathy for another (e.g., Rudolph et al. 2004). 
Alternatively, other cognitive factors such as perceiving emotional need in another can cause 
increased feelings of empathy (e.g., Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011). Consequently, it has 
been noted that researchers should investigate the various reasons why deficits arise, rather 
than empathy/sympathy itself (Barnett and Mann 2013a, Marshall, Hudson, Jones, and 
Fernandez 1995), and that potential blocks/enhancers of empathy should be investigated so 
that they can be targeted in assessment and intervention (Barnett and Mann 2013a). Although 
individual cognitive factors have been investigated (such as those mentioned above), these 
are rarely examined in combination and at the time the present project was started, no 
measurement scales existed to target them, and we had little knowledge regarding the relative 
importance of each cognitive antecedent. Addressing these issues will allow us to identify 
which of these cognitions have the greatest influence on empathy and sympathy (and 
therefore behavioural motivations), enabling for the identification of those cognitions that 
form the most pressing targets for education and intervention.  
Further knowledge of the variation of empathy according to context specific 
cognitions would benefit researchers and practitioners in several different disciplines. For 
example, an understanding of how offenders are able to suppress empathy for their victims, 
whilst having „normal‟ levels of empathy for others would prove useful for those aiming to 
address victim-specific empathy deficits in offending populations (e.g., Fernandez et al. 1999, 
Marshall et al. 1995). Understanding how empathy may underpin charitable donation 
behaviours (e.g., see Griffin et al. 1993, Kogut 2011) may also help to enhance charitable 
marketing campaigns, as determining how best to elicit empathy in potential donors can help 
maximise income generation for charitable organisations. Furthermore, the outcomes of this 
research can be applied by those who are interested in enhancing compassionate care 
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delivered by healthcare professionals (e.g., Hojat et al. 2002), particularly in light of the 
recent criticisms regarding a lack of compassion within some nurses in the UK (Care Quality 
Commission 2014, Francis 2013, The Patients‟ Association n.d.). Finally, a greater 
understanding of empathy may even benefit those in the marketing or business sectors, with 
empathy in salespersons being linked to greater customer satisfaction (Lee et al. 2011).  
1.2 Aims  
It is clear that efforts are needed to more fully understand this essential social ability 
through clearly examining what is meant by the term „empathy‟, developing a scale to 
examine the cognitions that underlie empathic responding, and further investigating empathy 
as a state variable. Therefore, the aims of this project were: i) to define empathy using a 
rational argument and evidence-based approach; ii) to construct and validate a scale to 
measure key state-based cognitive antecedents; iii) to examine the relationship between these 
cognitions, empathic responding, and helping behaviours; and iv) to determine whether all 
cognitions are equally influential for empathic responding and helping behaviours, or whether 
some are more influential than others. It was envisaged that this research would stimulate 
much needed investigation in this area, thus providing a greater theoretical understanding of 
the empathic process that will lead to the development of more effective strategies for the 
promotion of empathy consistent behaviours.  
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Research will be presented in this thesis in three sections. The objective of the first 
section (Chapters 2-4) is to provide the theoretical grounding and rationale for the 
development of the Cognitive Antecedents of Empathic Responding Scale (CAERS). The 
first of the above aims is addressed in Chapter 2, where opposing viewpoints concerning the 
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conceptualisation of empathy are considered in light of the available evidence and rational 
arguments made within the literature. Through this approach a number of common themes 
when defining empathy were identified, and a new conceptualisation of the term was 
formulated. In Chapter 3, the literature regarding the cognitive antecedents of empathy is 
reviewed, which served as the theoretical grounding for the development of the CAERS. 
Then in Chapter 4, the framework used during the development of the scale is presented. 
 The focus of the second section (Chapters 5-7) is on data collection and analysis. In 
Chapter 5, the construction of the CAERS is presented, along with initial validity and 
reliability data. Findings are also presented regarding the influence of cognitions on empathy 
in a high school bullying context. In Chapter 6, state empathy in the context of charitable 
donation behaviours is examined, to demonstrate how this research might be applied to a 
specific area of interest, and to examine how cognitions influence empathy-related helping 
behaviours. Two limitations of this study provoked further examination. Firstly, because 
participants in this study were aware that they were not required to actually give any money 
to charity, this meant that there was no real element of perceived self-interest, one of the 
cognitive factors under investigation. Secondly, the target‟s emotional needs in Study 4 were 
not ambiguous enough, which resulted in ceiling effects for the perceived need subscale. As 
such, in Chapter 7, a study in which participants believed that they were exchanging raffle 
tickets with a person displaying more ambiguous emotional needs is presented, demonstrating 
that the introduction of these elements changes the helping model developed in Chapter 6. 
The final section of this thesis (Chapters 8-10) draws together the developments made 
by this research towards our understanding of the empathic process, and the implications for 
those working with empathy within different fields of interest. In Chapter 8, the data from 
Chapters 5-7 is aggregated to develop a new model of the cognitive antecedents of empathic 
responding, and the implications for our understanding of the overall empathic process are 
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discussed. In Chapter 9 the implications of this research for those working in a number of 
different disciplines are outlined; specifically for those working in forensic, healthcare, and 
charitable contexts. Finally, overall conclusions are drawn in Chapter 10, where it is argued 
that further research in this area will enhance both research and practice in a number of 









Chapter 2: Empathy: A Review of the 
Concept 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the conceptualisation of empathy, by reviewing and 
critically appraising a range of definitions in the published literature. The purpose is to 
provide a comprehensive account of what is meant by empathy and to distinguish empathy 
from related terms such as sympathy. This review was accepted for publication by Emotion 
Review in June 2014 and is available online at the time of writing. This Chapter includes the 
pre-published version of the manuscript referenced below. The reference list for this 
manuscript has been embedded in to the overall reference list towards the end of this thesis. 
 
 
Cuff, B. M. P, Brown, S. J., Taylor, L., and Howat, D. J. (2014) „Empathy: A Review 












The term „empathy‟ was coined over one hundred years ago by Titchener, an 
adaptation of the German word Einfühlung (Wispé 1986). According to Stotland and 
colleagues, discussions of empathy may even date back to “the beginnings of philosophical 
thought” (Stotland et al. 1978). Despite this extensive history, empathy is not a well defined 
notion. Instead, there are perhaps as many definitions as there are authors in the field (Decety 
and Jackson 2004, de Vignemont and Singer 2006).  
Several problems result from this fact. Firstly, when interpreting research findings 
relating to „empathy‟, one must first determine precisely what is being studied, and the degree 
of confusion with related concepts. This can make the interpretation of outcomes difficult, 
compromising the comparability of studies (Brown, Harkins, and Beech 2012, Gerdes, Segal, 
and Lietz 2010). Secondly, there appear to be differences in the way researchers and 
practitioners conceptualise empathy (Mann and Barnett 2013), leading to a mismatch 
between the way empathy is researched and dealt with in treatment and education 
programmes that aim to enhance empathy. Thirdly, therapeutic difficulties can arise when 
concepts are understood differently (Book 1988, Clark 2010), with some understandings of 
empathy having greater therapeutic effectiveness than others (see Clark 2010, Nightingale, 
Yarnold, and Greenberg 1991). These issues, and suggestions for their resolution, are 
discussed further towards the end of this paper.  
While definition diversity should not necessarily be discouraged (e.g., Duan and Hill 
1996), efforts should be made to draw together knowledge to improve our understanding and 
to reduce confusion in the field.  Although “there is no way to ascertain which definition is 
correct” (Eisenberg et al. 1991: 64), it is possible to compare and contrast how empathy is 
conceptualised, and discuss any differences, examining competing viewpoints in light of the 
current knowledge-base. The purpose of this paper is to explore the range of current 
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conceptualisations of empathy and present a discussion outlining similarities that are 
supported in the literature, and to formulate a new conceptual summary of empathy that can 
be used by future researchers/practitioners.  
2.2 Identifying Areas of Confusion 
A snowballing procedure
1
 was employed to identify definitions in the literature from 
key papers, and exploring avenues of interest from reference lists. These initial key papers 
were sourced mainly from EBSCO databases when searching for more general literature 
reviews on the topic (e.g., using search terms such as empath* AND review). Other papers 
were identified during the search for models of empathy to inform the discussions presented 
in Chapter 3 (using search terms such as empath* AND model OR theory). Further papers 
were identified from initial searches of the literature from specific disciplines (e.g., including 
terms such as offender*, healthcare, charit*). This process was not intended as an exhaustive 
review
2
, but was designed to capture definitions across a range of different viewpoints. Only 
English language papers were examined, as there was no provision for translation of non-
English language sources. No restrictions were placed in terms of the year of publication.  
A total of forty-three distinct definitions/conceptual summaries were identified (see 
Table 2.1). A small number of these conceptualisations were not put forward by authors as 
formal „definitions‟, but were summary statements of the wider theoretical discussions of 
empathy. These informal methods of defining empathy were nevertheless reviewed alongside 
the formal definitions as they have the same relevance in terms of interpreting and 
                                                             
1Snowballing was used in favour of more systematic approaches as definitions of empathy are not identified in 
any consistent manner, and are generally presented within the main body of more widely focussed 
manuscripts. The use of search terms was therefore not possible. A more general search for ‘empathy’ yielded 
too many results for a systematic search for definitions, as a detailed review of each manuscript would be 
required (making the task unmanageable). A snowball technique was therefore the most viable strategy. 
2
Due to this fact, Grey Literature was not included in this review. Although this method still allowed the 
current authors to identify a number of common debates in the published literature, it should be noted that 
different definitions may exist in these non-academic / unpublished sources.  
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understanding research findings. The present discussion is based upon shorthand definitions 
of empathy, rather than full models, for two reasons. Firstly, many models of empathy focus 
upon the wider empathic process (i.e., the process from perception to behaviour), which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Secondly, this method allowed us to capture a wider range of 
ideas and theoretical positions, as the majority of definitions are presented in the literature 
without such models. The conceptualisations identified are numbered in Table 2.1; to avoid 
lengthy citations, in the following discussion these conceptualisations are referred to using 
superscript numbers relating to their position in Table 2.1.  
By breaking each definition down into individual clauses and examining similarities 
and differences, eight themes crucial to our understanding of the concept were identified and 
are discussed below. It is possible that other authors may identify further debates, but these 
eight examples reflect the most commonly discussed issues in the literature.  
2.3 Eight Example Themes Crucial to Our Understanding of 
Empathy 
2.3.1 Distinguishing empathy from other concepts 
Several notable attempts have been made to differentiate empathy from a range of 
associated concepts (see Batson 2011, Eisenberg et al. 1991, Scheler cited in Becker 1931). 
Others (e.g., Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade 1987, Preston and de Waal 2002) denote empathy 
as an overarching category, containing all associated concepts such as emotional contagion, 
sympathy, and compassion. To explain why empathy is commonly merged with associated 
terms, Ickes (2003) utilised Scheler‟s (cited in Becker 1931) discussion on the related 
concepts of compathy (shared feelings due to shared circumstances), empathy (understanding 
another‟s emotions through perspective taking), mimpathy (imitating another‟s emotions, 
without experiencing them oneself), sympathy (intentionally reacting emotionally), 
 
 
Table 2.1  
List of identified empathy definitions 
# Author(s) Definition 
1 Albeiro et al. (2009: 393) “The tendency to vicariously experience other individuals‟ emotional states...an emotional response that is 
focused more on another person‟s situation or emotion than on one‟s one...[which] can be either identical to or 
congruent with that of the other person involved.” 
2 Barker (2008: 141) “The act of perceiving, understanding, experiencing, and responding to the emotional state and ideas of another 
person.”  
3 Barnett and Mann (2013: 230)  “A cognitive and emotional understanding of another‟s experience, resulting in an emotional response that is 
congruent with a view that others are worthy of compassion and respect and have intrinsic worth.” 
4 Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 
(2004: 168) 
“The drive or ability to attribute mental states to another person/animal, and entails an appropriate affective 
response in the observer to the other person‟s mental state.” 
5 Batson et al. (2005: 486) “An other oriented emotional response elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone else.” 
6 Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade 
(1987: 20) 
“The other-focused, congruent emotion produced by witnessing another person's suffering involves such 
feelings as sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, and tenderness.” 
7 Clark (2010: 95) “A way... to grasp the feelings and meanings of the client.” 
8 Cohen and Strayer (1996: 988) “The ability to understand and share in another‟s emotional state or context.‟‟ 
9 Colman (2009: 248) “The capacity to understand and enter into another person‟s feelings and emotions or to experience something 
from the other person‟s point of view.” 
10 Coplan (2011: 40) “A complex imaginative process through which an observer simulates another person‟s situated psychological 







11 Davis (1983a: 114) “A reaction to the observed experiences of another.” 
12 Davis (1996: 12) “A set of constructs having to do with the responses of one individual to the experiences of another. These 
constructs specifically include the processes taking place within the observer and the affective and non-
affective outcomes which result from those processes.” 
13 Decety and Lamm (2006: 1146) “A sense of similarity between the feelings one experiences and those expressed by others.” 
14 Decety and Lamm (2006: 1146) “The ability to experience and understand what others feel without confusion between oneself and others.” 
15 Decety and Michalska (2010: 
886) 
“The ability to appreciate the emotions of others with a minimal distinction between self and other.” 
16 Decety and Moriguchi (2007: 22) “The capacity to share and understand emotional states of others in reference to oneself.” 
17 Dymond (1949: 127) “The imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another and so structuring the 
world as he does.” 
18 Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad 
(2006: 647) 
“An affective response that stems from the comprehension of another‟s emotional state or condition, which is 
identical or very similar to the other‟s emotion, or what would be expected to feel.” 
19 Feshbach (1975: 26) “A match between the affective responses of a perceiver and that of a stimulus person…. [definitions] must 
take into account both cognitive and affective factors.” 
20 Geer, Estupinan, and Manguno-
Mire (2000: 101) 
“The ability to perceive another person‟s point-of-view, experience the emotions of another and behave 
compassionately.” 
21 Goldman (1993: 351) “A sort of “mimicking” of one person‟s affective state by that of another.” 
22 Hein and Singer (2008: 154) “An affective state, caused by sharing of the emotions or sensory states of another person.” 







24 Hogan (1969: 308) “The act of constructing for oneself another's mental state.” 
25 Ickes (1997: 2) “A complex form of psychological inference in which observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are 
combined to yield insights into the thoughts and feelings of others.” 
26 Johnson, Cheek, and Smither 
(1983: 1299). 
“The tendency to apprehend another person‟s condition or state of mind.” 
27 Lazarus (1994: 287) “Sharing another‟s feelings by placing oneself psychologically in that person‟s circumstance.” 
28 Oliveira-Silva and Gonçalves 
(2011: 201) 
“The capacities to resonate with another person‟s emotions, understand his/her thoughts and feelings, separate 
our own thoughts and emotions from those of the observed and responding with the appropriate prosocial and 
helpful behaviour.” 
29 Pavey, Greitemeyer, and Sparks 
(2012: 681) 
“The experience of sympathetic emotions and concern for another person in distress.” 
30 Pease (1995: 202) “The action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, 
thoughts and experience of another of either the past or present without having the feelings, thoughts and 
experience fully communicated in an objectively explicit manner.” 
31 Pelligra (2011: 170) “The ability to anticipate and share others‟ emotional states.” 
32 Preston (2007: 428) “A shared emotional experience occurring when one person (the subject) comes to feel a similar emotion to 
another (the object) as a result of perceiving the other‟s state.” 
33 Preston and de Waal (2002: 4) “Subject‟s state results from the attended perception of the object‟s state‟‟ 
34 Rogers (1975: 2) “To perceive the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy and with the emotional components and  
meanings which pertain thereto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the 'as if' condition.” 







36 Singer and Steinbeis (2009: 43) “A distinction between oneself and others and an awareness that one is vicariously feeling with someone but 
that this is not one‟s own emotion.” 
37 Smith (1759 cited in Marshall et 
al. 1995: 100) 
“An ability to understand another person‟s perspective plus a visceral or emotional reaction.” 
38 Stocks et al. (2011: 3) “A category of emotional responses that are felt on behalf of others.” 
39 Stotland et al. (1978: 12) “An observer reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing or about to experience an 
emotion.” 
40 Titchener (1909; Cited by Duan 
and Hill 1996: 261) 
“A process of humanizing objects, of reading or feeling ourselves into them.” 
41 Van der Weele (2011: 586) “A basically passive process of information gathering.” 
42 Wispé (1986: 318) “The attempt by one self-aware self to comprehend unjudgmentally the positive and negative experiences of 
another self.” 









transpathy (emotional contagion, where one is „infected‟ by another‟s emotions), and 
unipathy (an intense form of transpathy). According to Ickes (2003), such terms differ across 
three dimensions: the degree of cognitive representations of the target‟s emotional state; the 
degree of emotion sharing; and the degree to which a self-other distinction is maintained. 
Ickes noted that empathy is located in the mid-range for all three of these dimensions, and 
that the meaning of this term “has an inherent ambiguity that invites the kind of definitional 
debates that have continued unresolved since the term Einfühlung was first introduced nearly 
a century ago” (p.64). Nevertheless, Ickes (and Scheler) claimed that although such terms are 
related, there is an argument for their separation.  
Perhaps the most frequent discussion with regards to this theme is the difference 
between empathy and sympathy. Several definitions
3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 23, 29, 33, 35, 38, 39
 appear to merge 
concepts of empathy and sympathy, or at least do not make this distinction clear, whilst 
others argue against merging sympathy and empathy (e.g., Eisenberg et al. 1991, Hein and 
Singer 2008, Scheler cited in Becker 1931). Eisenberg et al. (1991: 65) defined sympathy as 
“a vicarious emotional reaction based on the apprehension of another‟s emotional state or 
situation, which involves feelings of sorrow or concern for the other”. The distinction 
between empathy and sympathy has been described as “feeling as and feeling for the other”, 
respectively (Hein and Singer 2008: 157; emphasis in original). For example, when 
perceiving sadness in another, empathy will cause sadness in the observer (same emotion; 
feeling as), while sympathy will entail feelings of concern (different emotion; feeling for) 
(Singer and Lamm 2009). This is consistent with reported differences in the neurological 
processes underlying the two constructs (Decety and Michalska 2010). Due to these distinct 
emotional implications, it is the current authors‟ view that empathy and sympathy should be 




treatment in the literature by many authors, „sympathy‟ lends itself as the most appropriate at 
this time.   
Two other constructs commonly equated with empathy are compassion (“the feeling 
that arises in witnessing another‟s suffering and that motivates a subsequent desire to help”; 
Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010: 351) and tenderness (an expansive, “warm-and-
fuzzy” feeling often elicited by the delicate and defenceless; Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011: 
615). It is possible to differentiate tenderness, compassion, and sympathy. Tenderness has 
been linked to vulnerability in the target (i.e. a long-term need), whereas the motivation 
resulting from sympathy is targeted towards a current need (Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011). 
While the distinction concerning compassion is less clear one suggestion is that compassion 
is a higher-order construct, consisting of feelings of sympathy and pity (Goetz, Keltner, and 
Simon-Thomas 2010). As such terms are more concerned with one‟s feelings towards the 
other‟s plight, rather than the sharing of emotions, they are more closely related to sympathy 
than empathy (Kalawski 2010, Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011, Nakao and Itakura 2009). 
2.3.2 Cognitive or affective? 
Perhaps the most discussed aspect of empathy is whether it is a cognitive or affective 
concept. Cognitive empathy is the ability to understand another‟s feelings, related closely to 
theory of mind (Blair 2005). Affective empathy is concerned with the experience of emotion, 
elicited by an emotional stimulus. Some definitions are based upon only affective
1, 6, 13, 21, 22, 
23, 36, 38
, or cognitive
7, 15, 24, 25, 41, 42
, components. However, many definitions
2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 28, 30, 34, 35, 37 
include both.  
Research on personality and developmental disorders suggests that cognitive and 
affective empathy reflect two different constructs. For example, those with autistic spectrum 
disorder often appear to have cognitive empathy deficits, but average levels of affective 




pattern (Blair 2005). Numerous neurological studies have also demonstrated distinct brain 
regions associated with each construct (e.g., Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, and Perry 2009, 
Zaki et al. 2009).  Nevertheless, due to extensive interaction, separation of the two concepts 
has been rejected (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004, Duan and Hill 1996, Singer 2006). 
For example, Lamm, Batson, and Decety (2007) suggested that while affective empathy is 
automatically elicited, manipulation of cognitive elements can modulate affective elements. 
Given the above discussion, an appropriate viewpoint might be that of Heberlein and Saxe 
(2005), in that whilst the affective and cognitive components can be separated, it is important 
to remember the interaction between the two processes. To give another perspective, Strayer 
(1987) suggested that the affective component is the content of empathy, whereas the 
cognitive component is the process via which this content is formed. 
A further point to consider is whether empathy is necessarily restricted to an 
emotional context, or whether cognitive empathy can be considered „empathy‟ alone. For 
example, cognitive-only empathy could help therapists understand clients‟ thoughts and 
meanings, and teachers to recognise a lack of understanding in pupils (see Rogers 1967, 
1975). However, although inferring understanding and meaning in others uses very similar 
processes to cognitive empathy (e.g., perspective taking), the lack of interaction with any 
affective processes seems inconsistent with the widely accepted view of empathy as an 
emotional event (explicitly stated or implied by the majority of conceptualisations identified 
here). To avoid confusion, we recommend a different term for such scenarios, such as 
Empathic Understanding (Rogers 1967). 
Another debate relates to whether cognitive empathy and perspective taking (i.e., 
taking the perspective of the target, adopting their point of view) are the same construct. 
Several authors
9, 10, 17, 18, 27, 34, 37, 40
 suggest they are. Nevertheless, there are notable 




processes (Gery et al. 2009), and is one method of achieving cognitive empathy, the two 
processes may not be one and the same. There are other ways of understanding another‟s 
feelings without taking their perspective, such as reading facial expression (Besel and Yuille 
2010), accessing relevant memories of previous emotional situations (Eisenberg 1986), 
imagining events in another place or time (Stinson and Ickes 1992) and projection, where the 
observer assumes the target‟s emotional state to be the same as his/her own (Nickerson 1999, 
Nickerson, Butler, and Carlin 2011, Preston 2007).  
2.3.3 Congruent or incongruent? 
Some authors have explicitly argued that the empathic emotion of the observer needs 
to be congruent with that of the observed individual 
1,6
, with several implying this to be the 
case with a “sharing” of emotions
8, 16, 22, 27, 31, 32
, or “experiencing” the other‟s emotions
2, 14, 20, 
30 
vicariously. For others, congruency may occur but is not necessary
13, 18, 32
, and some 
authors suggest that the emotion is congruent with the observer‟s perception of need or 
entitlement in the other
3, 5, 23
, thus congruent with the situation. Clearly there is a need to 
disambiguate this issue. 
Some authors emphasise the importance of emotional congruency. For example, 
Rogers (1975: 4) conceptualised empathy as “entering the private perceptual world of the 
other and becoming thoroughly at home in it”. Within a therapeutic relationship (which 
Rogers was primarily concerned with), one may be able to share and discuss emotions in 
depth. However, even the best therapist will be influenced by his/her own perspective, and 
the degree of congruency will depend upon this influence. Additionally, there are many 
examples outside of therapeutic relationships where empathy is felt without the opportunity 
for deep discussion of emotions (e.g., witnessing accidents), where the perspective and 
interpretation of the observer is the key source of information. Such perspectives and 




(i.e., projection) and personality (Scheler 1954 cited in Stotland et al. 1978), and by priming 
effects (Hodges and Biswas-Diener 2007). Therefore, the degree of emotion matching will be 
dependent upon empathic accuracy: the ability to “accurately infer the specific content of 
another person‟s successive thoughts and feelings” (Ickes 2011: 57).   
Also arguing for emotional congruency, Hein and Singer (2008) suggested that 
congruency is what separates empathy (congruent) from sympathy (incongruent). This is 
consistent with the idea that empathy is related to the other‟s feelings, while sympathy is a 
reflection of one‟s own (e.g., the feelings of concern that the observer holds for the target). 
However, this does not necessarily imply that the other‟s emotion is a perfect match to one‟s 
own. Levenson and Ruef (1992) argued that without accurate perception it will be difficult to 
respond compassionately. Presumably, however, an individual will respond based on his/her 
empathic experience, accurate or not. Naturally, cases of extreme incongruency, such as 
feeling anger as a result of mistaking sadness for anger in the target, will represent a failure of 
empathy.  
According to de Vignemont and Singer (2006), neuroscientific evidence has yet to 
provide an answer to the debate on congruency, and testing for exact matching of emotion is 
nearly impossible (Preston 2007). Nevertheless, the degree of congruency is dependent upon 
factors such as personal experience, imagination, simulation (Coplan 2011) and the resources 
available for the verbal sharing of emotions. Accuracy is also dependent on how accurate the 
target is regarding his/her own emotions, which are often used as a measure of empathic 
accuracy (Batson 2011). If the target fails to accurately decipher his/her own emotional state 
then the task of being empathically accurate is made more difficult for the observer. Each of 
these factors suggests that true empathic congruency will be difficult to achieve. Whilst the 





2.3.4 Subject to other stimuli? 
The previous discussion assumes that an emotional other is present for the observer to 
perceive. With a few exceptions
18, 30, 35
, most authors make this assumption
2, 6, 13, 20, 22, 29, 32, 39
. 
However, some argue that direct perception may not be necessary. For example, Blair (2005) 
noted that empathy can either be in response to the emotions in another person or “other 
emotional stimuli” (p.699). Such stimuli may exist in three circumstances. First, it is possible 
to encounter another person who has just experienced an emotional event (e.g., an accident), 
but who is minimising emotional cues (verbal, facial, etc.). We argue that observers may infer 
emotionality through perspective taking, imagination, or the retrieval of relevant memories. 
Neuroscientific evidence supports this contention as „intentional empathy‟ (asking people to 
empathise with others) activates empathy-associated brain areas in the absence of emotional 
cues (de Greck et al. 2012).  Second, empathy for an absent target may be elicited by verbal 
statements from a third party (Blair 2005, Polaschek 2003), retrospectively (Barnett and 
Mann 2013a), and by inference from one‟s previous experience (Eisenberg et al. 1991).  
Third, empathy can also be evoked by stimuli about a fictional or imaginary person (Decety 
and Jackson 2004, Pelligra 2011, Singer and Lamm 2009). People respond emotionally to 
emotional scenes in books and animated films, where there are no living entities present 
experiencing an emotion, relying on imagination in such cases. We argue that there is little 
functional difference between empathy for a real, fictional, or absent person.  The key 
element to consider in the presence of an emotionally-laden stimulus is that of perception and 
understanding in the observer, rather than actual emotionality in the target. 
Additionally, a range of different emotions evoke empathy. „Negative empathy‟ (e.g., 
pain / sadness) is often given prominence in the literature. For example, Batson, Fultz, and 
Schoenrade (1987: 20) suggested empathy is “produced by witnessing another person‟s 




including anger, anxiety, disgust, fear, happiness, pain, and sadness. Moreover, individuals 
may not have the same empathic capacity for different emotions (Eisenberg 1986). For 
example, individuals may react strongly to „positive empathy‟ (e.g., empathy for happiness), 
but dampen negative empathy to minimise personal distress.  
2.3.5 Self-other distinction or merging? 
It is also important to examine the internal self-oriented factors. Some 
conceptualisations
10, 14, 34, 36
 maintain a clear self-other distinction: the observer is aware that 
his/her emotional experience comes from an external source (de Vignemont and Singer 
2006). None of the conceptualisations identified here state that the observer does not have 
this awareness.  
The main argument for a self-other distinction comes from the need to separate 
empathy from related concepts. In particular, this distinction is what separates empathy from 
emotional contagion (Decety and Lamm 2006, de Vignemont and Singer 2006, Gerdes, 
Segal, and Lietz 2010, Scheler cited in Ickes 2003). With empathy, the observer is aware that 
this feeling is a result of perceiving emotion in the other. With emotional contagion, the 
emotion is captured but the observer lacks this awareness and the observer believes this 
feeling to be his/her own 
Neuroscientific evidence has demonstrated that observing another‟s pain activates the 
observer‟s brain areas responsible for pain (Singer and Lamm 2009), reflecting some self-
other merging. Jackson et al. (2006) reported the results of an fMRI study that demonstrated 
others‟ experiences are processed the same as our own, but the degree of activation in 
relevant brain areas depends upon the degree of separation (i.e., greater activation when 
taking a „self-perspective‟ compared to an „other-perspective‟). Therefore, due to these 
shared processing systems some merging is evident. This merging aids empathy by providing 




other merging it would be difficult to understand the other‟s emotion (i.e., cognitive 
empathy).  
2.3.6 Trait or state influences? 
Over a quarter of the conceptualisations we identified
1, 4, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 20, 28, 31, 37
 denoted 
empathy as an “ability” or “capacity”, implying a stable trait concept. However, others 





.The trait view implies that some individuals are more 
empathic than others, with this ability being stable across time. Anatomical differences 
(Banissy et al. 2012), as well as both genetic and developmental factors (Eisenberg and 
Morris 2001), account for some variability in empathic abilities. Further support emerges 
from studies into the deficits found in autistic and psychopathic individuals. Other effects of 
dispositional factors such as gender (e.g., Derntl et al. 2010) and education (Thomas, 
Fletcher, and Lange 1997) have been reported. 
Thus, there is little doubt that empathic responding is subject to trait, individual 
difference factors. Nevertheless, considerable evidence supports the importance of 
situational, „state‟ factors. For example, sex offenders do not have generalised empathy 
deficits, but are able to avoid empathy for certain individuals or groups of people (Fernandez 
et al. 1999). Similarly, violent men have decreased empathic accuracy towards their spouses, 
compared to female strangers (Clements et al. 2007). Moreover, a number of situational 
factors have been demonstrated to influence empathic responding, such as observer-target 
similarity (Eklund, Andersson-Stråberg, and Hansen 2009), how much the observer values 
the target (Batson et al. 2007), mood (Pithers 1999), blame (Rudolph et al. 2004), perceived 
power (Galinsky et al. 2006), perceived need (Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011), and cognitive 
load (Rameson, Morelli, and Lieberman 2012). Thus, the evidence suggests that empathy is a 




2.3.7 Has a behavioural outcome? 
Another contention is whether empathy necessarily has a behavioural outcome. 
Although evidence suggests that empathy is often followed by a behavioural response 
(Eisenberg and Miller 1987), several authors have argued that empathy has no associated 





responses to empathy and several stage models of the empathic process contain some form of 
behavioural outcome (e.g., Betancourt 1990, Marshall et al. 1995). The singular concept of 
empathy, however, is typically located at an earlier stage, suggesting the separation of 
empathy from response behaviours. For example, Polaschek (2003) argued that empathy may 
be felt without an associated behavioural response in cases of competing interests or 
situational factors (e.g., when action would cause danger to the self). Others have argued that 
behaviour is evoked by empathy only when mediated through sympathy (e.g., de Vignemont 
and Singer 2006, Eisenberg et al. 1994), with the association between sympathy and helping 
being supported by experimental evidence (Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011). Furthermore, 
helping behaviours can precede empathy, such as in cases of emergency (Pithers 1999). 
The evidence therefore suggests that although empathy often leads to behavioural 
outcomes, this is not always the case, and such behavioural outcomes may be mediated 
through other factors. We suggest, therefore, that it is more appropriate to acknowledge this 
element as being a behavioural motivation (see Hills 2001), rather than having a direct 
behavioural component, due to those examples of non-action presented above. 
A further point to note is that empathy is not necessarily accompanied by a prosocial 
or helpful behavioural response. While empathy is normally associated with prosocial 
behaviours (perhaps due to lay use of the term; Hodges and Biswas-Diener 2007), this is not 




psychopaths to manipulate their victims (Hart, Cox, and Hare 1995), or used by 
businesspeople to undermine competitors (Hodges and Biswas-Diener 2007). 
2.3.8 Automatic or controlled? 
One final discussion point, although largely ignored in conceptualisations of empathy 
is whether empathy is automatically elicited or subject to control. Hodges and Wegner (1997: 
312) argued that empathy, like other states of mind, “can be produced by variables beyond 
our control”. Indeed, neuroscientific studies suggest that empathy is automatically activated 
upon perception of an emotional other (Singer et al. 2004). However, empathy is a state of 
mind that we can reflect upon, control, and modify (Hodges and Wegner 1997), using 
methods such as reframing (altering one‟s perspective or cognitions), suppression (not 
thinking about the situation), and exposure control (avoiding emotional situations); all of 
these require cognitive effort (Hodges and Biswas-Diener 2007). Thus, the evidence suggests 
the influence of both automatic and controlled processes on empathy. 
2.4 Discussion 
The conclusions from the above discussions can be summarised as follows: There are 
functional differences between empathy and related concepts; empathy includes both 
cognitive and affective elements; the emotions of the target and observer are similar but not 
identical; other stimuli, such as imagination, can evoke empathy; a self-other distinction is 
maintained in empathy, although a degree of merging is necessary; empathy is affected by 
both trait and state influences; behavioural outcomes are not part of empathy itself; and 
finally, empathy is automatically elicited but is also subject to top-down controlled processes. 





Empathy is an emotional response (affective), dependent upon the interaction between trait 
capacities and state influences. Empathic processes are automatically elicited but are also 
shaped by top-down control processes. The resulting emotion is similar to one’s perception 
(directly experienced or imagined) and understanding (cognitive empathy) of the stimulus 
emotion, with recognition that the source of the emotion is not one’s own.  
 
Consistent with the arguments above, our definition acknowledges the importance of 
both cognitive and affective factors, whilst qualifying emotional congruency based upon the 
accuracy of perception and cognitive understanding. Imagined stimuli are also acknowledged, 
as are the influences of both state and trait factors, and both automatic and controlled 
processes. The self-other distinction is identified but avoidance of the word „clear‟ leaves 
room for a degree of merging. Although it is to be noted that empathy may lead to 
behavioural outcomes, this definition of empathy purposefully avoids behavioural 
implications. Care has also been taken to avoid confusion with related concepts such as 
sympathy. 
2.4.1 Implications 
The purpose of this paper was to raise awareness of the above issues, in an effort to 
develop a more widely shared understanding of empathy. Variations in conceptualisations 
have led to several issues. For example, early measurement scales are often criticised for the 
use of purely affective (e.g., Mehrabian and Epstein 1972) or cognitive (e.g., Hogan 1969) 
conceptualisations and for measuring constructs other than empathy (Jolliffe and Farrington 
2006). Using a single definition will enable researchers to develop measures that conform to 
a shared understanding, allowing easier comparison between scales and study outcomes 
(Brown et al. 2013). Similarly, a clearer (and agreed upon) conceptualisation of related terms 




interpret and compare research outcomes. Additionally, better understanding of the themes 
discussed here may promote research into situational factors that contribute to empathy, the 
range of stimuli that may elicit empathy, and the range of emotions that may elicit empathy 
(e.g., joy, pride). 
Conceptualising empathy and related concepts with greater clarity can also benefit 
practitioners. For example, Mann and Barnett‟s (2013: 2) discussion suggests differences 
between practitioners‟ and researchers‟ conceptualisations of empathy, perhaps explaining 
the widespread implementation of empathy treatment programmes for offenders, despite a 
lack of research evidence for doing so. For example, it appears that intervention facilitators 
may perceive empathy to be an understanding of the impact of one‟s crimes on one‟s 
victim(s) (often specifically the ability to perspective take), rather than a sharing of emotion, 
as suggested by the various victim impact techniques employed within offender interventions 
(see Carich et al. 2003). Future research could examine the differences in how researchers 
and practitioners define empathy and related concepts, and examine what exactly 
practitioners wish to change/develop in offenders. For example, it might be that perspective 
taking is a greater treatment need than empathy. This would lead to greater consistency 
between research and practice, and therefore a greater empirical base for offender 
intervention.  
A clear distinction between empathy and sympathy, potentially achieved by clarity in 
definitions, also has importance in clinical education and practice. For example, Clark (2010: 
95) stated that there are “qualitative differences” between empathy and sympathy, with each 
of these factors having benefits under different contexts. Clark summarises his discussion by 
suggesting that “a counselor‟s awareness of the appropriate use of empathy and sympathy has 
potential to foster therapeutic gain” (p.100). Nightingale et al. (1991) provided medical 




respond either in an empathic (“I understand how you feel”) or a sympathetic (“I feel sorry 
for you”) manner. Those taking the more sympathetic approach to practice made greater use 
of hospital resources than those with an empathic approach. A clear understanding of the 
functional differences between sympathy and empathy in medical contexts may therefore 
have implications in medical education, when trying to optimise physicians‟ approaches to 
practice.  
2.4.2 Conclusion 
A new conceptualisation of empathy has been constructed based on careful 
consideration of previous conceptualisations, empirical evidence, and arguments presented by 
various authors in the field. Few authors to date have approached this task in such a way. By 
constructing an understanding of empathy through more informed approaches, we can make 
some headway into reducing the confusion that has plagued empathy research for more than a 
century, and pave the way for greater consistency in clinical practice. If empathy is defined 
using a more consistent approach, both research and practice will be enhanced as 
practitioners and researchers will be working with shared understandings of these complex 
concepts. This will allow greater comparability between research findings, promote research 
in often overlooked areas, and enhance the theoretical grounding for clinical interventions 











Chapter 3: The Cognitive Antecedents of 
Empathy 
3.1 Introduction 
As well as suffering from conceptual ambiguity (discussed in the previous chapter), 
empathy also suffers from ambiguity at the wider empathic process level (i.e., the process 
from perception through to behaviour). Many different theorists have attempted to lay out this 
process in a range of theories and models that have a great deal of variation in focus and 
content. However, as in Chapter 2, it has been noted that the influence of contextual factors 
on empathy has lacked discussion in the literature (Brown et al. 2013, Eisenberg et al. 1991, 
Nezlek et al. 2001), with focus tending to be at a global, trait level (Geer, Estupinan, and 
Manguno-Mire 2000).  
This restricted focus has limited our understanding of the state-based variations of 
empathy. For example, the numerous cognitive influences that underlie such variations are 
largely missing from conceptual understandings of empathy, and those models that do 
include such influences tend to limit focus to one or two factors (e.g., Betancourt 1990, 
Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011; Marshall and Marshall 2011, Rudolph et al. 2004). Although 
numerous cognitive antecedents have been individually examined within the literature, there 
have been no papers that attempt to review this literature in order to draw together knowledge 
of these cognitive antecedents and their influences within the empathic process. It is this gap 
that will be addressed in the current chapter. 
The importance of considering the cognitive antecedents of empathy lies in the fact 
that state cognitions, by definition, may be easier to change than trait capacities for empathy. 
Therefore, a greater examination of the changeable situation-specific cognitions, and their 




of contexts. For example, treatment programmes for sex offenders commonly include an 
empathy component (e.g., McGrath et al. 2009). Empathy education also holds utility in 
improving practitioner-client therapeutic relationships (e.g., Hojat et al. 2002, Tavakol, 
Dennick, and Tavakol 2012). The enhancement of empathy may also be useful for those 
wishing to promote charitable donations (e.g., Eveland and Crutchfield 2007). The following 
review should therefore prove informative for relevant practitioners and researchers, as these 
cognitive antecedents of empathy represent some attractive targets for measurement and 
intervention. 
Given the above discussion, the aims of this chapter are twofold: Firstly, to present 
the development of a new model of the entire empathic process from stimulus to behaviour, 
and secondly, to examine (and include in the model) the various state cognitive factors that 
have an impact on empathic responding. The novel value of the current chapter is that the 
literature regarding the influence of a variety of cognitions on empathic responding is 
summarised, enabling a greater understanding of how these cognitions contribute to empathy 
as a state variable
3
. In order to generate a more holistic understanding, including an 
understanding of how these cognitions contribute to behavioural motivations, the overall 
empathic process will be modelled and discussed. Upon consideration of existing models of 
empathy it seems apparent that there are four main sectors of the empathic process, consistent 
with that proposed by Proctor and Beail (2007). Firstly there is a perceptual component, 
which is followed in turn by cognitive interpretations, emotional outcomes, and behavioural 
motivations. This series of steps also holds parallels to Crick and Dodge‟s (1994) Social 
Information Processing Model, relating to children‟s aggressive behaviour. The stages of the 
proposed model (Figure 3.1) shall now be discussed in turn. 
                                                             
3 It should be noted that although elements of this model may apply to ‘positive empathy’ (i.e., empathy for 
positive emotions such as joy), this model (and indeed the remainder of this thesis) is primarily concerned with 
‘negative empathy’ (e.g., empathy for sadness or distress), as researchers are generally most interested in 






























3.2 Perception, Attention, and Cognitive Interpretation 
3.2.1 Perceiving, and attending to, an emotional stimulus 
The unavoidable first requirement of the empathic process is the presence of an 
emotional stimulus to which one can attend. Many models of empathy ignore this fact, 
perhaps with good reason given that stimulus presence is undisputed. However, doing this 
sidesteps consideration of the different possible stimuli for empathic processing. Perhaps the 
least controversial would result from the direct perception of an emotional other. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, other possibilities have been proposed that should not be ignored 
(e.g., imagination, retrospective empathy, anticipatory empathy, or fictional stimuli).  
Part of one‟s perception of events will include the recognition and understanding of 
emotional states in the target stimulus (including those alternative stimuli discussed above). 
Several authors have integrated emotion recognition into their models (e.g., Barnett and 
Mann 2013a, Marshall et al. 1995, Marshall and Marshall 2011) or have identified 
recognition as an appropriate early stage in the process (Coplan 2011, Gery et al. 2009, Ward, 
Polaschek and Beech 2006). The observer‟s empathic accuracy (the ability to “accurately 
infer the specific content of another person‟s successive thoughts and feelings”; Ickes 2011: 
57) will determine the nature of perception, which will in part determine any resultant 
empathic emotions. For example, the results of a facial emotion recognition task conducted 
by Gery et al. (2009) suggested positive correlations between the accuracy of emotional 
recognition and levels of empathy in samples of offenders and non-offenders (although the 
causal direction of these results was not established). As above, this recognition process 
should not be limited to present stimuli. For example, it is important to recognise anticipatory 
empathy in perpetrators of harm because recognising distress in the target after the harm has 




Upon perceiving an emotional stimulus one must pay attention in order to evoke any 
empathic response (Gu and Han 2007), thus forming the second stage of the proposed model. 
This remains applicable in the case of imagined stimuli as a lack of attention towards one‟s 
thoughts will mean that such stimuli will not be processed further. Reduced attention via 
distraction and/or increased cognitive load at this stage will likely limit any potential 
empathic responding (Decety and Lamm 2006). This has been demonstrated experimentally 
by Hein and Singer (2008) and Gu and Han (2007) who reported increased activation in the 
relevant brain areas of observers when they fully attended to another person in pain, 
compared to those carrying out a distracter task. In this sense, attention acts as a top-down 
moderator of the empathic process (Singer and Lamm 2009), influencing the degree of 
perception and processing of stimuli (Decety and Lamm 2006).  
Several moderators of attention in relation to empathy have been identified. Firstly, 
supporters of the Perception-Action Mechanism (PAM) note the influence of stimulus 
salience (Hofelich and Preston 2012, Preston 2007), whereby more salient stimuli (i.e., those 
deemed more important to the observer) are more likely to warrant greater attention in the 
observer, although over-salient and over-distressing stimuli may cause decreased attention 
via intentional avoidance (Preston 2007). Thus, cognitive control can have an influence over 
the level of attention paid to a target and attention can be allocated based upon self-interest 
and the observer‟s immediate ability to help (Preston and de Waal 2002). The degree of 
cognitive capacity available may also have an effect. This is particularly applicable to 
situations where competing mental concerns, such as empathy for the target and personal 
safety of the observer, may be in effect. Such personal interests may be deemed more salient 




3.2.2 Cognitive interpretation 
Once observers have perceived and attended to an emotional stimulus, they will 
attempt to make sense of the situation, forming the third stage of the proposed model. In 
addition to interpreting the target‟s emotional state, any thoughts and attitudes that the 
observer holds about the target and themselves will also shape the way they interpret the 
situation. Several authors have noted that empathy is largely based upon understanding 
(Decety and Jackson 2004, Preston and de Waal 2002, Zahavi 2008), and this is reflected in 
several theoretical models, to varying degrees (Betancourt 1990, Breithaupt 2012, Davis 
1996, Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010, Jacob 2011, Marshall & Marshall 2011, 
Preston 2007, Rudolph et al. 2004). The nature of this interpretation determines whether an 
empathic response is seen to be warranted, and if so, the level of responding. This would 
explain why our responses differ according to varying contexts. For example, upon hearing 
about the maiming of a notorious terrorist, empathy is unlikely to be the default response. 
Rather, factors such as low-valuing and blame take immediate precedence. On the other hand, 
should the same occur to a well-known celebrity, empathic responding is much more likely 
when that particular celebrity is highly valued by the observer. 
This cognitive interpretation stage will be dependent upon information from 
perceptual and attentional processes. One could argue that this stage denotes the most 
important process as empathic responding, along with the resultant behavioural motivation, is 
determined by this cognitive stage (as discussed in Chapter 2; Strayer 1987) (the evidence 
behind this statement is discussed below). Several cognitive factors have been identified that 
moderate this cognitive stage, determining whether the situation is deserving of an empathic 
response, and to what degree. These may take the form of cognitions about the self or 
cognitions about the target and each shall now be discussed in turn, focussing on their 




3.3 Cognitive Antecedents: Target-factors 
3.3.1 Perspective taking 
One factor that has received the most attention in the literature is perspective taking, 
defined as “the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others” 
(Davis 1983a: 113-114), and its association with empathic responding has been empirically 
demonstrated on multiple occasions (e.g., Batson et al. 1995; Batson et al. 2007; Danzinger, 
Faillenot, and Peyron 2009). Taking the perspective of the target allows the observer insight 
into the target‟s emotions, granting the observer better knowledge into the likely behavioural 
and emotional responses of the target (Davis 1983a). The reader is referred to Epley et al. 
(2004), and Gerace et al. (2013) for more in depth discussions on the process by which 
individuals take the perspective of another. 
The ability to take another‟s perspective, and the resulting influence on empathy, may 
vary according to current situational factors, potentiating the variation of empathy. For 
example, it has been demonstrated that induced cognitive load (e.g., via a distracter task 
involving number rehearsal) inhibits perspective taking ability (Davis et al. 1996), which 
requires cognitive effort (van der Heiden et al. 2013). The similarity between the observer 
and the target can also cause variation in perspective taking, as it is easier to imagine the 
perspectives of more similar targets (Chambers and Davis 2012). Other factors such as stress, 
anger, and intoxication have also been suggested to be potential mediators of perspective 
taking ability (Keenan and Ward 2000). The concern is that under contexts of decreased 
capacity or motivation to take another‟s perspective, effortful processing may be inhibited, 
resulting in less successful perspective taking (see Epley et al. 2014), potentially reducing 
affective responses. It should be noted that trait measures examining one‟s general tendency 






Several authors have highlighted the influence of how much an observer values the 
target on the resulting empathic response. Batson et al. (2007), for example, reported higher 
empathy scores in participants in a „high-valuing‟ condition as opposed to those in the „low-
valuing‟ condition (this was manipulated by presenting the target as either a likeable or 
antisocial person). Valuing can also promote greater empathic responding via its association 
with increased perspective taking towards a highly valued target (Batson et al. 2007, Batson 
et al. 1995).  
The degree of valuing is likely to be attributable to the relationship with the target, as 
individuals tend to value those with whom they have closer relationships (Hills 2001). 
Additionally, as the degree to which we value someone tends to be more enduring than 
emotional responses (Batson et al. 1995), valuing is likely to continually promote empathy 
towards those we like. Conversely, it is unlikely that empathy will be evoked under the 
context of an indifferent or adversarial relationship (Hanson 2003), where valuing will be 
lower. Another‟s distress may even result in pleasure should one strongly devalue the target 
(van Dijk et al. 2006). According to Hanson (2003), this pleasure at another‟s suffering is not 
limited to deviant individuals as one might expect. For example, many feel glad when a „bad 
guy‟ (someone is not valued highly) is killed in a film. All of these variations will likely be 
missed by current measures relying on a trait conceptualisation of empathy. 
Encouragingly, individuals tend to value others highly by default, unless there is 
cause for devaluation (Batson et al. 2007). Such a cause may present itself during an offence 
situation, and may provide some explanation for victim-specific empathy deficits in offenders 
(see Marshall et al. 1995). Individuals may devalue others prior to causing harm, inhibiting 
empathy towards that other individual, and making the harmful act easier to commit. 




empathy (Bandura et al. 1996). This is attributed to the fact that devalued individuals are seen 
as “subhuman objects” (Bandura et al. 1996: 366), which is apparent in the dehumanisation 
of the enemy during wartime, where empathic behaviour is often necessarily dampened 
(Bandura 1999).  
3.3.3 Similarity 
Whilst researchers have reported positive correlations between the degree of 
perceived similarity and empathy (Eklund, Andersson-Stråberg, and Hansen 2009; Feshbach 
1978; Stotland and Dunn 1963), other evidence suggests that this effect is mediated through 
factors such as perspective taking (Webster-Nelson and Baumgarte 2004), or valuing (Batson 
et al. 1995). Although more research is required to test the effects of similarity on empathy, 
any relationship may be explained by the greater presence of „knowledge structures‟ relating 
to the target when the target is similar to oneself (Stinson and Ickes 1992). This allows one to 
infer the target‟s feelings with greater accuracy, which in turn may lead to the greater 
elicitation of empathy. This is consistent with the discussion presented by Cikara, Bruneau, 
and Saxe (2011), who reviewed the literature demonstrating greater elicitation of empathy 
when the target is part of one‟s social group, as compared to a member of an outgroup.   
Several authors have noted that perspective taking ability is partly dependent upon the 
similarity between the observer and the target (e.g. Gerace et al. 2013, Komeda et al. 2009; 
Marshall et al. 1995, Rasoal, Eklund, and Hansen 2011), as greater knowledge of the target 
will make perspective taking easier, because the observer will have better knowledge of how 
the other is likely to react. For example, van Boven et al. (2004) reported that males were 
more likely to take the perspective of a man with testicular cancer than a woman 
experiencing a difficult childbirth, and vice-versa for female participants. This is a reciprocal 
effect, whereby perspective taking serves to increase the perceived self-other overlap of 




above suggests that empathy may be enhanced in situations where the observer perceives 
similarity with the target, and this similarity can be inferred on any number of factors (e.g., 
personality, appearance, cultural likeness, or social circumstances; Westbury and Neumann 
2008). Interestingly, this effect occurs cross-species, with people feeling greater empathy for 
animals more similar to themselves, such as chimpanzees (Westbury and Neumann 2008). 
3.3.4 Perceived need 
It is widely accepted, when not discussing positive empathy (i.e., empathy for positive 
emotions such as joy), that the target must be in need, either mentally or physically, in order 
to evoke empathy in an observer (Batson et al. 2007). Indeed, in a study by Lishner, Batson, 
and Huss (2011), participants self-reported greater empathy for an adult in need compared to 
an adult with no current need. However, it is the perception of need that is important. The 
target may well, in fact, be in great need but if this is not perceived by the observer, or is 
ignored (via reduced attention), then an empathic response is unlikely to follow. The 
accuracy of this perception may in part be due to the level of attention paid to the target but 
also appears partly dependent upon the degree of valuing. For example, Batson et al. (2007) 
observed that by manipulating valuing to be greater, perceived need also increased, 
suggesting a causal positive relationship. This is consistent with an earlier proposal that 
perception of need involves consideration of the difference between the target‟s current state 
and the state that the observer desires for the target (Batson 1987). If one highly values 
another then this desire will be greater.  
Target feedback is also an important consideration, but is often ignored in the 
literature. As highlighted by Vreeke and van der Mark (2003), empathy does not occur in 
isolation within the observer but is shaped via communication and the relationship with the 
target. The authors provide an example of a friend failing an exam. One‟s default response 




result, the observer‟s perception of need will decrease. Thus the level of perceived need (and 
in turn, empathic responding) will be partly determined by this target feedback loop. Gerace 
et al. (2013) also noted that observers will discern the accuracy of their perspective taking via 
target feedback. Of course, this target feedback may not always be present, such as cases of 
imagination or anticipatory empathy, but may influence empathic responding where 
available.  
3.3.5 Blame 
In some situations, the target may be blamed for his/her own distress. In cases where 
the observer is responsible for causing distress, the target may be blamed for their 
circumstances in order for self-exoneration in the observer (Bandura et al. 1996). A third-
party observer may even blame a distressed other to preserve the sense of a „just world‟ 
(Lazarus 1994, Lerner 1980). These attributions of blame have a negative impact on empathic 
outcomes, as demonstrated in a meta-analysis by Rudolph et al. (2004), where it was found 
that the targets whom were attributed with greater controllability (and thus more blame) over 
their situations received less sympathy and more anger from observers. Targets seen as being 
less in control (and so less deserving of blame) were associated with greater sympathy and 
helping behaviours in the observer. As noted by Rudolph et al., such effects have been 
explained by appraisal theorists, denoting that attributions of blame can elicit anger in the 
observer, resulting in a lack of empathic responding (see Weiner 1995). 
 An interesting effect was reported by Batson et al. (1997) that serves as a moderator 
to the above relationship. They found that learning that the target was responsible for his/her 
plight inhibited empathy in the observer. However, if empathy was evoked before learning 
about responsibility, these empathic feelings were maintained in the observer. As Batson et 




3.4 Cognitive Antecedents: Self-factors 
Certain perceptions relating to the self may also cause a variation of empathy within 
individuals, although these factors have been given far less attention in the literature than 
those perceptions relating to the target.  
3.4.1 Self-interest 
According to Hills (2001: 55), self-interest is “a fundamental consideration that 
cannot be overlooked where empathy is concerned”, yet this is very often the case, and is 
rarely included in models of empathy. Self-interest may preclude normal empathic 
responding that is in discord with current goals (Walker and Brown 2013), and this inhibition 
of empathy is perhaps achieved through limiting attention towards emotional cues (Hills 
2001). This may be particularly relevant to empathy deficits in those who harm others.  For 
example, Farrington (1986) placed a desire to fulfil self-interest as the first stage of the 
offending process. Where this self-interest promotes causing harm to another, then empathy 
may be inhibited. 
Research into the relationship between self-interest and empathy is somewhat limited.  
Nevertheless, the available evidence would suggest an association. In a regression predicting 
a willingness to donate organs, Cohen and Hoffner (2013) reported that self-interested factors 
(self-benefit and self-risk) were significant predictors of donation intent but perceptions of 
benefits to the recipient were not. Specifically, perceptions of risk to oneself reduced the 
likelihood of donating, whilst perceptions of self-benefit (e.g., pride) increased this 
likelihood. Empathy was also a significant positive predictor of willingness to donate. 
Interestingly, these authors reported a positive correlation between perceptions of self-benefit 
and empathic concern. This means that when empathic responding is in line with self-interest, 




Van Ornum et al. (1981) compared students demonstrating a history of helping 
behaviours (volunteers) with those demonstrating a history of self-interest (members of a 
biology honour fraternity). The authors reported greater trait empathy in the former compared 
to the latter. Although it may be debatable whether a group of biologists is really 
representative of people with self-interested tendencies, the more altruistic group nevertheless 
displayed greater levels of empathy. However, the causal direction of this effect is unclear in 
these results.  
Despite the potential inhibition of empathy by self-interest, it seems that in some 
instances where there are potential negative consequences to the observer, high empathy can 
override self-interested motivations. For example, Batson and Ahmad (2001) used 
instructions to manipulate empathy in their participants. They reported that high-empathy 
participants sacrificed their tokens to the other participants (as predicted by the association 
between empathy and helping behaviours) in a one-trial prisoners‟ dilemma (c.f. Batson and 
Moran 1999), whilst the majority of low-empathy participants held on to their tokens (as 
predicted by the discussion on self-interest above).  
Given the above discussion, although it would appear that self-interest may cause 
some variation in empathic responding, more research is required to fully determine the 
relationship between self-interest and empathy, and at what threshold empathy is able to 
override these inhibitory effects.  
3.4.2 Perceived power 
Perceived power is important to acknowledge as feelings of power are associated with 
increased pursuance of self-interest (Keltner, Gruenfield, and Anderson 2003), whether this 
interest is prosocially or egocentrically oriented. Côté et al.‟s (2011) discussion on this topic 
suggested that feelings of power inhibit empathy, creating an “emotional independence” 




Galinsky et al. (2006), who reported a negative correlation between power and both 
perspective taking and emotion recognition, both of which are important for empathy as 
discussed above. These findings suggest that behavioural responses in cases of high power 
will be guided by personal tendencies and motivations, rather than empathic emotions. In 
cases of low power, observers will be guided more by the emotion in the target (presumably 
in an empathic manner) and less by self-interest. Given that an observer‟s feelings of power 
will not remain stable across all targets and situations, empathy will vary according to 
context. 
 Power may also influence some of the other factors discussed here. For example, 
power can create a “psychological distance” (Galinsky et al. 2006: 1069) between the 
observer and the target, serving to reduce perceived similarity. High levels of narcissism 
(high perceived power) have also been associated with low levels of empathy (Delič et al. 
2011, Jonason et al. 2013). This association may be due to the negative correlation between 
narcissism and perspective taking, attributed to a lack of motivation to perspective take rather 
than a deficit per se (Delič et al. 2011). For example, Scully (1988) reported that feelings of 
power in their sample of rapists resulted in a lack of attention towards their victims‟ 
emotions, therefore affecting empathy via both attention and emotion recognition processes. 
Although the empirical evidence largely supports a negative relationship between 
power and empathy, perceived power may enhance empathic responding in certain situations. 
For example, Mast, Jonas, and Hall (2009: Study 4) reported that when leaders adopted an 
empathic leadership style, they were more sensitive to another‟s emotions than those who 
adopted an egoistic leadership style. As suggested by Mast and colleagues, more research is 






In a similar vein to victim blaming, the degree to which an individual feels 
responsible for his/her own actions may also account for some of the variance in empathic 
responding. The apparent lack of empathy in Milgram‟s (1963) classic study was attributed to 
obedience: The experimenter was in control and thus the participants lacked agency. Despite 
the effects of perceived target agency (i.e., blame) discussed above, little interest in self-
perceived agency (i.e., the perceived degree of control) has been applied to empathy, and so 
such effects are currently unclear. However, there is evidence to suggest that individuals 
behave with greater cruelty when perceived agency is low (see Bandura et al. 1996), 
suggesting lower levels of empathy. 
 Tentative conclusions as to the relationship between empathy and agency may be also 
drawn from discussions of guilt and shame, which have received greater attention in the 
literature. Feelings of guilt are attributed with the recognition that one can change (i.e., high 
agency) (Hanson 2003), whereas shame is characterised by the individual perceiving 
themselves as “inherently bad” (Marshall and Marshall 2011) and unamenable to change (i.e., 
low agency). These feelings of shame (low agency) are often associated with lower levels of 
empathy via feelings of personal distress (“a self-focused, aversive emotional response to the 
vicarious experiencing of another‟s emotion”; Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad 2006: 647) or 
by blocking recognition of harm (Marshall and Marshall 2011). 
3.4.4 Morality 
The notion of personal values or morals should also be considered as a potential 
influence. For example, a person who is strongly morally opposed to theft is highly unlikely 
to commit such an act, and such acts committed by others will be likely to evoke a greater 




views. In support of the influence of morals on empathic responding, Schulz et al. (2013) 
reported that children‟s empathy was higher when the target had a morally good goal, 
compared to when the goal was morally bad.  Eisenberg (2006) discussed several studies 
demonstrating an association between empathy/sympathy and moral reasoning, including the 
finding that morality also mediates the relationship between sympathy and prosocial 
behaviour.  
Morality will be especially important when considering those who cause harm to 
others. Theories of moral standards denote that our morals guide, and deter, behaviour 
(Bandura et al. 1996). Under ideal circumstances an individual will recognise that his/her 
behaviour is in discord with societal and personal morals, evoking empathy, and leading to 
cessation of harm. However, cognitive reconstruction of morality can serve to disrupt this 
process. There are at least seven ways in which moral codes may be bypassed: euphemistic 
language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of 
responsibility, disregarding consequences, dehumanisation, and attribution of blame 
(Bandura et al. 1996). Moral disengagement allows one to minimise the effects of anticipated 
guilt for their actions (Bandura et al. 2001). Several of these methods are likely to interact 
with the other factors discussed above (e.g., by minimising perceived need or agency) but 
those individuals with a greater tendency to utilise such reconstructive methods are the most 
able to overcome the behavioural restrictions imposed by empathy. Indeed, Lardén et al. 
(2006) reported a relationship between morality and empathy, mediated largely by distorted 
thinking styles.  
3.4.5 Mood and self-esteem 
Finally, the elicitation of empathy may also be dependent upon the current emotional 
stance of the observer, with mood being an important moderator of the first stage of Gallop, 




demonstrated empirically by Pithers (1999), who found greater levels of self-reported 
empathy in his sample of sex offenders when participants were experiencing a „typical mood‟ 
(i.e., “the emotional outlook that was most common in his day-to-day life”; Pithers 1999: 
273) compared to when experiencing a mood denoted as a precursor to their prior offences 
(i.e., “the predominant emotion that he had experienced prior to his past sexually abusive 
acts”; Pithers 1999: 273). As this demonstrates, mood also appears to cause some variation of 
empathy according to context.  
Whilst anger has received a fair amount of attention as an outcome of empathy (e.g. 
Davis 1996), its effects as an antecedent have largely been ignored. However, one should not 
ignore the potential barriers to empathy that anger imposes. Anecdotal evidence would 
certainly suggest that individuals are able to suspend empathy during angry encounters, 
behaving in ways that they would not normally behave. It may well be that anger serves to 
inhibit empathy in as much as empathy inhibits anger, as it seems sensible to assume that an 
angry observer will interpret emotional cues in a different manner than one whom is not. 
However, this again requires further investigation.  
Anxiety is another emotion that may serve to inhibit empathy. Similar to that of 
personal distress, anxiety may inhibit empathy by encouraging a greater focus on one‟s own 
emotions, rather than that of the target (Deardoff et al. 1977). Several authors have reported a 
negative correlation between anxiety and empathy (see Negd, Mallan, and Lipp 2011). 
Interestingly, however, this effect appears to be mitigated somewhat by perspective taking 
instructions (Negd, Mallan, and Lipp 2011), perhaps because these instructions refocus 
attention back to the target, rather than oneself. 
Positive correlations have also been demonstrated between self-esteem and empathic 
responding (e.g., Davis 1983a, Marshall et al. 1997, Miller, Hedrick, and Orflosky 2006). In 




esteem (Marshall, Anderson, and Fernandez 1999) and these distortions promote the 
inhibition of empathy. Threats to one‟s self-evaluation can also promote pleasure derived 
from another‟s suffering (van Dijk et al. 2011), which promotes further causing of harm to 
the other; an opposite response to empathy. Those with low self-esteem are more sensitive to 
such threats (Marshall, Anderson, and Fernandez 1999), making antisocial responses more 
likely.  
3.5 Empathic Outcomes and Behavioural Motivations 
The discussion thus far has proposed that the empathic process begins with a stimulus, 
which is perceived and attended to. This information is then used to form an understanding of 
the emotional state of the target, as well as an interpretation of the situation in the observer 
(shaped by the various cognitive factors discussed above). Such processes allow an observer 
to grasp whether the current situation warrants empathy, and to what degree the observer is 
willing to help. The next stages of the proposed model concern the emotional and behavioural 
outcomes of these cognitive processes
4
. Similar to Hanson‟s (2003) model (who described 
sympathetic, unhelpful, and antisocial responses), the outcome of the antecedent stage can 
result in one of three emotional outcomes, largely dependent upon the nature of the cognitive 
interpretation.  
Firstly, the observer may feel either that the situation does not require empathic 
responding (i.e., no perceived need) or that they simply do not care (e.g., low similarity; low 
valuing; uncaring emotional stance). Cases of indifference are commonplace. For example, 
many charities rely on peoples‟ empathy for donations but are often met with indifference. 
                                                             
4 Whilst the importance of state factors in the current model is emphasised, the influence of trait capacities 
should not be ignored during this stage, such as trait emotional responsiveness (Eisenberg and Fabes 1992). 
Certain populations have of course been shown to have trait deficits in various aspects of the empathic 
process that limit emotional responding, such as psychopathic (Blair 2005) or autistic (Baron-Cohen and 




Behavioural outcomes of indifference are largely characterised by a neutral, non-
responsiveness, suggested by the positive correlation between empathy and helping 
behaviours, wherein a lack of empathy is associated with a lack of motivation towards a 
helping response (see Eisenberg and Miller 1987, for a review). 
Secondly, one‟s interpretation of events may lead to a negative response to the 
distressed target. Batson et al. (2007) argued that empathy will only occur in the absence of 
antipathy, and this certainly seems to be the case in many instances. As noted previously, 
people often feel glad when a movie villain is killed (Hanson 2003), a clear example of 
cognitively induced antipathy. Antipathy is a likely outcome if a strong negative 
interpretation is applied to the current context (e.g., blame; strong devaluing; discord with 
self-interest). Angered individuals (i.e., negative mood) may also feel little empathy towards 
their targets as a result of temporary antipathy, with caring and regret returning once this 
temporary block has been removed (Polaschek 2003).  
Another possible negative outcome, with subtle differences to antipathy, is that of 
schadenfreude; “pleasure derived from another‟s misfortune” (van Dijk, Goslinga, and 
Ouwerkerk 2008: 632). Schadenfreude differs from antipathy by eliciting malicious pleasure 
from another‟s suffering rather than mere gladness. Consistent with the above discussion, 
Schulz et al. (2013) suggested five potential elicitors of schadenfraude that include: blame, 
low valuing, low self-esteem, a breach of moral codes, and envy, which may link in with self-
interest or create a power imbalance between target and observer. The behavioural outcomes 
of these negative states will be unlikely to motivate any form of helping behaviour and may 
even promote causing continued suffering to target. For example, Schulz et al. (2013) 
reported an inhibitory effect of schadenfreude on helping behaviour. This is likely to occur 
despite emotional pleas for empathy. For example, the perception of distress would not 




The third potential response is a positive one, whereby the observer perceives a need, 
and cares about the plight of the target (e.g., high valuing), with empathy as the result. In 
Chapter 2, empathy was defined as “an emotional response … similar to one‟s perception 
(directly experienced or imagined) and understanding (cognitive empathy) of the stimulus 
emotion”. This definition distinguishes empathy from indifference or antipathy / 
schadenfraude as in those cases the emotion experienced is not similar to the perceived 
emotion in the other (e.g., sadness/distress).  
Assuming then from the previous stage that empathy is the result, there are two 
possible secondary emotions, denoted by several models (e.g., Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade 
1987, Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad 2006, Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010) 
containing elements of personal distress (“a self-focused, aversive emotional response to the 
vicarious experiencing of another‟s emotion”; Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad 2006: 647) and 
sympathy (“an emotional response stemming from another's emotional state or condition that 
is not identical to the other's emotion, but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for 
another's welfare”; Eisenberg and Miller 1987: 91-92). These outcomes are also 
acknowledged in the current model, to highlight the fact that empathy (and therefore empathy 
consistent cognition) does not necessarily lead to altruistic behaviours (as noted in Chapter 
2). Such behaviours are based upon these secondary emotions, which are themselves 
determined by the level of arousal and degree of control (as suggested by Barnett and Mann 
2013a, Decety and Jackson 2004, Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010).  
The findings of Eisenberg et al.‟s (1994) questionnaire study suggest that less 
emotional, better emotionally regulated individuals are more prone towards sympathy than 
personal distress. Therefore, under times of low or high-but-managed arousal the most likely 
result (in the absence of indifference or antipathy) is the experience of sympathy. However, 




focussed on his/her own emotion and experience personal distress. These two experiences 
can have very different behavioural implications. Sympathy is said to have an altruistic 
motivation, encouraging prosocial behaviours (i.e., “actions intended to benefit one or more 
people other than oneself”; Batson and Powell 2003: 463), whilst personal distress has an 
egoistic motivation, encouraging the amelioration of one‟s own distress (Batson, Fultz, and 
Schoenrade 1987). The latter, personally distressed, individual will take the easiest route to 
remove this distress, whether this be through helping or avoidance (Batson 1991).  
Several implications may come about as a result of experiencing personal distress 
instead of sympathy. Cognitive deconstruction, along with the concomitant self-focus, is 
more likely in those prone to personal distress (Barnett and Mann 2013b). In addition, 
personal distress may cause an individual to blame the target for this distress (Covell and 
Scalora 2002). The results of Curwen‟s (2003) study suggested an association between 
feelings of personal distress and the presence of distorted thinking styles, with the latter being 
used to ameliorate the effects of the former. Such proposals would suggest an interaction with 
cognitive processes. Although presently untested, this suggests a constant updating of the 
empathic process, with emotional outcomes feeding back to earlier cognitive processes.   
Consideration of this stage holds additional implications for offenders, which are 
often discussed in relation to empathy deficits. For example, Gery et al. (2009) reported that 
their sample of sex offenders had a greater tendency towards personal distress than non-
offender controls (although the authors did call into question the measure used in this case). 
This may in part be due to the experience of shame in the offenders as shame can lead to 
over-arousal and personal distress (Marshall and Marshall 2011), as well as affecting emotion 
recognition and victim blaming as discussed above. According to the Pathways Model (Ward 
2003), distressed offenders may use sex as a soothing device to ameliorate their distress, thus 




suggested that problem-focussed coping is more likely to lead to sympathetic behaviour, 
whereas emotion-focused coping will not. Sex offenders appear to be more prone to the latter 
(Serran et al. 2007), and are therefore more likely to experience personal distress in the face 
of a distressed victim. All of these findings suggest the importance of improving emotional 
regulation and encouraging sympathy in order to promote altruistic motivations. 
It should be noted at this stage that actual behavioural responses are impossible to 
predict, but should at least be guided by such motivating factors. These behavioural 
motivations mark the final stage of the empathic process, and thus the model is complete.  
3.6 Implications 
This new model of empathy has been based upon careful consideration of existing 
knowledge concerning the various cognitive factors that influence empathic responding, as 
well as that concerning the main process chain. One of the benefits of pooling such 
information together is that new targets for measurement and enhancement can be identified; 
many of which have received scant interest to date. In particular, one can conclude from the 
above discussions that there are numerous cognitive antecedents of empathy that may 
underlie the variation of empathy according to context. Specifically, empathy is likely to be 
evoked to a greater degree when the observer takes the perspective of the target, values the 
target, perceives the target to be in need, perceives the target to be similar to themselves, 
perceives greater self-agency, and perceives a greater breach of moral codes. Empathy is 
likely to be evoked to a lesser degree when the observer blames the target, attributes greater 
priority to self-interest, and perceives power over the target (depending on the nature of self-
interest and power). Mood may either enhance or inhibit empathy, depending upon the exact 




Given that there are many factors in the empathic process, other than empathy itself, it 
is concerning that the majority of current measures largely focus upon „end product‟ 
emotions such as empathy or sympathy. Before these affective components are ever evoked, 
an observer may fail to attend to the stimulus; fail to recognise emotionality accurately; or 
simply fail to care. Given that these factors likely precede empathic emotions, measuring 
empathy or sympathy will offer little explanation for these events. However, cognitive factors 
such as those discussed above are all likely to be implicative, with extensive interaction 
between such factors also likely. Whilst more modern scales do contain a cognitive element, 
such as the Basic Empathy Scale (Jolliffe and Farrington 2006) and The Empathy Quotient 
(Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004), these tend to examine the broad ability of individuals 
to understand emotions in others, rather than any of the specific potential deficits identified 
here. More specific measurement of these earlier processes may allow us to identify failings 
of empathy at an earlier stage, and allow us a greater understanding into the specific 
processes through which empathy is evoked. 
As discussed previously, state factors have often been ignored in the measurement of 
empathy and the common focus upon trait levels of empathic responding has restricted our 
understanding of empathy deficits in individuals. In particular, although each of these 
cognitions has been associated with empathy in the past, they are typically dealt with in an 
isolated manner, and so we are not aware of which cognitions are the most important for 
empathic responding (and therefore empathy-related helping behaviours), neither are we 
aware of whether any mediation effects exist between them. A measure that examines the 
combined influence of these cognitions will allow for greater depth in our understanding of 
the concept, providing greater insight into processes influencing empathy as a state-variable.  
A consideration of the cognitions discussed here might also be used to further our 




complement existing theory in behavioural motivation. For example, these cognitions can be 
used to complement Kitcher‟s (2010) five dimensions of altruistic responding. According to 
the above discussions, the intensity of altruistic responses may be determined by perceived 
need and agency. The range of people treated altruistically may be determined by the degree 
of valuing, and the degree of similarity. The scope of contexts in which altruistic responses 
occur may be determined by mood, and whether the target is blamed for their own 
misfortune. The discernment of the consequences of one‟s behaviour for the target may be 
impaired should one focus upon self-interest. Finally, empathic ability may be determined by 
perceived need and cognitive empathy. As these examples demonstrate, a greater 
consideration of situation-specific cognitive antecedents can be used to gain a more detailed 
understanding of behavioural motivations resulting from the empathic process, providing a 
more in depth understanding of the cognitive processes underlying behavioural responses. 
More effective measurement of these cognitions (resulting from a more detailed 
understanding of their relationships with empathy and prosocial behaviours) will prove useful 
for those wishing to enhance empathy in others, and will allow treatment or education 
programmes to individually tailor their approaches towards specific deficits in the individual. 
This might apply in particular to those working in forensic, healthcare, and charity contexts. 
These areas are more fully discussed in Chapter 9, but are discussed in brief below. 
A consideration of the above cognitions can be used in the development of more 
effective promotional strategies for charitable organisations. For example, notions of blame 
should be avoided as Eveland and Crutchfield (2007) reported lower empathy (lessening the 
likelihood to donate) when sufferers of AIDS had contracted the disease through intravenous 
drug use. Conversely, higher agency and greater perceptions of need appear to encourage 
donation behaviours (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011a Basil et al., 2008; Cheung & Chan, 2000). 




examination of the full range of cognitive antecedents would allow for the identification of 
those aspects of cognition that represent the most efficacious targets for income generation, 
and would allow researchers to provide more specific guidance for charity advertisers 
wishing to evoke empathy in their audience, ultimately increasing income generation for 
those who need it most.   
Tailoring interventions to individual criminogenic needs is important when treating 
offenders according to the Risk-Needs-Responsivity approach to intervention (Andrews, 
Bonta, and Hoge 1990); an effective approach in lessening recidivism (see Andrews and 
Bonta 2010). In addition, many offenders do not display generalised deficits according to trait 
measures of empathy, but rather show victim-specific state deficits (Marshall et al. 1995). A 
fuller examination of how an offender perceives their victims may allow us to more fully 
understand any cognitive processes that underlie these specific characteristics. A combined 
approach is essential to determine which variables influence empathic responding and 
offending behaviour to the greatest degree, and which changes in cognition are able to bring 
about the greatest treatment change. Although measures of victim-specific deficits currently 
exist within the literature (e.g., see Polaschek 2003: 176), these tend not to tease apart the 
different components of empathy but rather provide a general score in the context of specific 
situations.  
Hojat et al. (2002: 1567) also noted that “it is important to investigate the underlying 
reasons for variations in empathy among health care professionals”. They stated that such 
knowledge will aid in the education of healthcare professionals, with the aim of promoting 
and maintaining an empathic approach to patient care. Current trait measures offer little 
explanation for the specific reasons behind empathic variation beyond simple individual 
differences. An examination of the various factors listed here may indicate which of the 




in turn providing specific targets for education and training. According to appraisal theorists, 
changing cognitive interpretations through intervention will ultimately change emotional 
responses (Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone 2001), leading to a greater likelihood of the 
elicitation of empathy. One could argue that this may be achieved via the consideration of 
those cognitive antecedents discussed here. 
3.5 Conclusion 
A new model of empathic responding has been developed, which addresses those 
concerns highlighted at the beginning of this chapter by examining the entire empathic 
process as well as paying close attention to influential contextual factors; elements so often 
missed in models of empathy. By examining the passage of information from perception to 
behaviour, this model allows for a more holistic understanding of the empathic process, 
allowing for the identification of potential failings in individuals where such failings are 
commonplace. The various cognitive aspects presented here offer some attractive targets for 
future measurement scales, which may allow us to gain a deeper understanding of how 
empathy varies according to the target and situation. This knowledge may in turn aid settings 
where the aim is to enhance empathy, such as the promotion of charitable giving, the 
treatment of offenders, and the education of healthcare professionals. By drawing knowledge 
together in this way, a clear need to further examine the cognitive antecedents of empathy has 
arisen. This review forms the basis for the following research into empathy as a state 
variable, allowing for the development of a measurement scale, and allowing us to gain a 





Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 The Need for a Measure of The Cognitive Antecedents of 
Empathic Responding 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the previous two chapters that highlight the 
need for further investigation into the cognitive antecedents of empathy. It was argued in 
Chapter 2 that more research was needed into the situational variation of empathy, due to the 
overall focus on trait capacities. This idea was furthered in Chapter 3, where a number of 
context-dependent cognitive antecedents of empathy were identified, and it was argued that a 
measure allowing for the combined examination of these antecedents would allow one to 
determine which antecedents have the greatest influence on the elicitation of state empathy 
(thus being the most important targets for intervention). This would be of benefit for 
researchers working in a number of different psychological disciplines (in particular those 
working in charity, forensic, and healthcare contexts). Such a measure therefore needs to be 
identified or, if one cannot be found, developed so that research can be continued in this area.  
A psychometric scale would be the most appropriate way to measure these cognitions. 
As discussed by DeVellis (2012), variables can often be measured more directly by observing 
behavioural reactions to external stimuli, and such methods can indeed produce more reliable 
and valid results as they are less susceptible to biases such as social desirability. However, 
whilst this may have been possible for measuring empathy (e.g., via helping responses), 
determining participants‟ cognitions via behavioural observations would be very difficult to 
do in any reliable and valid way. For example, there is no direct behavioural expression of 
perceived agency. One can only measure the behavioural outcomes that are motivated by 
such cognitions. DeVellis noted the following: “in instances when we cannot rely on 




means of a carefully constructed and validated scale” (DeVellis 2012: 11). Psychometric 
methods are therefore more suitable than behavioural methods for use in the studies reported 
here. Similarly, although other methods such as the Implicit Association Task (Greenwald, 
McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) could have been used to measure some of the cognitions 
identified in Chapter 3, such methods would typically only allow for the examination of one 
or two cognitions at a time. Psychometric methods were again preferable as they allow for an 
easier examination of multiple variables in combination, allowing for multiple comparisons 
to be made. Although psychometric measures are associated with their own limitations (e.g., 
social desirability), statistical controls can be used to mitigate such effects (discussed in 
Section 4.3).  
Another conclusion drawn in Chapter 2 was that the research literature relating to 
empathy often lacks distinction with sympathy: a related but nevertheless distinct concept. It 
is important that researchers aim to develop a clearer understanding of the functional 
differences between empathy and sympathy. Measures and methodologies should therefore 
make this distinction where possible. This would allow us to both identify any differences in 
the antecedents of empathy and sympathy and to identify any differences in the behavioural 
outcomes of these important social emotions. For consistency, the terms „empathy‟ and 
„sympathy‟ will henceforth be used to refer to these specific emotional responses. In 
instances where it is more appropriate to be non-specific (i.e., when referring to both, or 
referring to positive emotional responding more generally), or when specific statements 
cannot be made (i.e., when unsure where differences between empathy and sympathy lie), the 
term „empathic responding‟ shall henceforth be used. 
The aim of the current chapter is to address the above needs. A review of existing 
measures shall be presented in Section 4.2, with the aim of identifying any measures that both 




between empathy and sympathy. The outcome of this review was that no such measures 
existed at the time this search was conducted. As such, a framework for the development of a 
new measure that meets these aims is presented in Section 4.3. This framework was followed 
during the development of the Cognitive Antecedents of Empathic Responding Scale 
(CAERS), named to reflect its focus on the range of cognitions discussed in Chapter 3, and its 
measurement of both empathy and sympathy.  
4.2 A Review of Existing Measures 
A measure is needed to further investigate the cognitive antecedents of empathic 
responding. As previously discussed, questionnaire based psychometric methods are most 
appropriate for this task. However, this does not mean that one should saturate the literature 
with redundant measures when existing measures may be employed to serve the intended 
task. As noted by Clark and Watson (1995: 311 cited in Barry et al. 2011), “If reasonably 
good measures of the target construct already exist, why create another?” Before developing 
any new scale, it is therefore important to review the literature in order to identify existing 
measures that may be fit for purpose (Barry et al. 2011, DeVellis 2012).  
In order to determine whether any scales examining the cognitive antecedents of 
empathy already existed, a number of online databases were searched (Academic Search 
Complete, AMED, MEDLINE, and PsycINFO). Articles were included if they described a 
measure of empathy including either the antecedents of empathy, or cognitions or cognitive 
abilities that influence empathic responding. Scales that are used to examine the broad ability 
of individuals to understand another‟s emotions (i.e., trait cognitive empathy) in others were 
excluded to restrict the findings to those measures that are used to examine cognitions 
specific to a given target or situation. Only articles appearing in academic (peer review) 




no provision for the translation of non-English language sources. The results of the searches 
described below can be found in Table 4.1. 
The search terms empath* AND cogniti* AND antecedent yielded 44 results, within 
which only one relevant measure (i.e., matching the above inclusion/exclusion criteria) was 
identified. It was then decided to search for measures that either examined the antecedents of 
empathy or the influence of cognitions (which might not necessarily be labelled as 
„antecedents‟). Starting with antecedents, the search terms empath* AND antecedent AND 
scale yielded 19 results, within which 3 relevant measures were identified. The terms 
empath* AND antecedent AND measur* yielded 35 results, within which 2 relevant measures 
were identified. The search was then expanded to include scales that are used to examine the 
relationship between cognitions and empathy. The search terms empath* AND cogniti* AND 
scale yielded 586 results, within which 6 relevant measures were identified. The search terms 
empath* AND cogniti* AND measur* yielded 1,162 results, within which 9 relevant 
measures were identified (not already identified by the above terms). 
Due to the common merging of empathy and sympathy in the literature (discussed in 
Chapter 2), a search was also carried out to identify any scales examining the cognitive 
antecedents of sympathy. The same search terms (substituting empath* for sympath*) and 
exclusion and inclusion criteria were used as above. This search yielded 794 results, of which 
most were concerned with the sympathetic nervous system, rather than emotional sympathy. 





Table 4.1  
List of identified measures targeting the antecedents of empathic responding 




Leerkes and Crockenberg (2006) Measured the antecedents of mothers‟ empathy for their children. Focussed on 
antecedents such as pre-natal coping styles. 




Adams et al. (1982) Examined the impact of early perceptions of parents (e.g., parent support / affection 
during childhood) on empathy during adolescence. 
 Barnett et al. (1980) Developed a questionnaire to examine trait antecedents of empathy, focussing upon 
the impact of parenting (e.g., time spent with parents as a child) on capacities for 
empathy. 
 
 Hojat et al. (2001) Presented The Jefferson Scale of Physician Empathy, measuring empathy within 
healthcare professionals. This scale targets healthcare-specific cognitions such as the 
importance of empathic practices. 




Heinke and Louis (2009) Measured the influence of different cultural backgrounds (e.g., individualistic or 
collectivistic values) on empathic responding. 
 van der Mark, van Ijzendoorn, and 
Bakermans-Kranenburg (2002) 
Measured the impact of parenting on empathic concern. 




Grynberg, Heeren, and Luminet 
(2012) 
Developed the Vicarious Distress Questionnaire. This scale measures the antecedents 
to personal distress, which included the antecedent of agency. 
 Hayashino, Wurtele, and Klebe 
(1995) 
 
Examined the influence of cognitive distortions on empathy in child molesters. 
 Murphy, Mercer, and Duncan 
(2013) 
Developed the CARE measure, which is used to examine the performance of 








and planning skills. 
 
 Nagano (2000) Developed a scale that is used to examine four „attitudes‟ that foster cognitive 
empathy in a therapeutic context. These attitudes include the levels to which 
counsellors understand and accept what the client is saying, encourage the client to 
freely express views, and how well the counsellor can recognise his or her own 
understanding of the client‟s needs. 
 
 Tangney et al. (2012) Reported correlations between the Criminogenic Cognitions Scale and a measure of 
empathy. These cognitions are specific to attitudes towards offending and authority. 
 
 Waldron et al. (2006) Examined three measures of cognitive distortions specific to child molesters (e.g., the 
belief of children as sexual beings), and their relationships with empathy. 




Barriga, Sullivan-Cosetti, and 
Gibbs (2009) 
Measured „moral maturity‟ in relation to empathy. Although related to the morality 
domain identified in Chapter 3, this measure is not used to measure morality in any 
specific context. 
 
 Bethall, Lin, and McFatter (2013) Examined the impact of internal working models of the self (e.g., whether oneself is 
worthy of affection) and others (e.g., whether others are trustworthy) on empathic 
responding. 
 
 Gentile et al. (2014) 
 
Measured cognitive distortions regarding aggression (e.g., hostile attribution bias, 
aggressive fantasising) and empathy in the context of video game violence. 
 
 Gunther et al. (2007) Examined the relationship between leadership styles and empathic responding in 
nurses. 
 
 Marshall, Hamilton, and 
Fernandez (2001) 
Measured the impact of cognitive distortions on empathy in a sample of child 
molesters. 
 








assessing other people). 
 
 Nezlek et al. (2001) 
 
Measured the variation of empathy according to current mood states. 
 Sanford (1998) Measured the effect of relationship-based cognitions (e.g., memory accessibility for 
relationship troubles) on empathy within relationships. 
 





Dickert, Sagara, and Slovic 
(2011) 
Measured participants‟ sympathy under varying levels of cognitive load in the context 
of charitable donations. 
 
 Eisenberg et al. (2007) Examined the variation of empathy according to effortful control and impulsivity. 
 
 Eisenberg et al. (2014) 
 
Examined the relationship between prosocial moral reasoning and trait sympathy. 
 Gruen and Mendelsohn (1986) Examined the interaction between personality and situation type (e.g., different types 
of conflict) on sympathetic elicitation. 
 
 Rise et al. (2014) Examined the differences in sympathetic responding when participants were faced 













One can conclude from the above review that whilst there are a number of existing scales that 
have been developed to examine either cognitions, antecedents, or both, in the context of 
empathy, none directly address those concerns raised in Section 4.1 (i.e., an examination of 
the state based variations of empathy and sympathy according to a range of situation specific 
cognitions). Some scales target historical antecedents such as the effects of parenting (e.g., 
Adams et al. 1982, Barnett et al. 1980, van der mark, van Ijzendoorn, and Bakermans-
Kranenburg 2002), which offer limited scope for intervention for those already in adulthood. 
Other scales examine antecedents or cognitions within very specific contexts such as 
healthcare (e.g., Hojat et al. 2001) or offending (e.g., Tangney et al. 2012), and so are limited 
in terms of examining empathy across contexts. Others examine cognitions that are not 
specific to a given situation or target, such as personal leadership styles or coping strategies 
(e.g., Gunther et al. 2007, Leerkes and Crockenberg 2006). Such scales are limited in their 
abilities to examine the changeable nature of empathy according to context. No scale was 
identified that had been developed to assess a range of cognitions, and most are restricted to 
one or two variables only. Additionally, no scale was identified that measures both empathy 
and sympathy in combination. Given these issues, a new scale was needed to measure a range 
of cognitions towards a particular target, not limited to a particular area of interest.  
4.3 Scale Construction 
The specific details of how the „Cognitive Antecedents of Empathic Responding 
Scale‟ (CAERS) was developed shall be outlined in Chapter 5. However, the rationale behind 
the decisions made during the scale‟s construction shall be outlined here, based upon 
discussions of scale development found in the literature. This section shall largely follow the 




framework outlining the required steps to take when developing a new scale. These steps, and 
how they relate to the construction of the CAERS, shall be discussed in turn below, and 
suggestions from other authors in the field will be used to compliment these discussions 
where applicable.  
Step 1 (according to DeVellis 2012) is to determine what exactly one intends to 
measure. In order to do this, one must first determine the precise purpose of the scale (Barry 
et al. 2011), and develop a strong theoretical grounding for the scale (Barry et al. 2011, Lord 
and Novick 2008). Chapter 2 was partly used to serve this purpose, in that the need for 
greater research into the state variation of empathy was identified. The decision to include a 
sympathy subscale was also based upon Section 2.3.1, where the confusion surrounding the 
distinction between empathy and sympathy was identified. Chapter 3 was also used to 
develop the rationale for the scale, in which the literature regarding the cognitive antecedents 
of empathy was reviewed, and the need for further research was evidenced. This chapter 
therefore provided the justification for which variables the CAERS would measure, and the 
theoretical understanding of the expected relationships between these subscales.  
Step 2 is to generate an item pool. Similar to Step 1 above, it was important to clearly 
define each of the subscales examined before generating items (Loewenthal 2001), so that 
each item reflected its intended latent variable (DeVellis 2012). Several authors in the field 
(e.g., Barry et al. 2011, DeVellis 2012, Loewenthal 2001) have suggested that it is sensible to 
generate a large number of initial items, so that the scale can be condensed at a later stage. 
The suggestions of Loewenthal (2001) were followed, who provided the more specific 
recommendation of starting with an initial pool of 10-30 items per subscale, before 
condensing subscales into 3-15 items each. Although there may have been the temptation to 
develop overly short subscales to minimise participant boredom, such a decision may have 




2012), and might not have allowed the scale to adequately capture the intended construct 
(Barry et al. 2011). Multiple item subscales are also preferable over single item measures as 
they result in greater predictive validity (Diamantopoulos et al. 2012) and can have greater 
reliability (Loo 2012) than their single-item equivalents. The use of multiple item subscales 
also grants greater precision, as greater mental effort may be required to form conclusions 
about less concrete ideas such as the cognitions targeted by the CAERS (DeVellis 2012). A 
compromise between scale integrity (improved reliability & validity) and brevity (improved 
response rates) was therefore sought during scale development. As noted by DeVellis (2012), 
a strong scale that is completed by fewer participants (due to increased length) is preferable 
to a weaker (shorter) scale completed by more participants.  
At this stage, it was also important to avoid the generation of lengthy items, as this 
might have reduced clarity (DeVellis 2012). Item clarity is important so that the CAERS can 
be completed by individuals with a wide range of intelligence and reading abilities. 
Researchers have suggested that it is also sensible to generate some reverse scored items to 
avoid acquiescence effects (i.e., to discourage participants from agreeing thoughtlessly with 
all statement) (see Anastasi and Urbina 1997). Each of these suggestions was followed in the 
development of the CAERS, as described in Chapter 5.  
Step 3 is to decide upon a format for the scale. As variability represents a desirable 
quality for any scale (DeVellis 2012), likert type scales (i.e., multiple response options) 
seemed more appropriate than simple yes/no response types in the current context (consistent 
with the suggestions of Comrey 1988). However, as DeVellis (2012) noted, too many 
response options (e.g., a scale of 1-100) makes responding more difficult as it is harder to 
meaningfully discriminate between response options (DeVellis 2012), potentially leading to 
increased participant fatigue. Fatigue may have been a particular issue with the CAERS, 




therefore important to create a balance of variability and ease of completion. As such, it was 
decided to develop five-point likert-type scales to create this balance.  
Step 4 is to have the item pool reviewed by others knowledgeable in the area. 
DeVellis (2012) suggested asking these judges to rate how much each item is relevant to its 
intended subscale. This is to avoid confusion between subscales, and items that are attributed 
to the wrong subscales should be discarded (Loewenthal 2001). DeVellis (and Barry et al. 
2011) also noted that judges might be asked to rate items‟ clarity, again to avoid any 
confusion in future participants. Each of these steps were followed in Study 1 of the current 
research (described in Chapter 5). Performing these checks ensured that all items were face-
valid: i.e., items should appear to measure what they are intended to measure (Kline 2000). 
As well as avoiding confusion between subscales, assessing face validity allows one to see 
whether items are understood by participants as intended. Nevertheless, one should avoid 
producing a scale that is overly face-valid, which may lead to participants responding in a 
socially desirable manner (Kline 2000). As such, social desirability was measured in each of 
the studies reported within this thesis.   
Step 5 is to include validation items. As noted by DeVellis (2012), one should not rely 
on face-validity alone, and more rigorous methods of establishing validity are also required. 
As just mentioned, it is important to avoid the effects of social desirability so that 
participants‟ responses accurately reflect reality. Social desirability, defined as the “tendency 
to respond to self-report items in a manner that makes the respondent look good rather than to 
respond in an accurate and truthful manner” (Holtgraves 2004: 161), can range from “outright 
lying to putting one‟s best foot forward” (Andrews and Meyer 2003: 484). Social desirability 
was assessed during the development of the CAERS to ensure construct validity, as this is an 
issue associated with self-report measures in general (Holtgraves 2004). Although some 




free from social desirability (determined by non statistically significant correlations), others 
have been associated with this bias such as the E-Scale (see Kampfe et al. 2013) and the IRI 
(see Curwen 2003). These effects may be present to a greater degree in sensitive contexts 
(e.g., empathy in offenders) where participants are motivated to present themselves in a 
favourable light (Kämpfe et al. 2013). As noted by Fazio and Olsen (2003), the effects of 
social desirability will be dependent upon motivation and opportunity. When motivation 
(sensitive topic) and opportunity (self-report measure) is present, then socially-desirable 
responding may occur.  
Indirect measures, such as the Implicit Association Task (Greenwald, McGhee, and 
Schwartz 1998) may be less susceptible to the effects of social desirability (Kampfe et al. 
2013), as would other non-self-report methods of empathy such as facial or physiological 
indexes (see Eisenberg and Fabes 1990). However, these methods would be inappropriate to 
measure cognitions (as discussed previously). As such, the effects of social desirability in the 
CAERS were addressed through careful scale construction, resulting in weak correlations 
between CAERS subscales and a social desirability measure in Chapter 5. In addition, any 
relationships that do exist can be mitigated through the use of statistical controls (Paulhus 
1981). Following these suggestions, the construction of scale items that have strong social 
implications were avoided (i.e., items were developed with neutral social connotations; 
Anastasi and Urbina 1997), and a measure of social desirability was included so that such 
effects could be statistically controlled for where they arose.  
It is also important to ensure that scales hold good construct validity (i.e., how well 
the test performs according to theoretical predictions). Construct validity was assessed for the 
CAERS by generating hypotheses based on theoretical accounts of empathy, and putting 
these hypotheses to the test (c.f. Kline 2000). A scale can be said to hold good construct 




factors that are not expected to correlate do not correlate (divergent validity) (Campbell and 
Fiske 1959). Such predictions were derived from the discussions presented in Chapter 3, 
which allowed for the testing of convergent validity in the studies reported in the chapters to 
follow. Divergent validity was less easy to assess, given that the literature generally fails to 
identify which cognitive antecedents of empathy do not correlate. 
It was also important that the CAERS demonstrated good content validity: “whether 
the test adequately covers the dimension to be measured” (Domino and Domino 2006: 53). 
According to Messick (1989), scale items should hold both content representativeness (how 
well items cover the range of domains to be measured) and content relevance (how relevant 
items are to each domain). Each of these were ensured by properly defining each subscale, 
and generating items with these definitions in mind to ensure item relevancy. 
Representativeness was addressed by measuring the full range of cognitions identified in 
Chapter 3. 
Criterion-related validity (how well the test measures the intended variables) was also 
important to consider. This is made up of both concurrent (correlations with similar tests) and 
predictive (the ability of the scale to predict behaviour) validity. In assessing concurrent 
validity, the most appropriate measure was deemed to be the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis 1980): a well validated and frequently used measure of trait empathy. As state 
variation in empathy is at least partially dependent on trait capacities, results were expected 
to show correlations between the CAERS and the IRI. Nevertheless, as the two scales are 
measuring different aspects of empathy, very strong correlations were not expected. Kline 
(2000) suggested being „content‟ with moderate correlations (i.e., r = .4 - .5) in such cases, 
making use of other methods of validation to further attest to the validity of the scale.  
Scales should also hold good predictive validity, which is the ability of the scale to 




where the CAERS is used to predict donation behaviours. According to the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis (Batson 1991), the emotion subscales of the CAERS (i.e., empathy and/or 
sympathy) were expected to predict the intention to respond in a prosocial manner. 
Step 6 is to test the scale on a pilot sample. The purpose of this is to identify any 
errors in the scale, to identify any problematic items, and to preliminarily assess relationships 
between subscales (Domino and Domino 2006). DeVellis (2012) noted the importance of 
piloting the scale on a sample representative of its intended purpose. Although it is hoped that 
the CAERS will be used in a variety of contexts (e.g., offenders and healthcare professionals, 
and others), the most common testing population for studies on empathy is undergraduate 
students (especially in theoretical investigations as discussed here). This therefore formed the 
target population during scale validation. Further validation will of course be required should 
the CAERS be adapted for use in more specialised contexts (e.g., in the healthcare or forensic 
fields).  
Step 7 is to evaluate the scale. Several suggestions were offered by DeVellis (2012) 
for this stage. Firstly, items should be re-examined for appropriateness. Reverse scored items 
should be checked to make sure they are performing as intended, or whether they are 
inadvertently measuring a different construct (for example, sadness might be intended as a 
reverse scored item for happiness, but might actually be measuring a different construct; 
DeVellis 2012). Items also need to be checked for the range of scores that they produce in 
order to avoid ceiling or floor effects caused by the strength of wording. Cronbach‟s alpha 
should be calculated for each subscale at this point to ensure good internal consistency. A 
factor analysis should also be performed to confirm the intended structure of the scale. Each 
of these suggestions were followed in Studies 1-3 (see Chapter 5).  
Step 8 is to optimise the scale. One of the primary concerns is to optimise the length 




to be more reliable. It was therefore important to achieve the appropriate balance between the 
two. DeVellis (2012) recommends reducing the scale length by removing „bad items‟ 
according to inter-item correlations and the resulting effects on subscale alphas. This step was 
performed in Study 2 (Chapter 3).  
High internal reliability is vital for high validity (Kline 2000), and so it is important to 
assess this during scale development. Nunnally (1978) stated that alphas should be above .7 
for any scale. In order to ensure that this target was met, the 5 suggestions provided by 
Lowenthal (2001) for improving the reliability of subscales were followed: (1) Do nothing if 
alphas are acceptable; (2) Investigate item-scale correlations and remove items that lead to 
the greatest gains in alpha; (3) Calculate split-half reliabilities for small subscales (not 
relevant in the current context); (4) Conduct factor analyses and remove weak loading items; 
and, (5) Should all else fail, rewrite items and begin the process again.  
Although assessing test-retest reliability is recommended by several authors (e.g., 
Anastasi and Urbina 1997, DeVellis 2012, Domino and Domino 2006, Kline 2000, 
Loewenthal 2001), this may be less applicable to the CAERS. Kelly and McGrath (1988) 
suggested that there are four causes of poor test-retest reliability: change over time, natural 
oscillations according to time, variation in measurement methods, and unreliable 
measurement tools. Given that the CAERS is a measure of state variations within empathy, 
one would expect to observe changes and oscillations over time in the various cognitions 
according to the target and situation. Even when the target and situation remains constant 
across two time periods, current mood may change sufficiently to cause oscillations. One 
would therefore expect to observe lower test-retest reliability for this scale than would 
otherwise occur.  Although not examined here, it may be useful for future research to confirm 
the existence of these natural oscillations, or whether cognitions remain more stable than has 




4.4 Other Methodological Considerations 
After each of the above steps was completed, and the CAERS had been appropriately 
validated, it was decided to test the scale in more specific contexts to examine the effects of 
cognitions on empathic responding. It was important to consider sampling procedures during 
each of these studies, and in order to recruit a suitable number of participants, convenience / 
snowballing procedures were utilised. Although non-random methods such as these may be 
more prone to sampling bias, Loewenthal (2001) noted that such a bias is less influential 
when one is interested in relative effects (e.g., whether high valuing is associated with high 
empathy) than when one is interested in absolute effects (e.g., the amount of empathy felt for 
a particular target). Should one wish to standardise the CAERS in the future (i.e., to generate 
scale norms), more rigorous methods such as random sampling would become a necessity 
(see Kline 2000). Nevertheless, although convenience / snowballing procedures are 
acceptable in the current context, confounding variables (e.g., education and religiosity in 
Study 6) were still considered and controlled for, in accordance with the suggestions made by 
Loewenthal.   
In the study described in Chapter 6, online data collection methods were used, which 
are associated with several advantages and disadvantages, as discussed by Kline (2000). 
Some of the advantages of computer-based methods include being able to minimise variance 
due to testing conditions. This means that the way the questionnaire is presented to each 
participant is nearly identical, which is less true for face-to-face studies (e.g., variation caused 
by the researcher). However, there may still be some variance in the conditions around the 
participant (as in any study). The other biggest advantage of computer based testing is that 
scale administration is eased greatly, and human error during data entry is eliminated. 




participants to zoom in and use larger keyboards), who may otherwise find paper based 
testing difficult (Kline 2000).  
Despite the above, Kline (2000) noted some disadvantages associated with computer 
based data collection that researchers need to remain cautious of. Firstly, some persons (e.g., 
some older individuals or those with intellectual difficulties) may find it difficult to use 
computers, possibly limiting responses from such populations. This was a difficult issue to 
address, although one could perhaps argue that the same issue applies to paper based testing 
(i.e., some individuals will find them difficult to understand), and so this is perhaps not as 
specific to computer based testing as Kline suggests. Secondly, online testing eliminates 
rapport between the researcher and participant. This presents an ethical dilemma in that 
participants are less able to ask the researcher questions before or during the study. This was 
addressed in Study 6 by providing email addresses so that contact can be established should 
the participant require this. Kline also noted that a lack of face to face interaction also 
prevents the researcher from making any incidental observations (e.g., any aspects of the 
questionnaire that can be improved). Although such observations were not possible in the 
study presented in Chapter 6, these observations were however granted during the face-to-
face testing methods used in other chapters (i.e., Chapters 5 and 7).  
Controlling for socially desirable responding has been discussed, but there are other 
forms of reactivity that should also be accounted for. For example, demand characteristics 
(i.e., participants attempting to respond in a manner consistent with the perceived aims of the 
study) are an issue that applies to many psychological studies. To avoid these effects, the 
intended relationships between cognitions and empathic responding were not disclosed to 
participants, but rather participants were informed about the general nature of the study. 
Demand characteristics were less of an issue in Study 5, due to the use of deception 




The fact that psychology students at the university are obligated to participate in 
research studies may cause frustration in some individuals, thus they may have adopted a 
negative-participant role (see Weber and Cook 1972), also known as the „screw-you effect‟ 
(Masling 1966). In an effort to lessen the effects of such behaviours, the importance of each 
of these studies was emphasised to participants via information sheets (to encourage honest 
responding) and answer sheets were carefully checked for obvious occurrences of improper 
responding (e.g., giving the same answer for every question).  
The observer-expectancy effect (i.e., when the researcher influences participants‟ 
responses) was also taken into account when developing questionnaires and participant 
information sheets through the use of emotionally neutral terms. As all information was given 
to participants via written materials in Studies 1-4, it is unlikely that the researcher would 
have influenced participants beyond the information given in the questionnaire packs. The 
observer-expectancy effect may have been more of an issue in Study 5, which involved one-
to-one participant interaction, but verbal instruction was limited only to when participants 
were unable to understand the written instructions they were given.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the search for measures of the cognitive antecedents of empathy failed 
to identify any existing scales that are suitable to address those concerns raised in Chapter 3. 
The development of a new scale was therefore needed to serve the aims of the current 
research (as described in Chapter 1). The above steps, based on the suggestions provided by 
DeVellis‟ (2012), form a useful framework for the development of any scale, and have 
provided a number of recommendations. In the following chapter this framework is applied to 
the development of the CAERS, including the assessment of the internal reliability of each 




Chapter 5: The Cognitive Antecedents of 
Empathic Responding Scale 
5.1 Introduction 
Psychologists have attempted to measure empathy at least as far back as the 1920s 
(Chlopan et al. 1985) and a number of psychometric tools have been developed during this 
time. However, as discussed in the previous chapters, despite the range of scales available 
there are certain important aspects of empathy that are not typically examined in the 
measurement literature (i.e., the context specific antecedents). A new measure was therefore 
needed to further our understanding of these concepts.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
One of the main issues addressed here is that the vast majority of scales are measures 
of general tendency, i.e., typical levels of empathic responding. It is of course important to 
examine trait levels of empathy/sympathy, but such measures are limited in their abilities to 
inform us of context specific effects. As noted by Davis and Franzoi (1991: 74), “possessing 
a capacity does not ensure that this capacity will be used”. For example, it has often been 
noted that sex offenders, whilst possessing the capacity to feel empathy, typically lack 
empathy for their specific victims (Fernandez et al. 1999, Marshall et al. 1995).  As such, trait 
measures are ill-equipped to examine such specific effects, and a state measure will allow us 
greater insight into the variation of empathy/sympathy according to context.  
Furthermore, there are a wide range of cognitive factors that may determine such 
variations in empathic responding. For example, one tends to feel less empathy when one 
fails to perceive that the target is in need (Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011), or when the 
target is blamed for his or her current situation (Rudolph et al. 2004). Undoubtedly, such 
cognitions will vary according to context and the persons involved. Although the influence of 




literature (see Chapter 3), no measurement scale existed at the start of the current project to 
examine these antecedents in combination. As such, researchers have not been able to 
compare the influences of these variables. Such a scale may prove useful in developing our 
understanding of empathy and sympathy, and may allow for the identification of the most 
influential antecedents of empathic responding. 
Sympathy (“feelings of sorrow or concern for another's welfare”; Eisenberg and 
Miller 1987: 92) has received far less research interest than empathy in terms of its 
measurement and antecedents. However, it is important to consider sympathy when one is 
interested in the effects of empathy on helping behaviours (which is usually the case), as 
several authors have suggested that sympathy mediates the empathy-helping relationship 
(e.g., Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade 1987, de Vignemont and Singer 2006, Eisenberg, Fabes, 
and Spinrad 2006, Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010). Despite this suggestion, limited 
efforts have been made to examine these two constructs in combination. The longstanding 
confusion surrounding the definition of empathy and sympathy has also led to a blurring of 
these concepts (see Chapter 2), which has made it difficult to discern the unique antecedents 
and outcomes of empathy and sympathy. Given these issues, it was felt necessary to include 
both empathy and sympathy in the development of the new scale.  
The aim of this chapter is to present the Cognitive Antecedents of Empathic 
Responding Scale (CAERS). As discussed above, the purpose of developing this scale was to 
address the limitations associated with the assessment of empathy and sympathy
5
. 
Specifically, the aim was to measure the range of context-specific cognitive antecedents of 
both state empathy and state sympathy. In the remainder of this chapter the construction of 
this scale will be discussed, initial validity and reliability data will be outlined, and the 
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 This scale focuses upon ‘negative empathy’ (i.e., empathy for negative emotions such as sadness or distress). 
However, it should be noted that empathy can also apply to positive emotions (e.g., joy), which would not be a 




influence of cognitions on empathic responding in a high school bullying context will be 
examined. 
5.2 Construction of the CAERS 
In Chapter 3, ten cognitive antecedents of empathy were identified that are likely to 
influence degrees of empathic responding: perspective taking (can the observer adopt the 
target‟s perspective?), perceived need (does the target need help?), similarity (is the target 
similar to the observer?), valuing (does the observer respect/value the target?), blame (does 
the observer blame the target?), self-interest (do the observer‟s needs take priority over the 
target‟s needs?), perceived power (is the observer more powerful than the target?), morality 
(has a breach of the observer‟s moral codes occurred?), agency (does the observer feel able to 
help?), and mood and self-esteem. Although subscales of the CAERS are largely based upon 
these factors, a „Cognitive Empathy‟ subscale was substituted for the perspective taking 
component denoted by the earlier model (i.e., Figure 3.1). Although perspective taking no 
doubt forms an important part of cognitive empathy, the conclusions drawn in Chapters 2 and 
3 suggested avoiding restricting measurement of one‟s ability to understand another‟s 
emotions to one‟s ability to take another‟s perspective. Rather, it was preferable to include 
the additional methods of understanding another‟s emotions, such as by reading facial 
expressions (Besel and Yuille 2010), accessing relevant memories (Eisenberg 1986), 
imagination (Stinson and Ickes 1992), projection (Nickerson 1999), and/or when emotions 
are understood via conditioning (Blair 2005). 
As such, the CAERS consists of nine cognition subscales (cognitive empathy, 
perceived need, similarity, valuing, blame, self-interest, agency, morality, and perceived 
power), a self-esteem subscale, an empathy subscale, and a sympathy subscale. Six mood 




states were based upon those identified in Chapter 3 (i.e., anger and anxiety) along with 
others that have not received research interest in a the context of empathy but may 
nevertheless have an influence on empathic responding (happiness, sadness, relaxedness and 
tiredness).  
Ten items were generated by the researcher for each subscale (five each for empathy 
and sympathy
6
), with the focus being on maintaining face validity and ease of 
comprehension. These items were largely based upon synonyms and antonyms of the target 
cognitions. Care was also taken to avoid confusion between concepts. For example, power 
items were kept free of notions of agency, whereby an item such as “I have control over the 
situation” may contain elements of both. Object ambiguity was also kept to a minimum. For 
example, in the morality subscale statements such as “I was offended by what happened” 
were avoided as this could be interpreted in two ways: being offended by perpetrator‟s or the 
victim‟s actions. As the CAERS is primarily concerned with the measurement of context 
dependent factors, items were generated to make the respondent record his or her responses 
in relation to a specific target, such as “he/she needs help” (Item 1), rather than towards a 
general target (e.g., “I can recognise when others need help”). This allowed the scale to 
measure thoughts for specific individuals, in specific situations. This initial item pool can be 
found in Appendix A.1.   
Each item was measured via a five point likert-type scale ranging from „strongly 
disagree‟ to „strongly agree‟. In the case of mood and self-esteem, participants were simply 
asked to rate their current state via five point likert-type scales ranging from „not at all‟ to 
„very‟ for each mood state, and „very low‟ to „very high‟ for self-esteem. In the questionnaire, 
the mood and self-esteem scales were presented first, followed by a randomised list of the 
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 These subscales were originally combined to form an overall “empathic responding” subscale (thus consistent 
with the other 10-item subscales), but it was later deemed sensible to separate empathy and sympathy to 




remaining one hundred items. Roughly half (45%) of these remaining items were reverse 
scored to minimise acquiescence effects.  
Three studies were conducted to assess the reliability and validity of the CAERS, as 
well as to provide initial data for the effects of the cognitive antecedents on empathy and 
sympathy. Study 1 was primarily concerned with face validity (step 4 of Chapter 4); Study 2 
determined internal reliability and social desirability correlates (steps 6, 7, and 8 of Chapter 
4); and in Study 3 internal reliabilities were re-assessed following scale reduction, construct 
and concurrent validity checks were performed, and the relationships between cognitions and 
empathic responding were analysed (steps 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Chapter 4). Ethical approval was 
granted by the university‟s ethics committee for each study (Appendix B.1), and all 
participants were fully informed about the nature of the study and their rights to withdraw. 
All studies reported within this thesis conform with the British Psychological Society „Code 
of Human Research Ethics‟ (BPS 2010).  
5.3 Study 1: Face Validity 
5.3.1 Participants 
Five PhD students were recruited from the psychology department at Coventry 
University on an opportunistic and word of mouth basis. PhD students were recruited due to 
their ease of access (which was important due to time constraints in validating the scale) and 
because of the fact that they were demographically similar to the groups that would be 
completing the initial validation studies. All participants were female, with an age range of 





The purpose of this study was to assess the face validity and comprehension of items. 
Participants were first informed about the nature of the study (Appendix C.1) and provided 
consent (Appendix D). They were then provided with a randomised list of the one hundred 
scale items and a brief description of each subscale. Participants were asked to assign each 
item to a subscale, and highlight anything they did not understand. This allowed for the 
identification of any confusion between subscales and issues with comprehension. After 
submitting their responses, participants were thanked and debriefed (Appendix E.1).  
5.3.3 Results and Discussion 
No issues regarding comprehension arose. Overall, participants exhibited a mean 
correct assignment rate of 88.8%, indicating good face validity. Two items were assigned in 
error by two participants to the empathy subscale („Valuing 1‟: “I care about her”; „Cognitive 
Empathy 3‟: “I can imagine what she was thinking”). These items were removed from the 
scale. Three items were assigned in error by two participants to the cognitive empathy 
subscale. One item was removed („Blame 5‟: “She had no control over these events” [reverse 
item]). The other two were retained („Perceived Need 4‟: “She is upset”; „Perceived Need 5‟: 
“She is happy” [reverse item]) because of the strong theoretical links between perceived need 
and cognitive empathy (i.e., one must be able to understand the other‟s emotions via 
cognitive empathy in order to perceive emotional needs). 
As noted earlier, efforts were taken to avoid confusion between agency (the degree to 
which the observer feels they are able to help) and perceived power (the power imbalance 
between observer and target). However, one item designed to measure agency („Agency 4‟: 




two participants. In order to reduce overlap between these subscales this item was deleted 
from subsequent iterations of the CAERS.  
5.4 Study 2: Reliability and Social Desirability 
5.4.1 Participants  
Sixty-one participants were recruited during the lectures of two different masters level 
psychology courses. As in Study 1, the scale was validated using student samples mainly due 
to their ease of access. Additionally, although students may differ from other populations in 
terms of their absolute levels of empathy (e.g., see Lennon and Eisenberg 1987), there is no 
reason at the current time to assume that students would differ from other populations in 
terms of the relationships between cognition and emotion. Accordingly, there is no reason at 
the current time to assume that the use of student samples render the validation of the 
measure flawed
7
. This sample comprised of 6 males (9.8%) and 55 females (90.2%), with 
75.4% being of white British ethnic origin. A further 16.4% were of “other-white” origins, 
and the remaining 8% were of Africa, Asian, and Caribbean ethnic origins.  Ages ranged 
between 22 and 57 years (M= 31, SD = 6.74).  
5.4.2 Materials 
The Marlow-Crowne social desirability scale (short form). Due to time constraints 
the „M-C Form C‟ developed by Reynolds (1982) was employed as a measure of social 
desirability. This measure is a short form version of the 33 item Marlowe-Crowne social 
desirability scale (Crowne and Marlowe 1960), consisting of 13 true / false items. Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of socially desirable responding. This scale has good internal 
reliability (rkr20 = .76; Reynolds 1982) and strong correlations have been reported between 
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the M-C Form C and the original Marlowe-Crowne scale by both Reynolds (r = .93) and 
Fischer and Fick (1993) (r = .97). 
Video clip. In order to elicit empathy in the participants an audio-visual stimulus (one 
minute in length) was utilised. It was decided that a video more appropriately reflects a real 
life face-to-face situation than would alternative methods such as written vignettes. This 
video was sourced online from a popular video sharing site (available at 
http://www.tubechop.com/watch/1122369) and depicted a female high-school student 
describing her experiences of bullying. The subject describes how she entered into a 
relationship with the male partner of another girl, and became subject to bullying from her 
peers as a result of this relationship. This stimulus was selected carefully to address the 
majority of CAERS subscales. For example, blame is introduced through the notions of 
infidelity between the girl (the target) and the bully‟s partner. This video was also appropriate 
as each of the other variables being measured were suitably ambiguous in relation to the 
girl‟s situation (i.e., ceiling or floor effects were not anticipated); thus it was expected to 
glean suitably distributed results for statistical analyses. 
5.4.3 Procedure 
After being informed about the nature of the study (Appendix C.2) and providing 
consent (Appendix D), participants were asked to complete the first page of the CAERS, 
which consisted of demographic information questions and the mood and self-esteem scales, 
prior to viewing the video stimulus. Mood information was collected prior to the video as the 
effects of mood as an antecedent were of interest rather than the mood elicited by the 
stimulus, which would be closely related to empathy itself. Prior to being shown the video, 
participants were instructed to imagine that they are attending school with the girl depicted in 
the video and that the girl had approached them for help. They were also instructed to 




purpose of this was to introduce an element of self-interest; one subscale that would 
otherwise be difficult to address with this procedure. The video was then presented to the 
whole group. Following the video, participants completed the rest of the questionnaire 
followed by the social desirability scale, and were finally debriefed (Appendix E.1). 
5.4.4 Results and discussion 
One of the main purposes of Study 2 was to improve the internal reliability of subscales, to 
minimise social desirability correlates, and to reduce the number of items in order to ease 
scale administration. Initial checks indicated that all subscales exhibited good internal 
reliability and non-statistically significant correlations with the social desirability measure 
(Table 5.1). Two individual items, Self-interest 5‟ (“It is important that I meet my own needs 
here”; r = -.27, p = .04) and „Empathy 3‟ (“She didn‟t make me feel anything”; r = .27, p = 
.04), exhibited correlations with social desirability and were removed from future iterations 
of the scale. As there were no further issues with reliability or social desirability, the decision 
was made to remove two additional items from each subscale, in order to reduce the overall 
length of the scale. Further reductions (i.e., more than two items) would have reduced the 
internal reliability of the majority of subscales. Items were chosen on the basis of making the 
greatest improvements to internal reliability. As can be seen in Table 5.1, improvements were 
achieved for each subscale following item reduction, with the exception of those two scales 
that were reduced due to social desirability effects (i.e., self-interest and empathy), and 
valuing. Nevertheless, Cronbach‟s alpha scores still remained high for these scales post 
reduction. Correlations with the social desirability measure remained non-significant for each 
subscale following item reduction, with the correlation coefficient being further reduced in 







Table 5.1  
Reliability and Validity Checks 
 Cronbach‟s α  Correlation with SDS (r)
 a
 








Self-Interest .79 .77  -.18 -.14 
Agency .81 .82   .18 .22 
Morality .86 .87  -.10 .15 
Perceived Power .72 .76   .03 .08 
Cognitive Empathy .75 .77  -.08 -.00 
Perceived Need .74 .76  -.04 .02 
Similarity .87 .88  -.13 .09 
Valuing .87 .85  .15 .09 
Blame .88 .89  .14 .14 
Empathy .77 .72  .15 .10 
Sympathy .80 .81  .11 .15 
Note: “SDS” = social desirability scale.  
a
All correlation coefficients were non-significant (p > .05). 
 
5.5 Study 3: Relationships Between Cognitions and Empathic 
Responding 
5.5.1 Hypotheses 
One of the main purposes of Study 3 was to investigate the relationship between the CAERS 
cognitions and empathic responding. Based on the research evidence and arguments 
presented in Chapter 3, several relationships were expected to arise in the current study. It 
was hypothesised that empathy would positively correlate with morality, agency, cognitive 
empathy, valuing, perceived need, and similarity. Additionally it was expected that empathy 
would negatively correlate with self-interest, perceived power, and blame. Although largely 
exploratory at this stage, it was expected that there would be positive correlations between 
empathy and happiness, relaxedness and self-esteem, with negative correlations between 




on sympathy are lacking in the literature. However, due to the high expected correlation 
between empathy and sympathy, similar relationships to the above were expected. 
5.5.2 Participants 
A total of 177 criminology and psychology undergraduate students took part in the 
study during normal university lectures. Of these, 146 (82.4%) were female, and 31 (17.6%) 
were male. 50.8% identified as being of white British ethnicity. The next largest ethnic group 
was “other-white” (12.5%), followed by Indian (9%) and “black-African” (7.9%). The 
remainder consisted of a variety of Asian and mixed ethnic backgrounds. Due to small cell 
sizes the effects of gender and ethnicity were not considered further. Participants were aged 
between 18 and 44 years (M = 21, SD = 3.70). 
5.5.3 Method and Materials 
The same method and materials (using the revised version of CAERS) as Study 2 
were used in Study 3. The only exception being that the participants were asked to complete 
an additional validity check measure: 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). The IRI (Davis 1980) was employed as a 
concurrent validity check. The IRI is a popular measure of trait empathy, including four 
subscales of fantasy (the ability to identify with fictional characters), perspective taking (the 
ability to adopt the point of view of another), personal distress (feelings of anxiety when in 
the presence of a distressed other) and empathic concern (the tendency to feel concern for 
another). Subscales of the IRI exhibit moderate-to-good internal reliability (α = .70 - .78) 
(Davis 1980). Although the IRI is a measure of trait differences, correlations were expected 





5.5.4 Results  
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted (using AMOS software for SPSS) based on a 
maximum likelihood procedure to confirm that the items accurately reflected the intended 
latent structure. Standardised loading estimates can be found in Table 5.2. The initial 80-item 
model achieved poor model fit according to the non-normed fit index (NNFI = .75) and the 
comparative fit index (CFI = .76). As such, model trimming was employed to improve model 
fit. Four items were removed from each subscale and the analyses were repeated (Table 5.2). 
The revised 44-item model (resulting in the revised scale found in Appendix A.2) achieved 
better model fit. Bentler and Bonett (1980) recommended a minimum value of .90 for the 
NNFI and CFI, and Ullman (2001) recommended a maximum value of 2.00 for the chi-
square/degrees of freedom ratio. The revised model achieved these recommendations (TLI = 
.91; CFI = .92; χ
2
/df = 1.57). An RMSEA value of .05 also indicated good model fit 
according to MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996). All subscales continued to hold 
moderate-to-good internal reliabilities post reduction (Table 5.2). 
Subscale means for cognitive empathy, sympathy, and similarity subscale scores were 
significantly skewed; violating the assumptions for the Pearson‟s correlations conducted 
below. Log10 transforms corrected this issue for cognitive empathy and sympathy, and a 
square-root transform corrected the issue for similarity. Five subscales now exhibited 
significant correlations with social desirability (Table 5.3). These results suggest that those 
who wished to portray themselves in a more socially desirable manner indicated that they 
valued the target more, were less concerned with self-interest, understood the target‟s 
emotions more, and experienced greater empathy and sympathy for the target. Given these 
significant results, it was necessary to control for socially desirable responding in the 






Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Item Loadings and Internal Reliabilities 
  Initial Scale  Refined Scale 
Construct Item β Cronbach‟s α  β Cronbach‟s α 
Empathy E1 .46 .79  .46 .79 
 E2 .76   .76  
 E4 .83   .83  
 E5 .78   .79  
       
Sympathy S2 .87 .85  .79 .85 
 S3 .79   .69  
 S4 .69   .73  
 S5 .77   .80  
       
Valuing VA2 .69 .77  .73 .82 
 VA4 .67   .68  
 VA5 .72   .79  
 VA7 .68   .74  
 VA3 .31     
 VA8 .19     
 VA9 .58     
 VA10 .56     
       
Perceived Need PN2 .64 .71  .62 .69 
 PN3 .70   .68  
 PN4 .53   .51  
 PN10 .58   .60  
 PN1 .45     
 PN5 .50     
 PN7 .21     
 PN8 .43     
       
Blame BL4 .73 .88  .72 .87 
 BL6 .88   .91  
 BL8 .80   .79  
 BL9 .75   .75  
 BL1 .59     
 BL2 .64     
 BL3 .64     
 BL7 .51     
       
Self-Interest SI2 .75 .81  .80 .82 
 SI3 .82   .74  
 SI7 .62   .56  
 SI8 .71   .66  
 SI1 .50     




 SI9 .53     
 SI10 .32     
       
Perceived Power PP5 .72 .82  .70 .85 
 PP7 .71   .71  
 PP8 .77   .76  
 PP10 .86   .91  
 PP1 .36     
 PP3 .46     
 PP4 .61     
 PP6 .39     
       
Morality MO3 .60 .80  .59 .76 
 MO7 .68   .66  
 MO9 .66   .69  
 MO10 .77   .78  
 MO2 .47     
 MO4 .54     
 MO6 .54     
 MO8 .51     
       
Agency AG5 .82 .88  .85 .87 
 AG7 .80   .82  
 AG9 .78   .72  
 AG10 .77   .78  
 AG2 .55     
 AG3 .64     
 AG6 .55     
 AG8 .66     
       
Cognitive Empathy CE1 .61 .81  .64 .79 
 CE2 .64   .66  
 CE4 .61   .61  
 CE5 .75   .81  
 CE7 .64     
 CE8 .40     
 CE9 .66     
 CE10 .47     
       
Similarity SM5 .86 .90  .87 .92 
 SM6 .89   .92  
 SM7 .91   .89  
 SM10 .79   .76  
 SM1 .74     
 SM3 .53     
 SM4 .62     




high social desirability score, to avoid reductions in power (as removing participants would 
reduce the sample size). 
 
 
Table 5.3  
Reliability and validity checks 
   Correlation with IRI Subscales
c 
(r) 
Subscale Mean (SD) Correlation 
with SDS (r) 
F EC PT PD 
Self-Interest 2.42 (0.76)    -.21** -.18* -.38***   -.28*** -.12 
Agency 3.10 (0.86)  .04     .13 .23**     .18*   -.15* 
Morality 4.10 (0.56)  .11     .19*   .34***    .25***  .08 
Perceived Power 4.01 (0.63) -.07    -.12  -.09    -.09    -.26** 
Cog. Empathy
a 
0.31 (0.27)    .16*   .24**   .29***     .20**  .07 
Perceived Need 4.46 (0.43)  .08     .15   .36*** .17*  .08 
Similarity
b 
1.33 (0.27) -.06     .15   .11     .07  .09 
Valuing 3.13 (0.66)      .21**     .14   .40***    .36***  .13 
Blame 2.25 (0.80) -.07    -.13  -.21**    -.20** -.09 
Empathy 3.39 (0.78)    .17*     .29***   .54***     .40***  .15 
Sympathy
a 
0.36 (0.14)    .16*    .20**   .54***     .36***  .09 
Notes: “SDS” = social desirability scale; “F”=fantasy; “EC” = empathic concern”;  
  “PT”=perspective taking; “PD” = personal distress. 
a 
Log10 transformed. Untransformed mean for cognitive empathy was 3.82 (SD = 0.62), and  
  for sympathy was 3.97 (SD = 0.63).  
b 
Square-root transformed. Untransformed mean was 1.85 (SD = 0.76). 
c
 Controlling for social desirability scores.  
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 
Correlations with IRI subscales (Table 5.3) supported the concurrent validity of the 
CAERS. All but two of the CAERS subscales significantly correlated with the empathic 




be partly influenced by the trait capacities for empathy measured by the IRI. Of particular 
importance is the correlation between the empathy and sympathy measures and the empathic 
concern measure of the IRI. A significant correlation was also found between the measure of 
cognitive empathy (which includes an element of perspective taking) and the perspective 
taking subscale of the IRI. 
A good range of mean empathy (range = 1.25-5.00, M = 3.39, SD = 0.78) and 
sympathy (range = 1.50-5.00, M = 3.97, SD = 0.63) scores were evoked, indicating that the 
video was successful in eliciting empathy and sympathy. Correlation coefficients offered 
support for the hypotheses denoted in Section 5.5.1, with all subscales significantly 
correlating with both empathy and sympathy, with the exception of the non-significant 
correlation between sympathy and perceived power (Table 5.4). All of these correlations 
were in the hypothesised (i.e., see Section 5.5.1) direction, based upon the discussions 
presented in Chapter 3. Specifically, higher agency, cognitive empathy, perceived need, 
similarity, valuing, and greater breach of morals were associated with higher levels of both 
empathy and sympathy. Conversely, lower perceived power (non-significant for sympathy), 
self-interest, and blame were associated with higher levels of both empathy and sympathy.  
One of the advantages of measuring all cognitions in combination is that one can 
examine which of them have the strongest predictive power for empathy and sympathy 
(representing the novel value of the current research). As such, two multiple regressions were 
calculated. All nine cognitions were entered on the first block for both regressions and the 
residuals were normally distributed (with the aforementioned data transformations). 
Durbin-Watson statistics were acceptable
8
 when both empathy and sympathy were 
entered as the dependent variable (d = 1.8 for both regressions). VIF values for both tests 
                                                             




ranged between 1.00-1.86, indicating acceptable multicolinearity
9
. After controlling for social 
desirable responding, predictor variables explained a significant amount of the variance in 
both empathy (F(9, 166) = 25.55, p < .001, R
2
 = .59, R
2
Adjusted = .57) and sympathy (F(9, 166) 
= 23.34, p < .001, R
2
 = .57, R
2
Adjusted = .54). As can be seen in Table 5.4, there were 
differences in the predictors of empathy and sympathy. Perceived need, valuing, and 
cognitive empathy were significant predictors of both empathy and sympathy. Similarity was 
a predictor of empathy only, and morality and self-interest were predictors of sympathy only. 
There were many significant inter-correlations between the cognition subscales (Table 
5.5), with only eight not being statistically significant: perceived power with perceived need, 
blame, agency, morality, and cognitive empathy; and similarity with perceived need, self-
interest, and morality. 
The correlations between the various mood states and empathy/sympathy were also 
examined (Table 5.4). Seven participants were removed from this analysis due to missing 
data. All six mood states (happy, sad, anxious, relaxed, angry, and tired) and self-esteem were 
not statistically significantly correlated (p > .05) with empathy or sympathy. Thus, the 
hypotheses that these mood states would correlate with empathy were not supported by the 
current findings. Several statistically significant correlations between these mood states and 
the other subscales were however observed (Table 5.5). The results suggest that greater 
sadness and anxiety were associated with a greater perception of similarity. Greater anger 
was associated with greater focus on self-interest. Finally, higher self-esteem was associated 
with greater perceptions of power and breaches of morality, while being associated with 





                                                             




Table 5.4  
Relationships with Empathy and Sympathy: Correlations and Linear Regressions 
 Empathy  Sympathy
a 
Cognitions r β  (t)  r β  (t) 
Perceived Need   .43***    .24 (3.75***)   .48***   .16 (2.42*) 
Blame -.35***    .06 (0.98)  -.37*** .08 (1.18) 
Self-Interest -.33***   -.01 (0.16)  -.44***    -.16 (-2.63**) 
Perceived Power  -.20**   -.05 (0.79)       -.10 .03 (0.55) 
Valuing .66***    .48 (7.73***)   .58***      .35 (5.44***) 
Morality .37***    .08 (1.14)   .48***     .20 (2.94**) 
Agency .36***    .06 (1.10)   .35*** .04 (0.68) 
Cog. Empathy
a 
.43***    .12 (2.04*)   .51***     .21 (3.38**) 
Similarity
b 
.36***  .20 (3.48**)        .23**       .11 (1.80) 
Mood States
c 
     
Happy .06 -   .03 - 
Sad .03 -  -.01 - 
Anxious     -.11 -  -.08 - 
Relaxed     -.02 -  -.02 - 
Angry     -.02 -  -.02 - 
Tired     -.02 -  -.02 - 
Self-Esteem .07 -   .07 - 






n = 170 







Table 5.5  
Subscale correlation matrix (controlling for social desirability scores) 
 PN Blame SI PP Valuing Morality Agency CE Similar. 
PN - -.27*** -.31*** .13 .27*** .52***   .14*  .36***   -.06 
Blame - -  .29*** .08 -.41*** -.52*** -.36*** -.40***   -.19** 
SI - - -      .29*** -.35***   -.17* -.34*** -.28***   -.10 
PP - - - - -.27**    .10  -.11  -.11   -.34*** 
Valuing - - - - -  .33***   .35***   .29***  .26** 
Morality - - - - - -   .18*   .37***   -.01 
Agency - - - - - - -   .29***    .29*** 
CE - - - - - - - -    .25** 
Similarity - - - - - - - - - 
Mood States
a
         
Happy
  .10 .01 -.06  .02   .04   .04 -.03 -.07     -.04 
Sad
 -.10 -.04 -.04 -.06   .07   .01  .11  .01   .16* 
Anxious -.14  .12  .11 -.10 -.03 -.07  .00 -.02   .16* 
Relaxed  .07 -.02 -.08  .11   .02   .04  .12 -.03     -.12 
Angry -.14  .09     .24**  .15 -.06 -.03 -.09 -.03     -.04 
Tired -.05  .11 -.05 -.02 -.01 -.09 -.09  .07     -.08 
Self-
Esteem 
 .14  .00   .05     .27*** -.10    .15*  .01  .09     -.20** 
Notes: “PN” = Perceived Need”; “SI” = self-interest; “PP” = perceived power; “CE” = 
Cognitive Empathy. 
a
n = 170 







5.6 General Discussion 
A new measurement scale (the CAERS) was developed to examine the influence of a 
number of situation specific variables on empathic responding. This scale is unique in the fact 
that it measures a range of antecedents in combination, and that the factors it measures will 
vary according to the target and the situation. This has advantages over other scales that only 
measure one‟s trait capacity for empathy/sympathy. In Study 1 it was demonstrated that the 
CAERS has good face validity. As a result of Study 2 the scale was condensed to improve the 
internal reliability of the subscales. Study 3 demonstrated concurrent validity with the IRI, as 
empathy and sympathy (CAERS) correlated significantly with the empathic concern subscale 
of the IRI, and the CAERS cognitive empathy subscale correlated significantly with the 
perspective taking subscale of the IRI. The results of Study 3 also offered partial support for 
the hypotheses in Section 5.5.1. Specifically, the expected relationships between the nine 
cognitions and empathic responding were supported, but the relationships between mood and 
empathic responding were not.   
In addition to developing the CAERS, a core purpose of this study was to examine the 
role various cognitions play in the empathic process. The findings of Study 3 suggest that the 
amount of empathy one feels towards a target is significantly predicted by the amount one 
values the target, perceives need in the target, understands the target‟s emotions, and believes 
that the target is similar oneself. Although the other variables (i.e., blame, self-interest, 
perceived power, morality, and agency) did not significantly contribute to the regression 
model, correlations were observed that are consistent with past research. Specifically, the 
results demonstrated a positive relationship between empathy and valuing (Batson et al. 
2007), cognitive empathy (Batson et al. 1995, Batson et al. 2007), perceived need (Hein and 
Singer 2008, Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011), morality (Schulz et al. 2013), similarity 




correlations were found between empathy and self-interest (Cohen and Hoffner 2013, van 
Ornum et al. 1981), perceived power (Galinsky et al. 2006), and blame (Rudolph et al. 2004).  
The fact that these variables individually correlated with empathy, but were not 
significant when entered into the regression alongside the other variables, emphasises the 
need to examine these in combination. The CAERS is the first scale that allows one to do 
this. The current results suggest that not all antecedents are equally influential, and further 
research is needed to determine where any mediation effects may be present. For example, 
blame is often denoted to inhibit empathic responding (see Rudolph et al. 2004), but it did not 
significantly contribute to the regression model here, despite the statistically significant 
correlation. It may be that the influence of blame is mediated through another variable such 
as valuing or similarity, as we may dehumanise, or distance ourselves from, those who are 
blamed for their own misfortune (Lazarus 1994). Mediation analyses such as these are 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
A similar picture was found with regards to sympathy. Although the results suggested 
that the majority of antecedents significantly correlated with sympathy (with the exception of 
mood and perceived power), only five of these variables significantly predicted sympathy in 
the regression analysis. Namely, self-interest appears to inhibit sympathy felt for the target, 
with the opposite being true for perceived need, valuing, morality, and cognitive empathy.  It 
is also interesting to note that perceived power correlated with empathy, but not sympathy. It 
may be that any emotional independence caused by feelings of power (Côté et al. 2011) 
extends only to the sharing of emotions (i.e., empathy) and has no influence on feelings of 
concern (i.e., sympathy), which perhaps requires further research. 
This study has demonstrated that differences between the antecedents of empathy and 
sympathy exist, further representing the novel value of this research. Not only does this 




it has implications for our understanding of these concepts. The results reported here suggest 
that empathy (i.e., the sharing of emotions) is elicited to a greater degree when one perceives 
the target to be in greater need, values the target more, understands the target‟s emotions and 
feels more similar to the target. However, sympathy (i.e., feelings of concern) is elicited to a 
greater degree when one values the target more, perceives the other to be in greater need, 
understands the target‟s emotions more, perceives a greater breach of moral codes, and when 
self-interest is perceived to be less important than the needs of the target. These findings not 
only suggest differences in the way that empathy and sympathy manifest, but may also have 
implications should these differences carry over to motivations for helping behaviours. These 
differences are rarely discussed in the literature, and suggest a greater need for research into 
the differences between these related concepts. 
The findings relating to mood and self-esteem did not support initial predictions. 
Research into the influence of several of these mood states on empathic outcomes is lacking, 
and so perhaps the results reported here may cause us to rule out such influences. However, 
the results regarding anxiety are inconsistent with the results reported by Negd, Mallan, and 
Lipp (2011), which suggested that low anxiety participants felt significantly more empathy 
for the target than high anxiety participants. The results of Negd, Mallan, and Lipp‟s study 
were based upon a manipulation whereby genuine anxiety was elicited via the threat of an 
electric shock. Therefore, and this is perhaps true for all of the above mood variables, it may 
be that the CAERS was unsatisfactory in capturing the true mood of the participants. Perhaps 
something more sophisticated than a self-report scale is needed to properly assess the 
influence of pre-existing mood on empathy. Alternative methods may be required to untangle 
the nature of these relationships, although such investigations fall outside the scope of the 





There are certain limitations to the current research that should be considered. Firstly, 
it must be noted that while this scale has been deemed to measure the cognitive antecedents 
of empathy and sympathy, the results presented here do not attest to the causal direction of 
these effects. Nevertheless, the results of several other studies do appear consistent with the 
understanding of these cognitions as being antecedents. Manipulation studies (where 
cognitions have been manipulated by the researcher) are able to attest to the causal effects on 
empathy/sympathy, and these have been demonstrated for similarity (Komeda et al. 2013), 
perspective taking (cognitive empathy; Batson and Ahmad 2001), perceived need (Lishner, 
Batson, and Huss 2011), valuing (Batson et al. 2007), blame (reviewed by Rudolph et al. 
2004), perceived power (Mast, Jones, and Hall 2009) and morality (Schulz et al. 2013). One 
can say with some confidence, therefore, that cognitions do precede emotional outcomes, and 
therefore supports the notion that these cognitions may represent important targets for the 
enhancement of empathic responding. Nevertheless, it is of course also possible that 
emotional outcomes can alter cognitions as part of a feedback loop. Further testing is required 
to assess this notion.  
Secondly, although no issues with comprehension arose from Study 1, and no further 
issues were brought to the researcher‟s attention during the course of Studies 2 and 3, it must 
be acknowledged that all participants here were university educated, and were in the majority 
young, female, and of a white British ethnic background. Further validation would be 
required before applying the CAERS to samples that do not match such characteristics.  
Thirdly, four subscales exhibited significant correlations with the social desirability 
measure. Specifically, these results suggest that those who aimed to respond in a socially 
desirable manner indicated that they valued the target more, felt more empathy and sympathy 




see such relationships, they are in the expected direction should participants be trying to 
portray themselves as more caring and selfless individuals. Encouragingly, the correlation 
coefficients were rather small. Nevertheless, the effects of social desirability should be 
considered when using this scale, and will be controlled for in the following studies. Further 
testing is required to assess the effects of social desirability on this scale in more sensitive 
contexts, where such effects may be more implicative (Curwen 2003, Fazio and Olsen 2003, 
Hanson and Scott 1995). 
5.7 Conclusions 
The CAERS was developed to examine the relationships between a range of 
cognitions and empathic responding (meeting the second aim of this thesis). This scale 
demonstrates good internal reliability, and its validity is confirmed in the consistency 
between the current findings and past research. Using this scale, it has been demonstrated that 
nine situation specific variables have an impact on empathy/sympathy (relevant to the third 
aim of this thesis), and that differences exist between the antecedents of empathy and 
sympathy (despite the common merging of these terms; see Chapter 2). As each of the 
cognitions will vary according to the target and situation, this contributes to our 
understanding of empathy and sympathy as state variables. Importantly, as these cognitions 
have previously been dealt with in isolation, these results suggest that some cognitive 
antecedents have greater influences on empathic responding than others (relevant to the 
fourth aim of this thesis).  
It is important to continue with this combined approach to gain a greater 
understanding of the empathic process, by identifying which of these variables have direct 
effects on empathy/sympathy, and where any mediation effects lie. As researchers are 




behaviour, it is important to examine how the influence of these cognitions carries over to the 
latter stages of the empathic process (i.e., leading to behavioural motivations). In the next 
chapter, these themes will be explored, to gain a fuller understanding of how these cognitions 
contribute to the entire empathic process, and to demonstrate how the CAERS can be applied 
to foster greater understanding within a specific area of psychological interest (i.e., the 




Chapter 6: Cognitions, Empathy, and 
Charitable Donations 
6.1 Introduction 
Charitable organisations rely on donations from members of the general public, with 
43-65% of their incomes being generated from individuals (National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations [NCVO] 2014a). Nevertheless, in a typical month, only 55% of people donate 
to charities, a proportion that has remained fairly stable since 2006 (NCVO 2014b). The 
average donation amount in a typical month has also remained stable between 2004 and 2014 
at £10 (GBP) (NCVO 2014b), despite the monetary worth of this amount decreasing due to 
rising inflation. Charitable need is not restricted to monetary donations. For example, data 
from the U.S. suggests that despite 40% of individuals needing blood donations in their 
lifetime, only 5% actually donate their blood (Bloodcenters.org 2007 cited in Fisher, 
Vandenbosch, and Antia 2008). There is a clear benefit for charitable organisations in 
increasing the number of people who donate, as well as the representative value of each 
donation. To this aim, charitable organisations spend large amounts of money on marketing 
materials each year (roughly $7.6 billion per year in the U.S., according to Watson 2006). 
The purpose of this chapter is to present novel research using the CAERS to examine how the 
efficacy of such materials may be improved, and to demonstrate how an understanding of the 
cognitive antecedents of empathic responding may be used to foster such improvements. 
A common method of promoting charitable giving (defined as  “the donation of 
money to an organization that benefits one beyond one‟s own family”, Bekkers and Wiepking 
2011a: 3) has been via the elicitation of empathy, often achieved through the use of 
promotional campaigns such as television advertisements. Several empirical studies have 




Ridgway, and Basil 2008, Davis 1983a, Griffin et al. 1993; Mattila and Hanks 2012, Shelton 
and Rogers 1981, Verhaert and van den Poel 2011), and this relationship is consistent with 
the idea that feelings of empathy promote altruistic helping behaviours (Batson 1991). 
A related, although less researched factor to empathy, is that of sympathy (“feelings 
of sorrow or concern for another's welfare”; Eisenberg and Miller 1987: 92), which has also 
been associated with helping behaviours (e.g., Batson 1991). However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, conceptual understandings of empathy and sympathy have frequently become 
blurred in the research literature, and it is often unclear which of these concepts are being 
investigated, and where any unique influences lie. This lack of clarity also applies to the 
charitable donation literature. In addition, it is not clear where any unique influences of 
sympathy and empathy lie, which is important given that the results of Study 3 (see Chapter 
5) demonstrated functional differences between these variables. As such, it is necessary to 
investigate whether evoked shared emotions (empathy) or feelings of concern (sympathy) are 
most important in the context of charitable donations.  
It is relatively well accepted that empathy, and perhaps sympathy, promotes helping 
behaviours; including the donation of money or other goods to charity. However, it is less 
clear which specific aspects of charity fundraising campaigns are best able to evoke 
empathy/sympathy in their target audiences, and therefore improving the efficacy of these 
campaigns is made difficult. Although researchers (e.g., Griffin et al. 1993, Mattila and 
Hanks 2012) have suggested that charity advertisers should aim to elicit a degree of empathic 
responding in their audiences, little specific guidance is given for how best to achieve this. 
The results of Study 3 suggest that a number of cognitions about oneself and others may be 
suitable for this purpose, as results showed several significant relationships between these 
cognitions and empathic responding. Several of these cognitions have been examined under 




likely to donate when they blame the potential recipient for his/her circumstances (Griffin et 
al. 1993, Kogut 2011). Higher agency (when the potential donator feels that he/she has the 
resources available to help) also appears to encourage donations (Basil, Ridgway, and Basil 
2008, Cheung and Chan 2000), and when perceptions of need are higher, the likelihood of 
donation also increases (see Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). 
Although some knowledge is available regarding these cognitions in relation to 
charitable donations, there are no published papers that examine all in combination. 
Accordingly, we lack an understanding as to which variables are the most important targets 
for charitable promotions. Using a combined approach (as utilised in Study 3; Chapter 5) will 
allow one to determine which variables have the greatest effect on a likelihood to donate 
(thus being the most efficacious target for fundraisers), and will allow one to model the 
process leading up to charitable donation decisions. These two issues form the main aims of 
the current research. Based on the above discussion (and the discussions presented in chapters 
3 and 5), it is expected that some (e.g., blame, agency, and perceived need; according to the 
above citations), but not all, cognitions will influence the likelihood to donate, mediated at 
least partially by feelings of empathy and/or sympathy.  
6.2 Study 4: A Study of Charitable Donation Behaviours 
6.2.1 Design 
This study was designed to investigate the antecedents of charitable donation 
behaviours. To meet the above aims, participants were asked to view and respond to a real-
world charity advertisement. A correlational design was employed using the nine CAERS 
cognitions, the empathy and sympathy subscales of the CAERS, and a measure of donation 
likelihood. Social desirability and trait empathy were also measured to control for these 




for the identification of the variables that influence charitable donation decisions to the 
greatest degree, therefore allowing for the development of a new model charitable donation 
decisions.  
Data was collected online, as this provided an easier method of targeting a larger 
sample from a wide range of demographic backgrounds (i.e., members of the general public) 
that would have been otherwise more difficult to achieve via paper-based methods. Ethical 
approval for this study was granted by the university ethics committee (Appendix B.2), and 
the study conformed with the British Psychological Society‟s „Ethics Guidelines for Internet-
Mediated Research‟ (BPS 2013). 
6.2.2 Participants 
Eighty-three members of the general public were recruited via social networking websites 
and internet message boards. Members of the general public were targeted as this more 
accurately reflects the target audience for charities than would a sample restricted to students 
(i.e., charities typically target a range of demographic backgrounds). Twenty-five participants 
were male (30%) and 58 were female (70%), with an age range of 18-72 (M = 36.1, SD = 
13.5). Most (83%) participants described themselves as white-British, 6% as „other-white‟, 
and 11% as white-Irish, or Indian, or mixed ethnic backgrounds. A wide range of education 
backgrounds were captured, including „no formal education‟ (2.4%), GCSE level (13.3%), A-
level (9.6%), undergraduate degree level (34.9 %) and postgraduate degree level (39.8%). 
6.2.3 Materials 
Participants were presented with the same questionnaires as in the studies described in 
Chapter 5. The revised version of the CAERS was used as a measure of cognition and state 
empathic responding. The IRI (Davis 1980; described in Chapter 5) was included to 




donation behaviours. The „M-C Form C‟ (Reynolds 1982; described in Chapter 5) was 
employed as a short form measure of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne 
and Marlowe 1960). The measure of social desirability was needed to control for positive 
presentation biases, as participants may have been motivated to present themselves as caring, 
helpful individuals. A video clip was also used as an example charity promotional material.  
Video Clip. A television advertisement for a UK based charity was sourced from a 
popular video sharing website (available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=CK7svcKCAcQ). 
This video (60-seconds in length) depicts a war veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, clearly struggling to maintain a stable home life. At the end of the video, viewers 
are asked by the narrator to donate money in order to help war veterans suffering from post-
war stress. As with the video described in Chapter 5, this video was chosen because each of 
the variables being measured were seen to be suitably ambiguous in relation to the man‟s 
situation; thus it was expected to glean suitably distributed results for statistical analyses, and 
lessen the likelihood of floor and ceiling effects. 
Online Survey. The above materials were presented to participants via an online 
survey hosted on the „Bristol Online Survey‟ website. Participants were able to respond via 
personal computers or tablets and submitted their responses by clicking checkboxes.  
6.2.4 Procedure 
The study was advertised on social networking sites and other internet message boards (i.e., 
forums for people interested in participating in research studies), with the aim of capturing a 
range of demographic backgrounds. Upon deciding that they wished to participate, 
participants followed a link to the online survey, and were displayed an information sheet 
(Appendix C.3) stating that the purpose of the study was to investigate how people‟s thoughts 




donate to charity. Participants were then required to give consent by checking a number of 
tick-boxes (following the format of Appendix D).  
Demographic information was collected first, including a number of control variables 
(level of education, marital status, number of children, religiosity, level of income, donation 
frequency, and donation recency) identified as being possible confounds by Bekkers and 
Wiepking (2011b, 2012). However, preliminary analyses indicated that none of these factors 
seemed to significantly influence the donation likelihood variable (p > .05), and so were not 
considered further. Participants were asked next to complete the IRI to determine trait levels 
of empathic responding, followed by the social desirability measure to determine 
susceptibility to socially desirable responding. 
Participants were then asked to watch the video, and immediately after were asked 
how likely they would choose to donate on a six point likert-type scale ranging from „very 
unlikely‟ to „very likely‟ (following a similar approach to Basil, Ridgway, and Basil 2008, 
Griffin et al. 1993 Mattila and Hanks 2012). A neutral option was deliberately omitted from 
this scale to force participants into a response as this is more reflective of real life where 
individuals will decide whether or not they will donate. A dichotomous (i.e., yes/no) response 
format was avoided as it was decided that a likert-type scale would more precisely assess 
how likely participants believed they would donate to the charity (gaining more insight into 
the strength of their decision). It should be noted that participants were fully aware that they 
would not actually be required to donate any money at this stage. Following these questions, 
participants were asked to complete the CAERS. At the end of the study they were thanked 
and debriefed as to the full nature and aims of the study (Appendix E.2).  
6.2.5 Results 
As can be seen in Table 6.1, all CAERS and IRI subscales achieved strong internal 




ceiling effects) and so a Log10 transform was applied to this variable. Several subscales 
significantly correlated with the social desirability measure (Table 6.1). It was therefore 
necessary to control for socially desirable responding in the subsequent regressions. As 
described in Chapter 5, statistical controls were used in favour of removing high-scoring 
participants to avoid the reductions in power associated with smaller sample sizes.  
 
Table 6.1  
Subscale averages, ranges, internal reliabilities, and social desirability correlates 




Donation Likelihood 3.49 (1.35) 1.0-6.0 - .22* 
     
CAERS Subscales     
Self-Interest 2.47 (0.57) 1.1-3.9 .80 -.16 
Agency 2.51 (0.68) 1.0-4.1 .88 .11 
Morality 3.61 (0.68) 1.5-5.0 .84 .11 
Perceived Power 3.58 (0.58) 2.5-5.0 .81 .13 
Cognitive E. 4.14 (0.56) 2.6-5.0 .86 .34** 
Perceived Need
a 
0.32 (0.12) 0.0-0.5 .82 .14 
Similarity 2.22 (0.61) 1.0-3.5 .87 -.03 
Valuing 3.87 (0.54) 2.4-5.0 .83 .17 
Blame 2.21 (0.79) 1.0-4.8 .90 -.36** 
Empathy 3.74 (0.82) 1.5-5.0 .88 .15 
Sympathy 3.98 (0.63) 2.0-5.0 .82 .28* 
     
IRI Subscales     
Fantasy 3.36 (0.79) 1.1-5.0 .82 -.06 
Empathic Concern 3.86 (0.69) 1.3-4.9 .82 .37** 
Perspective Taking 3.70 (0.68) 1.6-4.9 .84 .49** 
Personal Distress 2.50 (0.76) 1.1-4.9 .87 -.26* 
Note. “SDS” = Social desirability scale.  
a
 Log10 transformed. Untransformed mean was 4.50 (SD = 0.46). 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
 
 
The antecedents of empathy and sympathy. Analyses were first conducted to 
determine whether the CAERS cognitions, along with trait empathic capacities, had an 




and then sympathy as the dependent variables. Durbin-Watson statistics were acceptable for 
the empathy (d = 1.9) and sympathy (d = 2.1) regressions. VIF values for both tests ranged 
between 1.00-2.80; indicating acceptable multicolinearity. Variables were entered in three 
blocks. Social desirability scores were entered into the first block to control for this bias. The 
IRI subscales were entered into the second block. CAERS subscales were entered into the 
third block to examine the influence of these state cognitions above and beyond trait 
capacities for empathy/sympathy. The results of these regressions can be found in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2  
Empathy and Sympathy regression 
Note. “SDS” = Social desirability scale.  
a
 Log10 transformed 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
In the empathy regression, only blocks 2 and 3 significantly contributed to the model 
(overall adjusted R
2
 = .67), indicating no significant influence of social desirability. Of the 
IRI subscales, only Empathic Concern (EC) made a significant contribution to the model, 
indicating that participants with the greatest trait EC felt more empathy towards the target in 
 Empathy  Sympathy 
 β    t ΔR2   Fchange  β     t ΔR2  Fchange 
Block 1   .02    1.85      .08  6.68* 
    SDS  .15 1.36     .28  2.58*   
Block 2   .41  13.94***      .27  8.08*** 
    Fantasy  .10 1.04     .00  0.04   
    Emp. Concern  .49 4.12***     .43  3.39***   
    Persp. Taking  .23 1.76     .19  1.39   
    Pers. Distress  .00 0.02    -.02 -0.23   
Block 3   .30  8.30***      .30  6.57*** 
    Self-Interest  .01 0.14    -.02 -0.18   
    Agency  .18 2.46*     .07  0.90   
    Morality  .28 3.34**     .12  1.21   
    Perceived Power
 
 -.03 0.37    -.05 -0.62   
    Cognitive E.  .04 0.40     .18  1.53   
    Perceived Need
a 
 .11 1.16     .15  1.45   
    Similarity  .03 0.46    -.12 -1.45   
    Valuing  .38 3.59***     .39  3.26***   




the current context. Three CAERS subscales significantly contributed to the model, 
indicating that context specific cognitions explained a significant proportion of empathic 
variance after controlling for trait capacities. Specifically, the results suggest that empathy 
was felt to a greater degree when participants perceived a greater breach of moral codes, 
perceived a greater ability to change the target‟s circumstances (agency), and valued the 
target to a greater degree.  
With respect to sympathy, all 3 blocks made a significant contribution to the model 
(overall adjusted R
2
 = .58). Firstly, the results suggested that the more participants wished to 
portray themselves in a favourable light, the more they indicated that they felt sympathy for 
the target. Similar to the empathy regression, trait EC significantly predicted feelings of 
sympathy in this context. In Block 3, only valuing made a significant contribution to the 
model, suggesting that the more a participant valued the target, the more sympathy that 
participant felt.  
The antecedents of charitable donation decisions. Next, analyses were conducted to 
determine whether cognitions and emotions were able to predict the likelihood of donating to 
this charity (Table 6.3). Variables were entered in 4 blocks, with each block making a 
significant contribution to the model (p < .05; overall adjusted R
2
 = .40). Durbin-Watson (d = 
1.9) and collinearity statistics (VIF = 1.00-3.52) were in agreement with test assumptions. 
Social desirability was significant in Block 1, affirming the need to control for this influence. 
The IRI variables were entered into Block 2. Both EC and personal distress (PD) significantly 
contributed to the model, suggesting that those with higher trait EC, and lower susceptibility 
to becoming distressed, were more likely to donate. In Block 3, only empathy significantly 
predicted donation likelihood, indicating that the more empathy participants felt for this 
target, the more likely they were to donate. The cognitions were entered into Block 4 in order 




a mediation through emotional responses (i.e., empathy). Such direct effects were implied for 
two cognitions. As blame increased donation likelihood decreased. The positive influence of 
agency on donation likelihood was marginally outside the threshold for significance (p = .07). 
Given the uncertainty of this result (and the number of variables included in the regression), 
agency was retained in the path analysis to follow. 
 
Table 6.3  
Donation likelihood regression 
  Donation Likelihood 
 β 95% CI t ΔR2 Fchange 
Block 1    .05 4.05* 
     SDS  .22 .00 < .43   2.01*   
      
Block 2    .21   5.51** 
     Fantasy -.06 -.28 < .16 -1.56   
     Empathic Concern  .35 .08 < .62    2.57*   
     Perspective Taking  .13 -.16 < .43  0.91   
     Personal Distress -.24 -.45 < -.02   -2.20*   
      
Block 3    .08 4.60* 
     Empathy  .39 .07 < .70    2.45*   
     Sympathy -.01 -.30 < .28 -0.09   
      
Block 4    .17  2.49* 
     Self-Interest -.09 -.30 < .12 -0.86   
     Agency  .19 -.02 < .40   1.84
† 
  
     Morality -.09 -.34 < .16 -0.74   
     Perceived Power  .09 -.11 < .28  0.85   
     Cognitive E. -.12 -.41 < .16 -0.87   
     Perceived Need
a 
 .06 -.19 < .31  0.48   
     Similarity  .16 -.04 < .36  1.60   
     Valuing -.02 -.34 < .30 -0.09   
     Blame -.37 -.60 < -.13     -3.06**   
Note. “SDS” = Social desirability scale.  
a
 Log10 transformed 
*p<.05; **p<.01; 
†






Path analysis of the charitable donation model. Based on these findings, a 
provisional model of the process leading to donation decisions was developed. Variables that 
did not contribute to either regression model (i.e., in Tables 6.2 and 6.3) were excluded to 
encourage good model fit.  In order to test this model, a path analysis was conducted using a 
maximum-likelihood procedure. Variables were ordered in three stages based upon 
theoretical assumptions. Stage 1 was the IRI and CAERS subscales (i.e., the antecedents of 
empathy). Stage 2 was empathy. Stage 3 was donation likelihood (i.e., the final donation 
decision). All possible paths were examined (excluding backwards paths between stages). 
This initial model showed poor model fit according to the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) index (= 0.33), and so path trimming was employed, removing all 
non-significant (p > .05) paths from the model. Analyses were re-run using this new model, 
which showed better fit. Values above .95 for the Non-Normed Fit Index (.99), the Goodness 
of Fit Index (.97), and the Comparative Fit Index (.99), suggested a very good model fit (Hu 
and Bentler 1999, Schumaker and Lomax 1996). Similarly, an RMSEA value of .04 indicated 
good model fit according to MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996) and Hu and Bentler 
(1999). 
 The final model, including the standardised regression coefficients can be found in 
Figure 6.1. All paths shown are significant to p < .05 or less, and the results suggested that 
44% of the variance in donation likelihood can be explained by the variables within the 
model. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, blame and trait personal distress appeared to have direct 
influences on a likelihood to donate; the influence of agency was partially mediated through 
feelings of empathy; and the influences of valuing, morality, and trait empathic concern, 






Figure 6.1. Trimmed model of the influences on donation likelihood. Values indicate 
standardised regression coefficients. All paths were significant (p<.05).  
 
6.3 Discussion 
The results presented here offer novel findings regarding the cognitive and affective 
antecedents of charitable donation behaviours, and demonstrate how the current research can 
be used to improve our understanding of the empathic process in a specific field of interest. 
The results of the path analysis suggested that individuals may be more likely to donate when 
they experience greater levels of empathy and agency, with empathy being enhanced via 
morality, valuing, agency, and trait empathic concern. Conversely, individuals may be less 
likely to donate when they blame the target and have higher levels of trait personal distress. 
These results demonstrate that perceptions of individuals depicted in charity advertisements 
have a significant influence on the likelihood to donate to that charity (either directly or 
indirectly through empathy). These findings are therefore consistent with discussions 
presented in earlier chapters regarding the importance of considering state factors in addition 




identification of those cognitions that have the greatest effects on donation behaviours, which 
has obvious implications for those involved with income generation and the development of 
promotional materials for charitable organisations. Accordingly, the following suggestions 
can be made. 
First and foremost, charities should avoid eliciting any notions of target blame, as this 
appeared to have the largest direct (negative) effect on a likelihood to donate. This is 
consistent with previous research demonstrating a negative relationship between blaming and 
donation behaviours (e.g., Griffin et al. 1993, Eveland and Crutchfield 2007). Certain appeals 
may be particularly susceptible to blaming, such as those targeting the homeless, alcoholics, 
or people with AIDS (Griffin et al. 1993). For example, based on their findings, Eveland and 
Crutchfield (2007) advised AIDS charities to be mindful of notions of promiscuity and drug 
use, as these factors might engender feelings of blame in potential donators (which may lead 
to feelings of anger rather than empathy; Rudolph et al. 2004). Eveland and Crutchfield‟s 
findings differ somewhat from the current results in that they found an impact of blame on 
empathy, but are nevertheless in agreement with the conclusion that blame is damaging to 
income generation.  
The results presented here also suggest a direct negative influence of trait personal 
distress on likelihood to donate, indicating that those more prone to becoming distressed 
during emotional encounters were less likely to donate. Further research is required to fully 
explain this relationship as actual levels of distress experienced during the study were not 
measured here. Nevertheless, the current findings are consistent with the empathy literature, 
in that feelings of personal distress are more likely to motivate egocentric (e.g., escape) 
behaviours, rather than altruistic (i.e., helping) behaviours (Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade 
1987). For example, Cameron and Payne (2011) provided evidence to suggest that people can 




overwhelming appeals. As such, charities should avoid overly emotional appeals that might 
cause distress. Future research is needed to determine the threshold at which avoidance may 
occur.  
The elicitation of empathy also seems to have a direct influence on donation 
behaviours; a finding commonly reported in the literature (e.g., Basil, Ridgway, and Basil 
2008, Davis 1983b, Einholf, Philbrick, and Slay 2013, Mattila et al. 2012, Verheart and van 
den Pool 2011), and consistent with the empathy-altruism literature (e.g., Batson 1991). The 
current results are inconsistent, however, with the suggestion that the effects of empathy on 
helping behaviours are mediated through feelings of sympathy (See Chapter 3; e.g., de 
Vignemont and Singer 2006, Eisenberg et al. 1994, Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011); instead 
suggesting that it is important to evoke emotions similar to that perceived in the target (e.g., 
sadness, resulting in empathy) rather than feelings of concern (sympathy). Unsurprisingly, 
state empathy was partially determined by trait empathic concern, suggesting that those with 
a greater tendency towards empathy were more likely to feel empathy for this target.  
The model presented in Figure 6.1 can be used to determine how best to evoke 
empathy in target audiences (representing an important novel contribution of this research): 
by appealing to an individual‟s sense of valuing, morality, and agency. The strongest 
influence on empathy was that of valuing. The more that the participants liked / cared about 
the target, the more empathy was elicited; a finding consistent with previous research (e.g., 
Batson et al. 2007). This suggests the need to present targets as being likable individuals, 
worthy of another‟s donation. For example, one way in which advertisers can achieve this is 
via the „identifiable victim effect‟. When charities utilise a „poster child‟, they are able to 
generate greater incomes than when focussing on the suffering of whole populations (e.g., 
Kogut 2011, Slovic 2007, Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007, Västfjäll et al. 2014). As 




proportions rather than absolute numbers of lives, so that “ten deaths out of many million is 
merely a drop in the bucket”. By focussing on the suffering of one individual, every person in 
that reference group (i.e., 100% of a group of one) is suffering. The increase in valuing 
achieved by this „individual‟ focus results in the greater elicitation of empathy, and 
consequently a greater likelihood of donation (Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007).  
A significant positive relationship between morality and empathy was also found, 
indicating the more a participant believed that what had happened to the target was morally 
wrong, the more empathy the participant felt for the target. Although there have been several 
studies examining the influence of a moral obligation to donate (i.e., trait morality) on 
charitable donation behaviours (see Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a), no studies appear to have 
examined the impact of context specific breaches of personal morals on a likelihood to donate 
to a specific charity. Further research is therefore needed to confirm these findings. Charity 
advertisers may seek to promote ideas of moral injustice during the development of 
promotional materials. However, as Batson, Ahmad, and Tsang (2002) noted, such moral 
codes may be easily sidestepped by viewers when it suits them best.  
The final influential factor to discuss is that of agency. The current results suggest that 
the more one feels able to make a difference with donations, the more likely one is to donate 
(see Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). It may be that an ability to help others serves to elicit 
feelings of anticipatory guilt should one not choose to donate, and by donating one is able to 
avoid such guilt (Basil, Ridgway and Basil 2008). This effect is partially mediated through 
empathy, whereby greater agency appears to elicit greater feelings of empathy. The current 
results suggest that charity advertisers should make potential donors aware of how a donation 
(of a manageable amount) will make a difference to the target. Many charities already take 
this approach (e.g., “for less than a cup of coffee per day you can help save a needy child”; 




donations are being suitably received by the target. As Bekkers and Wiepking (2011a) 
cautioned, charities should avoid „flashy‟ fundraising methods that may give observers the 
impression that their money is not being spent wisely. For example, Bekkers and Crutzen 
(2007) demonstrated a reduction in monetary donations when using such methods. 
6.3.1 Limitations 
 As is the case with most research in this area, the use of post-hoc self-report methods 
may have affected the external validity of the current study. In a real world donation decision 
it is unlikely that individuals will stop and reflect upon their specific thoughts towards the 
individuals depicted in a charity advert; at least not to the same degree as was expected here. 
Rather, such decisions may be largely based upon gut feelings or instincts (e.g., Small, 
Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007). Although participants‟ donation decisions were likely 
unaffected by thorough introspection (as this decision was made before completing the 
CAERS), their reporting of emotions and cognitions may have been affected, as thinking 
about one‟s own emotions may be sufficient to change them (see Lieberman 2007). 
Furthermore, it is possible that whether participants decided to donate or not may have 
influenced the cognitions that they subsequently reported. Further research is required to 
determine the extent of any differences between automatic and deliberative 
emotions/cognitions, and what implications these might have for charitable donation 
behaviours.  
Another limitation of the current study relates to the interpretation of the results for 
perceived need and self-interest. Firstly, the video employed here seemed to have elicited a 
ceiling effect with regards to perceived need, implying that the emotional needs of the man in 
the video were obvious to the participants (i.e., the video was too effective in eliciting 
perceptions on need). Although the data transformation granted more appropriately 




self-interest, participants in the current study were aware of the fact that they would not 
actually be donating money to this charity, and so the potential loss of self-interest (i.e., 
giving away money) was only imagined. This might mean that participants did not make the 
same cost-benefit analyses as if money were to actually change hands. Given these 
limitations, further research is required to determine whether the relationships reported here 
can be replicated when the target‟s needs are more ambiguous and when participants are 
faced with the actual „loss‟ of money. These limitations form the rationale for the following 
study (see Chapter 7). 
It is also possible that a lack of power in the current study may have resulted in type II 
errors for some of the variables investigated here. Due to time constraints and a lack of 
participant interest, the obtained sample size (n = 83) was less than that suggested by a-priori 




). Although still 
useful in determining the largest influences on empathic responding / donation decisions, the 
existence of type II errors (i.e., false-negative results) might affect our interpretation of those 
antecedents not exhibiting statistically significant influences. This shall therefore also be 
examined in the following chapter (i.e., Study 5).  
Finally, although efforts were made to capture a range of demographic backgrounds, 
it should be noted that this sample were largely white British and educated to degree level. 
Further research would be needed to confirm whether the relationships outlined in the 
donation decision model (i.e., Figure 6.1) remain the same in other populations. 
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated how the cognitive antecedents of empathy can be used in an 
applied field to enhance empathic responding towards a target in need. The results of Study 4 
                                                             




have allowed for more specific suggestions to be made to charity advertisers wishing to elicit 
empathy in their audiences. Based on these results, it can be concluded that in order to 
maximise an individual‟s likelihood to donate to a particular organisation, charity advertisers 
should present the target of their appeal as being blameless, while also evoking a degree of 
emotionality through appealing to a donator‟s senses of agency, morality, and valuing. This is 
the first study to examine a large range of cognitive antecedents in such a way, and this has 
allowed for the identification of the most influential cognitive antecedents, and a model of the 
donation decision process has been developed. Continued investigation into how individuals 
arrive at such decisions will allow us to effectuate continued improvements to charity 
marketing strategies, allowing for the maximisation of income generation for those who need 











Chapter 7: The Trade-Off Between Self-
Interest and Perceived Need in Helping 
Situations 
7.1 Introduction 
It was interesting to note in the previous chapter that neither perceived need nor self-
interest contributed to the helping decision model. This finding is inconsistent with popular 
understanding, and therefore warrants further investigation. For example, Hills (2001: 55) has 
deemed self-interest to be “a fundamental consideration that cannot be overlooked where 
empathy is concerned”, and the role of perceived need has been deemed “obvious and 
uncontroversial” by Batson et al. (2007). As empathy researchers are ultimately interested in 
behavioural implications of empathic processes (at least in most cases), it is important to 
further investigate these issues so that we can gain a better understanding of how these 
variables (i.e., self-interest, perceived need, and empathic responding) interact within the 
empathic process as a whole, leading to the development of prosocial motivations.  
There are three possibilities that may explain the findings reported in Study 4 
(Chapter 6). Firstly, it is possible that perceived need and self-interest may indeed have no 
relationship with helping behaviours. Secondly, it may be that Study 4 lacked the power to 
detect a statistically significant influence of perceived need and self-interest on the helping 
decision. An examination of the effect size estimates (Table 6.3) suggested this to be 
unlikely, given that the confidence intervals (95% CI for β) comfortably surrounded the null 
effect (i.e., 0) for both self-interest (-.30 < .12) and perceived need (-.19 < .31), but is 
nevertheless a possibility given the wide estimates. Given the small overlap with zero, these 
confidence intervals also indicate a possible type II error with regards to the relationship 




may have been missed. This was less likely for self-interest (-.14 < .16), which more 
comfortably surrounded the null effect. A third possibility (discussed in Section 6.3.1) is that 
certain aspects of Study 4 limited the impact of self-interest and perceived need on decision 
making, as participants were fully aware that they would not actually be required to give any 
money away, and ceiling effects were observed for perceived need, possibly due to the 
stimulus employed. Because of these issues, the same cost-benefits analyses (i.e., the 
weighing up of own-versus-other needs) that would have occurred within a real-world 
behavioural response might not have occurred. A study where participants are faced with 
more ambiguous needs, and a more genuine element of self-interest, may yield different 
results. This hypothesis forms the rationale for the study outlined in the current chapter. 
Before presenting Study 5, the relationship between self-interest, perceived need, and 
empathic responding shall be discussed in more detail, to further support the claim that 
relationships are expected between these variables.  
7.1.1 Self-interest, perceived need, and empathic responding 
Gerbasi and Prentice (2013: 496) defined self-interest as “the pursuit of gains in 
socially valued domains, including material goods, social status, recognition, academic or 
occupational achievement, and happiness”, and stated that “other motives (e.g., altruism, 
conformity) are taken seriously if, and only if, they account for additional variance in 
behaviour above and beyond self-interest.” (p.495). It is therefore important to fully 
determine the effects of self-interest on empathic responding and prosocial behaviours. As 
noted in Chapter 3, altruistic responding can be disrupted when such a response would go 
against self-interest (Walker and Brown 2013), and an over-focus on self-interest (rather than 
another person‟s needs) can promote aggressive behaviour, where such behaviours are 
instrumental to achieving one‟s goals (Arsenio and Lemerise 2001, Ward and Durrant 2013). 




emotional costs of charitable donations increase, the more people are motivated to avoid 
empathic responding. 
The relationship between self-interest, empathy, and helping behaviours has been 
demonstrated in the research literature, which is why the non-significant influence of self-
interest in Study 4 was an unexpected result. For example, Wang et al. (2014) found that self-
interest was the primary concern in a competition task, and took priority over consideration 
of the outcomes for another person. Van Ornum et al. (1981) reported that those with a 
history of helping others scored higher on an empathy questionnaire than those with a history 
of self-interest. Additionally, Cohen and Hoffner (2013) reported results suggesting the 
importance of self-interest. Specifically, perceived self-risks (e.g., body disfigurement) and 
self-benefits (e.g., pride) significantly predicted the intention to sign an organ donor card, 
while benefits to the recipient (e.g., increasing chance of survival) did not predict a likelihood 
to donate.  
A prominent view among psychologists, therefore, is that individuals are likely to act 
with self-interest in mind (Gerbasi and Prentice 2013, van Lange et al. 2006). However, there 
are situations where individuals can reject this self-interest to act in an altruistic manner. For 
example, Batson and Ahmad (2001) reported that participants were willing to sacrifice their 
own raffle tickets to cheer up another person in need, when they felt empathy for that person. 
As Batson and Ahmad noted, this behaviour makes no sense from a rational choice theory 
point of view (i.e., meeting one‟s own financial needs), but is better explained by the 
consideration of other individuals‟ needs as in the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson 
1991). One may also argue that this might be explained by the negative state relief model 
(attending to another‟s needs to remove one‟s own personal distress; e.g., Cialdini et al. 




responding (e.g., Avenanti et al. 2006, Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011, Saarela et al. 2007); 
which in turn can promote altruistic behaviours (e.g., Batson et al. 2007).  
The above suggests then that when an individual encounters a situation where another 
person is in need of help, that individual is faced with a dilemma: to prioritise one‟s own 
needs and act selfishly, or to prioritise the other person‟s needs and act selflessly. In his 
motivational model of empathy, Zaki (2014) implied that the resolution of this dilemma can 
either push individuals towards an empathic response (attending to perceived need) or 
towards an indifferent emotional response (attending to self-interest). However, research is 
lacking into how these variables interact to promote or inhibit empathic responding and/or 
helping behaviours. In fact, only two studies appear to attempt this, and these have 
conflicting findings: Cohen and Hoffner (2013) reported that self-interest, but not other-
interest (loosely equating to perceived need), predicted helping decisions, while Gerbasi and 
Prentice (2013) reported that both variables predicted helping behaviours.  
Certain limitations to the above studies (i.e., Cohen and Hoffner 2013, Gerbasi and 
Prentice 2013) also warrant further investigation. Firstly, limited attention was paid to the 
interaction between self-interest and perceived need, and the effect of this interaction on 
empathic responding and helping behaviours. Secondly, the scale developed by Gerbasi and 
Prentice (2013) was a trait measure, examining individual tendencies to pursue self or other-
interests. As is the running theme in this thesis, researchers should also focus on 
understanding how these factors interact within a specific situation. Thirdly, empathic 
responding was either not measured (Gerbasi and Prentice 2013) or measured only as a trait 
variable (Cohen and Hoffner 2013); again offering little insight into the impact on empathic 
responding within a given situation. Given these issues, and the limitations of Study 4, 




7.2 Study 5: One-Trial Prisoner’s Dilemma 
7.2.1 Aims 
The factors contributing to empathy-related helping decisions need to be more fully 
investigated. The aims of this study were therefore as follows: i) to present a more focussed 
(and therefore more powerful) study to examine the possibility of false negative results 
reported in Study 4; ii) to examine whether the introduction of ambiguous needs and a 
genuine element of self-interest changes the nature of the helping decision model (i.e., Figure 
6.1); and iii) to further investigate the interaction between cognitions (especially perceived 
need and self-interest), empathic responding, and the generation of helping decisions. This 
study addressed the limitations of prior research (discussed on the previous page) by more 
fully examining how self-interest and perceived need interact within a specific empathic 
helping situation (i.e., as state, not trait, variables), and by examining how cognition and 
empathic responding contribute to the generation of helping decisions.   
7.2.2 Design 
In order to meet the above aims, the one-trial prisoner‟s dilemma method adapted by 
Batson and Ahmad (2001) was employed. In this procedure, participants believed that they 
were competing for raffle tickets with another (actually fictional) participant, thus introducing 
a more genuine element of self-interest. This method was appropriate as the deception 
allowed the researcher to more tightly control the events experienced by the participant (i.e., 
each participant was faced with the exact same information and same decisions), while 
allowing for the measurement of cognition / empathy towards a specific target. This 
procedure also uses a written communication as a stimulus for empathy, presumably being a 
less powerful stimulus than the video used in Study 4 (lessening the likelihood of the ceiling 




genuine element of self-interest when there is no funding available for the use of actual 
money (as was the case here).  
An independent measures design was employed, wherein participants were randomly 
assigned to either a low self-interest or high self-interest condition, by offering tickets to a 
prize draw of different amounts (£5 or £50 respectively; although for fairness, all participants 
were ultimately entered into a raffle for £55, following the debrief). This manipulation, as 
well as the measures used (described below), reflects the only difference from the 
methodology employed by Batson and Ahmad (2001), and served to introduce a real element 
of self-interest (addressing the main limitation of Study 4). There were 14 dependent 
variables in the current study: Nine cognitive antecedents of empathy; four trait empathy 
subscales; and a social desirability scale. Ethical approval for this study was granted by the 
university ethics committee, and the study conformed with the British Psychological Society 
„Code of Human Research Ethics‟ (BPS 2010). 
7.2.3 Participants 
One hundred and eleven undergraduate students were recruited via the university 
research scheme in exchange for „research credits‟ (psychology students at the university are 
required to accumulate a number of credits per year, earned by participating in research 
studies). However, 11 of these were excluded after they expressed beliefs that the fictional 
participant did not exist (participants were asked if they had any suspicions about the nature 
of the study before being debriefed). Students were recruited in this study as they were more 
readily available to the researcher than members of the general public. To avoid a small 
sample size (a limitation of Study 4), it was deemed sensible to recruit a student sample in 
this instance. Only female students were recruited so that the CAERS and the written 
communication (supposedly from the fictional participant) could be made specific to a female 




the fabricated situation. Ages ranged between 18-34 years (M = 20, SD = 2.33). Participants‟ 
ethnicities were as follows: 22% white British, 19% white non-British, 20% Indian, and 19% 
black. The remaining 20% were of other Asian and mixed ethnic backgrounds. 
7.2.4 Materials 
The same measures were used as described previously (see Chapter 5 for descriptions 
of these scales). Specifically, the CAERS was used to measure state cognitions and empathic 
responding; the IRI was used as a measure of trait empathic capacities; and the M-C Form C 
was used as a social desirability measure. 
Sender’s Note [Appendix F]. A written communication, developed by Batson and 
Ahmad (2001), was used as the emotional stimulus in the current study in order to evoke 
empathy / sympathy in the participants. Appropriately, this note is a less powerful stimulus 
than the video used in Study 4, thus being less prone to perceived need ceiling effects. The 
note was hand written by a female colleague to give the impression that it had been written 
by a fictional female student that the participants had been paired up with in the study 
(henceforth referred to as the „partner‟). It described how the partner had recently 
experienced an upsetting break-up with her boyfriend, and that she has been feeling down. 
This note has been shown to evoke empathy and perceived need in those who read it (Batson 
and Ahmad 2001), and was adapted for the current study to make it more suitable for a 
British population (e.g., American colloquialisms were changed to British).  
Initial Self-Interest (ISI). A three-item scale was developed to measure how 
important the £5 / £50 prize was to the participants. It was assumed that participants would 
believe that £50 was more important to them than £5. This scale exhibited good internal 
reliability (α = .81). The three items were “this amount of money is important to me”, “I 






The procedure used was largely based upon the methodology developed by Batson 
and Ahmad (2001), and a summary can be found in Figure 7.1 at the end of this section. The 
study was advertised on the university‟s research participation website, where students were 
able to express an interest to participate, and sign up to a timeslot for the study. Upon 
entering the room, participants were informed (via an information sheet; Appendix C.4) that 
the purpose of the study was to investigate the effects of four factors (the balance of initial 
resources; whether participants could choose to donate or not; whether the exchange was 
simultaneous or one after another; and whether participants met their partner face-to-face) on 
reactions to the exchange of goods. They were also told that they had been paired up with 
another anonymous participant (actually fictitious), with their partner being met in another 
room. This deception was required so that participants did not know the true nature of the 
study. Participants were also informed that they would be competing with their partner for 
tickets to either a £5 or £50 prize (each participant was randomly allocated to a condition, and 
was unaware of the other condition). After reading the information sheet, participants gave 
consent (Appendix D), provided demographic information, and completed the ISI, IRI, and 
social desirability measure.  
Once the above questionnaires had been completed, participants were given 
instructions for the one-trial prisoner‟s dilemma procedure adapted by Batson and Ahmad 
(2001). This instruction sheet can be found in Appendix G. Participants were told that in this 
condition they would not meet their partner face-to-face but would receive written 
communication from them (i.e., the sender‟s note). Participants were told that they were in 
the „receiver‟ condition, and so would not be required to write a note themselves. Participants 
were given three blue cards indicating a number of tickets that they would receive towards a 




tickets (red cards), and that they would be required to exchange one token with their partner, 
with their partner making the first move. Participants were given a tabulated form of the 
possible outcomes for both themselves and their partner (Table 7.1).  
 
Table 7.1  
Outcome possibilities for participants and their imaginary partner  
Participant  Partner 
Final Tokens held Tickets for 
prize draw 


















Notes: A red+5 / blue+5 combination yields 20 instead of 10 tickets. This procedure was 
developed by Batson and Ahmad (2001) to match the standard prisoner‟s dilemma payoffs. If 
one person ended with a negative value, that person received 0 tickets for the prize.  
 
While participants were reading the instruction sheet, they were left alone for 
approximately three minutes. This was to allow them enough time to read the instructions, 
and to give them the impression that the researcher was talking to the other participant in 
another room. Once the researcher returned, participants were given more time to finish 
reading the instruction sheet if required. Questions were answered when necessary, but verbal 




Once the instructions had been read and understood, participants were asked to read 
the sender‟s note. A message at the top of the page explained that the partner wrote this note 
before learning about the nature of the study. This was so the participant did not believe that 
the partner was simply attempting to influence her decision with a negative story. Once 
participants had read the note they were asked to look at the token they had been given, 
which was always a red „-5‟ card, and were asked to put one of their own blue cards in the 
envelope (the researcher looked away while participants were making their choice. This was 
to reduce social desirability and demand effects). Participants could either choose to give 
away a „-5‟ card, which would mean that both parties ended with 5 tickets, or they could 
choose to give away a „+5‟ card, which would mean that the participant ended with 0 tickets 
and their partner ended with 25. In essence, giving a „-5‟ card is more indicative of a response 
consistent with self-interest (the participant retains the maximum amount of tickets possible), 
while giving away a „+5‟ card is more indicative of a helpful response that is inconsistent 
with self-interest (the participant sacrifices all their tokens to maximise the chances of the 
partner). Like Batson and Ahmad (2001), it was assumed that participants would think that 
the „+5‟ card would be perceived as a positive outcome by the partner, while the „-5‟ card 
would not.  
After making their choice, participants were asked to complete the CAERS. So that 
the generally negative-focussed content of the CAERS (e.g., “she is upset”) did not raise 
suspicions, participants were verbally informed that their partner had told the researcher that 
she had written about a negative event. Once participants had completed the CAERS, they 
were asked whether they had any suspicions about the nature of the study. This was to assess 
whether they had any doubts about the existence of the fictional participant (11 did express 
such doubts and were excluded from the following analyses). Finally, participants were fully 




would receive one ticket to a £55 prize draw, irrespective of the choice made. Once the study 
was complete, one participant was drawn at random to receive the prize. For clarity, a process 
tree of the overall procedure can be found in Figure 7.1.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Process tree of the procedure (from the participants‟ point of view).  
 
7.2.6 Results 
The perceived need subscale was normally distributed, with an appropriate midpoint 
(M = 3.50, SD = 0.36), thus avoiding the ceiling effects observed in Study 4. All other 




social desirability measure did not significantly correlate with any other variable used within 
the following analyses (Table 7.2), disaffirming the need to control for self-presentation 
biases in this instance. Similarly, initial analyses indicated that IRI variables had no 
relationship with the helping decision variable (p > .05). To avoid complicating the 
regression models, and to increase statistical power (thus addressing the first aim of this 
study), these variables were excluded from the following analyses.  
 
Table 7.2  
Subscale averages, ranges, internal reliabilities, and social desirability correlates 






Initial self-interest 3.57 (0.91) 1.0-5.00 .81 -.16 
     
CAERS Subscales     
Self-Interest 2.58 (0.82) 1.00-4.75 .88 -.10 
Agency 1.93 (0.74) 1.00-4.00 .75 .19 
Morality 3.20 (0.72) 1.50-5.00 .72 -.14 
Perceived Power 3.75 (0.67) 1.50-5.00 .85 -.04 
Cognitive E. 4.04 (0.58) 2.00-5.00 .81 .05 
Perceived Need
 
3.50 (0.36) 2.00-4.00 .70 -.01 
Similarity 2.61 (1.00) 1.00-5.00 .94 -.03 
Valuing 3.52 (0.62) 1.50-5.00 .81 .07 
Blame 1.79 (0.58) 1.00-3.00 .83 .14 
Empathy 3.51 (0.79) 1.75-5.00 .81 .15 
Sympathy 3.76 (0.63) 1.75-5.00 .80 .14 
Note. “SDS” = Social desirability scale.  
a
 p > .05 for all correlation coefficients 
 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine whether there was a 
difference between groups in their initial self-interest (ISI) scores. A significant difference 
was not found (t(98) = -1.92, p > .05), indicating that participants in the £50 condition (M = 
3.93, SD = 0.76) felt that the value of the prize they were offered was no more important to 
them than did those in the £5 group (M = 3.64; SD = 0.75). It was therefore inappropriate to 
use the value of the prize as an indication of initial self-interest. However, the ISI scores 




= 3.79, SD = 0.91), and were normally distributed. It was therefore decided that the use of 
this measure represented a more appropriate indication of initial self-interest than did the 
group to which participants were assigned. As such, although an independent measures 
design was originally intended, a correlational design was employed for the following 
analyses, using the ISI scale scores instead of dichotomous group membership.  
The primary interest of this study was how perceived need, self-interest, and empathic 
responding contributed to participants‟ helping decisions (i.e., whether they decided to give a 
„+5‟ or a „-5‟ card to their partner). A binary logistic regression with participants‟ decisions 
as the dependent variable was conducted (Table 7.3). Variables were entered in three blocks: 
ISI in the first block; empathy and sympathy in the second block; and perceived need and 
self-interest in the third block. Variables were normally distributed and exhibited no issues 
with multicollinearity (according to VIF values). Hosmer-Lemeshow tests indicated good 
model fit (p > .05).  
Only blocks 1 and 3 significantly contributed to the model (p < .05). In brief, ISI 
significantly predicted the likelihood of making a helping decision, suggesting that the more 
participants valued the prize offered to them, the less likely they were to give a „+5‟ card. 
However, additional analyses determined that this relationship disappeared when controlling 
for state self-interest (χ
2 
= 2.96, p > .05), suggesting a mediation effect. Empathy and 
sympathy did not contribute to the model, indicating that emotional responses did not directly 
influence participants‟ decision making (as they did in Study 4). In Block 3, only self-interest 
significantly contributed to the model, suggesting that participants were less likely to give a 








Table 7.3  
Binary Logistic Regression 
 Helping Likelihood  
 β SE β Wald‟s χ
2 





Block 1      
     Initial self-interest -.53 .25 4.54* 0.59 0.36-0.96 
      
Block 2      
     Empathy  .53 .41 1.64 1.70 0.76-3.81 
     Sympathy -.39 .41 0.58 0.68 0.25-1.85 
      
Block 3      
     Self-Interest -.96 .38    6.56** 0.38 0.18-0.80 
     Perceived Need -.38 .84     0.21 0.68 0.13-3.52 
Note. Dependent variable = helping decision (coded as follows: „-5‟ = 1; „+5‟ = 2)  




Although not the primary aim of the current study, another regression was conducted 
to see whether any of the other CAERS variables accounted for participants‟ decision making 
(Table 7.4). Interestingly, none of these variables made significant contributions to the model, 
again indicating that the only factor that directly influenced decision making was self-
interest. Although self-interest appeared to have the only direct influence on the decision to 
help, it was possible that the effects of other variables were mediated through self-interest. To 
test this assumption, a linear regression was conducted with self-interest as the dependent 
variable (Table 7.5). Initial self-interest was controlled for, as this might have affected 
responding during the trial. These results suggested that empathy, agency, and blame had a 
significant relationship with self-interest, indicating that when the participants blamed the 
target, self-interest was more salient. Conversely, when participants felt more empathy and 







Table 7.4  
The influence of CAERS variables on helping decisions 
 β SE β Wald‟s χ
2 





Block 1      
     Initial self-interest -.53 .25   4.54* 0.59 0.36-0.96 
      
Block 2      
     Self-Interest -1.06 .395     7.19** 0.35 0.16-0.75 
     Perceived Need -0.49 .804 0.37 0.61 0.13-2.97 
     Blame  0.06 .476 0.02 1.06 0.42-2.70 
     Perceived Power  0.45 .396 0.01 1.05 0.48-2.27 
     Valuing -0.38 .541 0.48 0.69 0.24-1.98 
     Agency  0.35 .346 1.01 1.42 0.72-2.79 
     Cognitive Empathy -0.11 .471 0.05 0.90 0.36-2.27 
     Similarity  0.25 .278 0.83 1.29 0.75-2.22 
     Morality -0.17 .352 0.24 0.84 0.42-1.68 
Note. Dependent variable = helping decision (coded as follows: „-5‟ = 1; „+5‟ = 2)  
*p < .05; **p < .01 
 
 
Table 7.5  
Linear regression with self-interest as the dependent variable 
 Self-Interest 
 β t ΔR2 Fchange 
Block 1   .04    4.30* 
     Initial self-interest .21  2.07*   
     
Block 2   .20  12.30*** 
     Empathy -.33   2.61**   
     Sympathy -.20     1.24   
     
Block 3   .18    3.37** 
     Agency -.34     3.42**   
     Morality  .15 1.38   
     Perceived Power  .17 1.48   
     Cognitive E. -.18      1.30   
     Perceived Need -.37 1.90   
     Similarity  .16   2.08*   
     Valuing -.01 0.06   
     Blame  .29   2.20*   




A particular interest of this study was the interaction between perceived need and self-
interest within the empathic process (i.e., the balancing of self and other needs). The lack of a 
significant correlation between ISI and perceived need (r = .13, p > .05) suggested that 
perceived need judgements during the trial were not influenced by the prize offered to 
participants. Analyses were also conducted to determine whether information about another 
person‟s needs changed the salience of self-interest during the trial. Although perceived need 
held a significant relationship with self-interest when entered into a regression equation alone 
(β = -.33, p < .01; controlling for ISI), as was the case in Gerbasi and Prentice‟s (2013) study, 
this relationship disappeared when entered into the regression model alongside the other 
variables (β = -.19, p > .05), suggesting that the influence of perceived need was distributed 
amongst its covariates.  
For the sake of comparison between the studies reported in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, 
additional analyses were conducted to further examine the antecedents of empathy and 
sympathy (Table 7.6). Self-interest, morality, similarity, perceived need, and valuing 
accounted for some of the variance in empathy. Perceived need, similarity, self-interest and 
valuing accounted for some of the variance in sympathy. 
A path analysis was conducted to summarise all of the above results (Figure 7.2). 
Bayesian estimation was used to account for the dichotomous outcome variable (i.e., the 
helping decision) and a posterior p-value of .41 indicated acceptable model fit
11
. All paths 
shown are significant to p < .05 or better. In summary, self-interest had a direct influence on 
the helping decision, which in turn was influenced by empathy, agency, and blame. Empathy 
had four antecedents itself: similarity, morality, perceived need, and valuing.  
 
 
                                                             




Table 7.6  
Linear Regression: The cognitive antecedents of empathy and sympathy 
 Empathy  Sympathy 
Subscale β
a 
     t  β
b
   t 
Self-Interest -.21 -2.46*  -.17 -1.94
* 
Agency .01 0.10  -.13 -1.50 
Morality .19 2.35*  .15 1.81 
Perceived Power
 
 -.09 -1.14  -.03 -0.38 
Cognitive E. .10 1.24  -.03 -0.35 
Perceived Need .18 2.09*   .27 3.00** 
Similarity .23 2.87**   .18 2.09* 
Valuing .23 2.28*   .34 3.34** 








= .51; Fchange = 10.56*** 











The results of the current study add to our understanding of the overall empathic 
process; in particular with regards to the relationship between perceived need, self-interest, 
empathic responding, and helping behaviours. Each of the aims described in Section 7.2.1 
have been addressed. Firstly, the relationship between self-interest / perceived need and 
helping has been examined with greater power. Secondly, the introduction of a genuine 
element of self-interest appeared to change the nature of the helping decision model, 
suggesting that self-interest represents an important additional step to the helping model 
presented in Chapter 6. Thirdly, the results of this study have granted novel information 
regarding the interaction between cognitions, empathic responding, and helping decisions, 
allowing for further development of the empathic process model (Figure 3.1).  
Perhaps the most important finding of the current study is the fact that the addition of 
a genuine element of self-interest, which was not present in Study 4, appeared to change the 
decision making process. In particular, participants appeared to give greater consideration to 
self-interest in their decision making, and as a result, self-interest was the only variable that 
had a direct influence on decision making in the current study, with all other influences being 
mediated through this variable. Not only does this change our understanding of the empathic 
process, but it also suggests that researchers need to ensure that a genuine element of self-
interest is addressed in methodologies similar to that described in Chapter 6, to ensure that 
external validity is retained.  
The fact that self-interest was the primary feature of decision making supports 
previous suggestions that altruistic responding can be disrupted when such a response would 
go against self-interest (Walker and Brown 2013). The overall importance of self-interest 
means that these results are in agreement with past research (e.g., Cohen and Hoffner 2013, 




Cornish and Clarke 1986), as when participants desired the prize more, they were more likely 
to optimise their own chances of winning it. In addition to replicating past findings, the novel 
value of the current research also lies in the fact that it provides a more detailed analysis of 
the interactions between self-interest, perceived need, and empathic responding; and adds 
additional knowledge regarding the influence of other empathy-related cognitions on the 
salience of self-interest.  
The current results suggest that the greatest negative influence on the salience of self-
interest (and therefore indirectly promoting altruistic behaviours) was feelings of empathy 
towards the fictional partner. This is consistent with the commonly cited association between 
empathy and altruistic responding (e.g., Batson 1991), and is consistent with the suggestion 
that feelings of empathy can overcome self-interested desires (Batson and Ahmad 2001). 
Similar to the results of Study 4 (Chapter 6), a number of cognitive antecedents promoted the 
elicitation of empathy during the study. Specifically, empathy was elicited to a greater degree 
when participants reported greater perceptions of need (c.f. Lishner, Batson, and Huss 2011), 
similarity (c.f. Komeda et al. 2013), breaches of morality (c.f. Schulz et al. 2013), and when 
they valued the target more (c.f. Batson et al. 2007). The fact that similarity and perceived 
need contributed to the model in Figure 7.2, but not in Figure 6.1, suggests that Study 4 may 
indeed have lacked the power to determine these relationships, thus meeting the first aim of 
the current study.  
In addition to those influences mediated through feelings of empathy, the current 
results also provide some novel findings with regards to the influence of two other cognitions 
on perceptions of self-interest. Firstly, higher agency (feeling able to help the target) reduced 
the salience of self-interest (thus increasing the likelihood of helping). This is consistent with 
Berman and Small (2012) who suggested that when we believe that prosocial acts would not 




action (because the other is not negatively affected by our decision). Secondly, blaming the 
target for her circumstances increased the salience of self-interest (thus decreasing the 
likelihood of helping), perhaps because the target was not seen to deserve one‟s help (see 
Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010), thus removing the sanctions imposed by 
anticipated guilt (see Pelligra 2011). It is encouraging to note that the relationship between 
agency / blame and the helping decision reflects the results reported in Study 4. However, 
these were direct relationships in Study 4, while being mediated through self-interest in the 
current study. This again is likely explained by the introduction of a genuine element of self-
interest, and further implies that researchers should employ caution during the design of 
future studies to ensure that perceptions of self-interest are genuine.  
It was interesting to observe that there was no direct interaction between self-interest 
and perceived need, as one would expect a certain amount of balancing one‟s own needs 
against the needs of the other (i.e., cost-benefit analyses). Although this is in contrast with the 
results reported by Cohen and Hoffner (2013), this difference in findings is likely due to the 
fact that these authors did not measure empathic responding during their study. The current 
results suggest that individuals primarily balanced consideration of self-needs against the 
degree of emotional responding. This could be explained by one of two theories (see 
Cropanzano, Goldman, and Folger 2005 for a brief review). Firstly, according to the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson 1991), empathetic participants may have been 
motivated to sacrifice their own needs to alleviate the suffering of their partner. Secondly, 
according to the negative state relief model (see Cialdini et al. 1987), empathetic participants 
may have been motivated to alleviate their own distress by helping the other to resolve their 
current predicament. Further research is needed to determine the most likely explanation, but 
either theory nevertheless suggests that the best way to overcome self-interest based 




measured by the CAERS (i.e., similarity, morality, perceived need, and valuing, as well as 
agency and blame). 
7.3.1 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Certain limitations of the current study suggest the need for further research in this 
area. Firstly, as with Batson and Ahmad‟s (2001) research, this study was developed under 
the assumption that participants would believe that giving their raffle tickets to the other 
person would cheer them up (i.e., addressing their partner‟s emotional needs). To do this, 
participants would be giving away their chances to the raffle (i.e., sacrificing their own 
financial needs), and thus there was a mismatch between the needs of the self and other (i.e., 
financial vs. emotional). It is possible that participants based their decisions on how much 
they believed the other person needed money, rather than an emotional boost, which the 
perceived need subscale was unable to measure. Individuals may behave differently when in 
the context of congruent needs (e.g., the sender‟s note might have suggested concerns about 
money), and so future research is needed to confirm the above model (Figure 7.2) in such 
contexts. For example, it might be that when a helping response more appropriately matches 
the target‟s particular needs, perceived need exhibits a more direct influence on the helping 
decision process.  
Secondly, the current study adopted a rather limited view of self-interest, and a 
broader examination may help to determine the reasons why individuals chose (or chose not) 
to help their fictional partner. For example, the separate domains of approach motivating self-
interest (e.g., pride at helping another) and avoidance motivating self-interest (e.g., avoiding 
the loss of money) were not measured here (see Cohen and Hoffner 2013). The self-interest 
subscale of the CAERS focuses primarily on avoidance motivation, but research including 
both domains of self-interest may lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the helping 




altruistic behaviour relate to the model presented in Figure 7.2. For example, a greater 
influence of approach motivating self-interest might suggest support for the negative state 
relief model (e.g., by helping the other in order to relieve one‟s own distress [Cialdini et al. 
1987], or to minimise feelings of guilt [Pelligra 2011]), whereas a greater influence of 
avoidance motivating self-interest might suggest support for the rational choice theory 
(retaining material goods for oneself).  
Thirdly, future research might examine the extent to which people offer help to 
others. As noted by Zaki (2014), even when one decides to help another, individuals may 
choose the helping response least costly to themselves, thus still being swayed by self-
interest. It would be interesting to replicate the current study but give participants the option 
of giving away only some of their raffle tickets. This might allow one to observe whether 
those who decide to help, give away less of their tickets as self-interest increases in salience, 
allowing for a more thorough investigation of the interaction between these factors.  
Fourthly, as with almost any procedure that involves deception, it is possible that 
some participants failed to declare their suspicions about the nature of the study when asked 
by the researcher (i.e., some participants included in the analyses may not have believed in 
the existence of their research partner). This risk is perhaps further increased by the sampling 
of psychology students, who often gain familiarity with deceptive procedures. Although 
various steps were taken to discourage suspicions (i.e., the researcher left the room to „talk to 
the partner‟; the note had been hand-written by a female colleague; various instructions were 
given to avoid the materials seeming too tailored to the fabricated situation), this is 
nevertheless a possibility and so the current results should be interpreted with some caution.  
Finally, as with Studies 1-4, further work would be needed to confirm these results 
with  more diverse samples, as the current findings are drawn only from university educated 




needed to confirm whether the model presented in Figure 7.2 remains applicable in other 
samples that do not match these characteristics. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results of this study have allowed for the enhancement of the model 
developed in Chapter 6, by demonstrating how the introduction of a genuine element of self-
interest changes the decision making process. In particular, it appears that self-interest 
represents an important additional step to the model presented in Chapter 6. This has allowed 
for the development of a more ecologically valid model of the decision making process, and 
has further added to our understanding of how the cognitive antecedents of empathic 




Chapter 8: Modelling the Cognitive 
Antecedents of Empathy and Sympathy 
8.1 Introduction 
Thus far, the purpose of the research reported in this thesis has been to identify the 
potential cognitive antecedents of empathy and sympathy, to develop a tool to measure such 
factors, and to examine their influences on empathic responding and helping behaviours. The 
results have allowed for the identification of the most influential cognitive antecedents of 
empathy and sympathy, and some common themes have emerged. The findings of those 
studies reported in chapters 5-7 can now be combined, so as to draw overall conclusions for 
our understanding of how these cognitions contribute to the overall empathic process.  
Before discussing the results, as all findings are based upon data gleaned from the 
CAERS, it is important to confirm the factor structure of the scale at this stage. The same 
confirmatory factor analysis reported in Study 3 (Chapter 5) was conducted using data from 
those studies not included in this original analysis (i.e., studies 2, 4, and 5) (n = 244), in order 
to see whether model fit can be replicated in novel samples. Goodness of fit indices (χ
2
/df  = 
1.69; NNFI = .88; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .05) were acceptable according to recommended 
values (Bentler and Bonett 1980, MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara 1996, Ullman 2001), 
providing support for the validity of the CAERS. However, values for the NNFI and CFI did 
still remain below Hu and Bentler‟s (1999) more stringent recommendations of .95. It is 
likely that model complexity is still a disadvantage at present, as it is more difficult to 
achieve good model fit with a large number of scale items (Anderson and Gerbing 1991). 
Incorporating all the data collected within this thesis (i.e., including the sample used for the 
original validation; n = 421) improved the above model fit indices (χ
2
/df  = 1.85; NNFI = .92; 




match Hu and Bentlers (1999) more stringent recommendations. Further testing will be 
required to establish whether shortening the scale (perhaps by removing less influential 
subscales; see below) can also lead to further improvements.   
8.2 Building a hierarchical model of cognitive antecedents 
Encouragingly, several similarities appeared across each of the studies described in 
Chapters 5-7. For example, valuing had a significant influence on empathy in all three 
studies, with perceived need, morality and similarity having a significant influence in two 
studies each (i.e., Studies 3 and 5 for perceived need and similarity; Studies 4 and 5 for 
morality). Similarly, valuing significantly influenced sympathy in all three studies, while 
perceived need and self-interest were significant predictors of sympathy in two studies each 
(i.e., Studies 3 and 5). All of these relationships were in the directions consistent with the 
research described in Chapter 3.  
Despite these significant relationships, several cognitions did not appear to 
significantly influence empathy (i.e., blame, perceived power, and self-interest) and/or 
sympathy (e.g., blame, perceived power, and agency) in any of the studies reported here. 
There are three possibilities that may explain these findings. Firstly, these variables may 
indeed have no relationship with empathy / sympathy. This suggestion is unlikely, however, 
given the past research in this field (see Chapter 3). Secondly, the power of the studies 
reported here may have been too small to capture the effects of so many variables of interest. 
Thirdly, the influences of these variables may be mediated through those variables with 
significant influences. Aggregating the data from Studies 2-5 would allow for substantially 
greater power, allowing for an investigation into these possibilities. Although there appears to 




further examination, this method allows for the development of a preliminary model of the 
antecedents of empathic responding.  
A data-driven procedure was therefore used to build a hierarchical model of the 
influences of CAERS cognitions on empathy and sympathy (i.e., to identify primary and 
secondary influences). Using data from all four studies that employed the CAERS (n = 421), 
linear regressions were conducted to identify which cognitions had direct influences on 
empathy and sympathy; henceforth termed „first-order antecedents‟. Durbin-Watson tests 
indicated acceptable autocorrelation when both empathy and sympathy were entered as the 
dependent variable (d = 1.96 for both tests). Similarly, low variance inflation factor (VIF) 
values (< 2) indicated acceptable multicollinearity for both tests. The residuals for each test 
were also normally distributed. The results (Table 8.1) suggested that the first-order 
antecedents of empathy are perceived need, valuing, cognitive empathy, morality, and 
similarity. The first-order antecedents of sympathy are perceived need, self-interest, valuing, 
cognitive empathy, and morality. Similar to the findings presented in Table 5.4, the fact that 
nearly all variables individually correlated with empathy/sympathy (as found in previous 
research) but did not all maintain this relationship when covariates were taken into account, 
reaffirms the need to test such variables in combination, and demonstrates that not all 
antecedents are equally influential.  
As noted on the previous page, a lack of power in previous studies may have resulted 
in type II errors with regards to the influence of some variables on empathy (blame, perceived 
power, and self-interest) and/or sympathy (blame, perceived power, and agency). The fact 
that the aggregated data still exhibits small (according to Cohen 1988) and non-statistically-
significant regression coefficients suggests that when these variables exhibited non-
statistically significant relationships with empathy or sympathy in Studies 3-5, this was not 




variables have an indirect influence on empathy / sympathy, mediated through first-order 
antecedents. Variables with such indirect influences will henceforth be termed „second-order 
antecedents‟. 
 
Table 8.1  
Linear regressions with empathy and sympathy as the dependent variable 
 Empathy  Sympathy 
Cognitions r β
a
  (t)  r β
a
  (t) 
Block 1      
    SDS    .14** .14 (2.88**)    .17***   .17 (3.60***) 
Block 2      
    Perceived Need   .41*** .18 (4.45***)   .52***  .26 (6.34***) 
    Blame  -.32***  .00 (0.03)  -.32***   -.05 (-1.32) 
    Self-Interest  -.34*** -.03 (-0.73)  -.39***   -.09 (-2.23*) 
    Perceived Power  -.17*** -.04 (-1.06)       -.05    .01 (0.30) 
    Valuing .66***  .47 (11.79***)   .55*** .33 (7.91***) 
    Morality .33***  .12 (3.00**)   .44*** .20 (5.00***) 
    Agency .23***  .04 (1.20)   .30***    .05 (1.33) 
    Cog. Empathy .43***  .14 (3.66***)   .42***    .12 (2.72**) 
    Similarity .28***  .13 (3.60**)        .13**    .06 (1.64) 
Note. “SDS” = social desirability scale.  
a
All variables entered on the first block. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 
Linear regressions were conducted to determine the relationships between second- 
and first-order antecedents. Durbin-Watson and VIF statistics were again within acceptable 
limits. The results of these regressions can be found in Table 8.2 for empathy and in Table 
8.3 for sympathy. One could argue that the causal direction may be reversed for these 
relationships (i.e., that first-order antecedents influence second-order antecedents, and that 




nearly all second-order antecedents correlate with empathy/sympathy seems to preclude this 
possibility.  
 
Table 8.2  
Regressions for the relationship between first- and second-order antecedents of empathy 




Cog. Empathy Perceived need Valuing Morality Similarity 
β  (t) β  (t) β  (t) β  (t) β  (t) 
Self interest -.16 (-3.13**) -.28 (-5.30***) -.19 (-3.75***) -.10 (-1.88)  .05 (0.90) 
Blame -.35 (-7.11***) -.02 (-0.29) -.56 (-7.67***) -.10 (-2.08*) -.19 (-3.68***) 
Agency  .08 (1.56)  .21 (4.07***)  .07 (1.36)  .35 (6.85***) -.04 (-0.77) 
PP  .02 (0.45)  .15 (3.01**) -.21 (-4.62***)  .14 (2.78**) -.33 (-6.68***) 
Note: „PP‟ = perceived power. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 8.3  
Regressions for the relationship between first- and second-order antecedents of sympathy 




Cog. Empathy Perceived need Valuing Morality Self-Interest 
β  (t) β  (t) β  (t) β  (t) β  (t) 
Similarity   .14 (2.71**) -.12 (-2.12*)   .20 (4.15***)  -.05 (-1.03)   .05 (0.90) 
Blame -.36 (-7.29***) -.09 (-1.79) -.36 (-7.78***)  -.13 (-2.68**)  .21 (4.23***) 
Agency  .14 (2.88**)  .29 (5.82***)  .14 (2.99**)   .38 (7.80***) -.31 (-6.47***) 
PP  .04 (0.82)  .07 (1.26) -.18 (-3.67***)   .10 (2.01*)  .17 (3.34**) 
Note: „PP‟ = perceived power. 




One additional consideration that should be examined is whether the influences of the 
antecedents of sympathy (Tables 8.1 and 8.3) are mediated through their effects on empathy. 
Building on the suggestions of others (e.g., Eisenberg et al. 1991), the initial model proposed 
in Chapter 3 denoted that empathy precedes sympathy within the empathic process. Given 
that empathy and sympathy share many common antecedents it is possible that a mediation 
effect is present. To test this possibility, the above regression was repeated with sympathy as 




control variable. The results of this regression (Table 8.4) are much the same as in Table 8.1, 
with the exception being the now non-statistically significant influence of cognitive empathy; 
suggesting that the influence of this variable on sympathy is mediated through empathy. To 
test the alternative possibility that sympathy precedes empathy, empathy was entered as the 
dependent variable, and sympathy was entered as the control variable. Similar to the above, 
most of the effects from Table 8.1 remained; the exception being the now non-significant 
influence of morality, which suggests that this variable is mediated through sympathy. In 
summary, these results seem to contradict the original model presented in Chapter 3 (i.e., 
Figure 3.1), and instead suggest that the cognitive antecedents act independently on both 
empathy and sympathy.  
 
 
Table 8.4  
Investigating the possibility of mediation effects between empathy and sympathy 
 Sympathy  Empathy 
Cognitions β t  β t 
Block 1 (controls)      
      SDS .08         2.20*  .02 0.56 
      Empathy .68 19.29***  - - 
      Sympathy - -   .69      19.29*** 
Block 2      
      Perceived Need  .19   4.86***   .09   2.17* 
      Blame -.05        -1.41   .02 0.51 
      Self-Interest -.08        -2.11*   .01 0.13 
      Perceived Power  .03         0.76  -.04        -1.27 
      Valuing  .14 3.17**   .35       8.83*** 
      Morality  .15   4.11***   .04         1.16 
      Agency  .03         0.94   .03         0.74 
      Cognitive Empathy  .05         1.41   .10    2.80** 
      Similarity  .01         0.27   .11    3.21** 
Note. “SDS” = social desirability scale.  





Figure 8.1. A model of the cognitive antecedents of empathy and sympathy. 
 
 
By drawing together the findings reported above, a new model of the antecedents of 
empathic responding can be presented (Figure 8.1). In summary, cognitive empathy and 
similarity have a direct influence on empathy; morality and self-interest have a direct 
influence on sympathy; and valuing and perceived need have a direct influence on both 
empathy and sympathy. These first-order antecedents are in turn influenced by second-order 
antecedents: agency, blame, and perceived power. This is a rather simplified model, and more 
complex relationships do exist within each order of antecedents. For example, Batson et al. 
(2007) have previously reported that valuing has an influence on perspective taking 
(cognitive empathy). Davis et al. (1996) have suggested that perspective taking can increase 
perceived similarity. Batson et al. (1995) have reported that increased similarity can increase 




however, the model presented in Figure 8.1 should nevertheless prove useful in identifying 
the most pressing targets for those wishing to enhance empathy and/or sympathy in others. 
The implications that these results have for our understanding of each of the cognitive 
antecedents of empathy and sympathy can now be discussed in greater depth. 
 
 
Table 8.5  
Subscale correlation matrix (n = 421) 
 PN Blame SI PP Valuing Morality Agency CE Similar. 
PN - -.12* -.32*** .11* .26***  .46***  .30***  .32*** -.11* 
Blame - -  .23*** .03 -.40*** -.17*** -.04 -.38*** -.17*** 
SI - - - .12* -.32*** -.21***  -.31*** -.27*** -.04 
PP - - - - -.24***   .10*  -.01 -.01 -.34*** 
Valuing - - - - -   .18***   .12*   .35***  .29*** 
Morality - - - - - -   .39***   .19***  -.06 
Agency - - - - - - -   .15**  -.03 
CE - - - - - - - -   .18*** 
Similar. - - - - - - - - - 
notes: “PN” = Perceived Need”; “SI” = self-interest; “PP” = perceived power; “CE” = 
Cognitive Empathy. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 
8.2.1 The antecedents of both empathy and sympathy 
Valuing. Across all of the studies reported here, the extent to which participants 
liked/valued the target consistently had the strongest influence on the elicitation of empathy 
and sympathy (although the diminished beta value for the sympathy regression in Table 8.4 
suggests that much of this effect may be mediated through empathy). This finding is 
unsurprising given the common sense assumption that we will become more 




However, although the relationship between valuing and empathic responding has been noted 
in the literature (e.g., Batson et al. 2007, Stocks et al. 2011), it has not received the level of 
research attention that is deserved, given the current results. The exception to this is Batson et 
al. (2007), who placed the importance of valuing above other variables such as perceived 
need and perspective taking. These findings mean that those wishing to enhance empathic 
responding should certainly be aware of how much their client values the target(s) of 
concern. As noted by Batson et al. (2007), individuals value others at least moderately unless 
there is a cause for devaluation (e.g., an adversarial relationship; Hanson 2003), meaning that 
those wishing to enhance empathic responding should also be particularly mindful of 
potential reasons for devaluation.  
Perceived Need. The degree to which participants were able to discern an emotional 
need in the target also determined the degree to which empathy and sympathy were elicited, 
whereby the more needy targets elicited the most empathy/sympathy. This is again 
unsurprising as without this perception there would be nothing to feel emotional/concerned 
about. Such a finding is again consistent with prior research (e.g., Lishner, Batson, and Huss 
2011). Although perceived need did not appear to be an antecedent of either empathy or 
sympathy in Study 4, the results of Study 5 suggested that this may have been due to a lack of 
power. 
Although in some cases individuals may have a particular difficulty with recognising 
emotions in others (e.g., those with autism; Poljac, Poljac, and Wagemans 2012), it is 
assumed that generally people possess the ability to do this. Therefore, it is important that 
those wishing to enhance empathy/sympathy are aware that perceptions of need can be 
minimised to inhibit empathy when such an action would be of benefit to the perceiver. For 
example, Brown et al. (2013) discussed how empathy for victims can be avoided when 




are not limited to offenders. Therefore, when enhancing empathy/sympathy, one should make 
sure that practitioners are aware of such potential blocks to recognising emotional needs in 
others, and efforts should be made to avoid such blocks.  
8.2.2 The antecedents of empathy 
Cognitive empathy. The fact that one‟s ability to understand another‟s emotions 
featured as an antecedent of empathy was expected, especially given the importance 
attributed to perspective taking in the literature (e.g., Davis 1996, Lamm, Batson, and Decety 
2007), but also because of those other ways of understanding another‟s emotions such as 
reading facial expressions (Besel and Yuille 2010). However, this finding was somewhat 
unexpected in light of the non-statistically significant regression coefficients reported in 
Studies 4 and 5. The most likely explanation for this is that although cognitive empathy does 
appear to influence empathy (and therefore should be included as an antecedent of empathy 
in the model), this influence is relatively weak. Therefore, the relationship was only 
discoverable with greater statistical power (i.e., the analyses in the current chapter had 
considerably greater power than analyses in previous chapters). This suggests that, although 
important, understanding another‟s emotions is perhaps not as important (when compared to 
the other variables discussed here) as has been suggested in the past. Although understanding 
is needed for empathic responding, it might be that the influence of cognitive empathy is 
dichotomous (i.e., one either understands or does not understand another‟s emotions), and 
that the depth of this understanding (i.e., as a continuous variable) is not as important as the 
depth of other variables, such as valuing. This is reflected in the relatively small regression 
coefficients reported in the analyses above. 
Similarity. The more that participants perceived similarity with the target, the more 
likely they were to empathise with that person, consistent with prior research in this area 




direct relationship, rather than being mediated through cognitive empathy or valuing; a 
possibility raised in Chapter 3. It is important therefore, when wishing to enhance empathy, 
that similarities between the target and observer are emphasised. However, although there is 
evidence to suggest that similarity between the target and observer can improve prosocial 
responses (e.g., Feeny and Clarke 2009), other evidence suggests that such similarity can 
impede them. For example, Eayrs and Ellis (1990) reported that emphasising the equal rights 
and capabilities of „handicapped people‟ can reduce monetary donations; possibly because 
similar capability implies they do not need help. Similarity should therefore only be 
emphasised when it does not impede on perceptions of need.  
It was interesting to note that similarity did not feature as a significant predictor of 
empathy in Study 4. This could be due to a lack of power (as suggested in Chapter 7), but 
might also be explained by the work of Houston (1990), who reported that similarity has the 
greatest effect on empathic responding when the observer and target are similar on the factor 
most pertinent to the target‟s distress. It could be that the participants had less in common 
with the issues presented in Study 4 (i.e., the distressing consequences of war), and had more 
similar experiences to the targets in Study 3 (i.e., bullying) and Study 5 (i.e., the breakup of a 
relationship); explaining the greater effect of similarity on empathic responding in Studies 3 
and 5. Empathy enhancers may again wish to bear this in mind.  
8.2.3 The antecedents of sympathy 
 The antecedents of sympathy are a rather under-researched area, with research into 
factors relating to sympathy often being merged with empathy, and not presented explicitly 
(see Chapter 2). The results reported here suggest that sympathy is perhaps not as important 
as empathy in relation to helping behaviours, which is usually the ultimate goal for those 




with regards to sympathy, and also further add to the arguments made in Chapter 2 that 
sympathy should be separated from empathy in the research literature.  
Morality. The results reported here suggest that the more participants believed what 
had happened to the target was morally wrong, the more concerned they became for that 
target (consistent with Schulz et al. 2013). Although morality also appeared to have an effect 
on empathy, which would be consistent with previous suggestions (e.g., Bandura et al. 1996), 
further analyses determined that this appears to be mediated through feelings of sympathy.  
Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas (2010) suggested that when individuals perceive 
unjustified suffering, compassion (related to sympathy; see Chapter 2) is elicited to motivate 
individuals to remedy this suffering. Individuals may therefore fail to feel sympathetic for a 
target either because they failed to perceive a breach of morals (i.e., the suffering is justified), 
or because that target falls outside of the individual‟s “moral community” (i.e., the range of 
people for which morality is applied; Hills 2001: 55), and so considerations of fairness are 
not applied to that target (Opotow 1990). One way in which practitioners may enhance a 
sense of concern for others, therefore, might be to encourage relevant moral codes in their 
clients, and to ensure that morality is applied to relevant targets. Such a task may be difficult 
however, as although most people at least have the intention to act in a morally just way, such 
moral codes are easily violated when they could act in a manner more consistent with self-
interest (Batson, Ahmad, and Tsang 2002).  
 Self-Interest. Hardin‟s (1977 cited in Batson, Ahmad, and Tsang 2002: 436) “cardinal 
rule” is to “never ask a person to act against self-interest”. This certainly seems to be the case 
for those participants in Study 5, who appeared to base their helping decisions primarily on 
the salience of their own interests. The fact that self-interest also appears to have a negative 
impact on feelings of concern (i.e., sympathy) is also consistent with past research (e.g., 




others when addressing these would interfere with personal goals. In relation to sympathy, it 
would seem that when self-interest is salient, concern for one‟s own needs (i.e., self-interest) 
takes priority over concern for the other person‟s needs (i.e., sympathy). For example, 
Arsenio and Lemrise (2001) discussed how bullies are less concerned about their victims 
when bullying behaviours can help achieve self-satisfaction. Those wishing to enhance 
feelings of concern in individuals may therefore try to enhance the salience of targets‟ needs, 
aiming to supersede the salience of self-needs. Although this suggestion requires empirical 
support, such methods may prove more fruitful than targeting self-interest itself; attempting 
to break Hardin‟s (1977 cited in Batson et al. 2002) cardinal rule. Alternatively, practitioners 
could attempt to re-frame self-interest factors, to make them more compatible with the needs 
of others (e.g., by emphasising the potential self-benefits of helping behaviours). 
8.2.4 Second-order antecedents 
 Agency. Past research has tentatively suggested that the degree to which one feels 
able to help the target positively influences the amount of empathy felt for that person (see 
Chapter 3). The results presented in this thesis suggest that this is not the case in a direct 
sense. Rather, the effects of agency on empathy appear to be mediated through perceived 
need; in that feeling able to improve the target‟s situation encourages one to perceive greater 
need in that target. With respects to the antecedents of sympathy, agency increases 
perceptions of a breach of moral codes, perceived need, and valuing; while decreasing the 
salience of self-interest. It should be noted that although agency did not contribute to the 
empathy model in Chapter 5, Chapter 7, and in the current chapter, it did in Chapter 6. It is 
difficult to explain this anomaly at the present time, and this requires further investigation.  
Although agency seems to hold less importance than other variables in terms of 
empathic responding, it seems more important for the motivation of helping behaviours; 




had a direct influence on helping behaviours (partially mediated through empathy in this 
case), and in Study 5 agency had an influence on helping behaviours mediated through self-
interest. Therefore, while agency might not be a focus for those wishing to promote empathic 
responding, it might attract greater focus when the desire is to improve prosocial responding. 
 Blame. Similar to agency, blame appears to be more important for the promotion of 
helping behaviours than for the enhancement of empathic responding. Blame had a direct 
influence on helping in Study 4, and an indirect influence (mediated through self-interest) in 
Study 5; consistent with past research demonstrating a negative impact of blame on charitable 
donation behaviours (e.g., Eveland and Crutchfield 2007, Griffin et al. 1993). In terms of the 
antecedents of empathy and sympathy, blame appears to have an indirect effect mediated via 
negative influences on cognitive empathy, valuing, morality, and similarity. As with agency, 
although blame might not be a priority for those wishing to enhance empathy/sympathy, it 
might be a priority when the ultimate goal is to enhance prosocial behaviours (e.g., when 
trying to encourage charitable donation behaviours). 
 Perceived Power. The perceived power imbalance between an observer and a target 
appeared to have no influence on helping behaviours, but did have an indirect influence on 
both empathy and sympathy. When participants believed that they were more powerful than 
the target, they perceived a greater degree of need and perceived a greater breach of morals. 
This would suggest an overall enhancement of empathic responding (e.g., Côté et al. 2011). 
However, perceived power also reduced valuing and similarity; suggesting an inhibition of 
empathic responding (e.g., Lee and Tiedens 2001). As demonstrated with these examples, 
research continues to be inconclusive regarding the prosocial or antisocial nature of power 
(see Handgraaf et al. 2008), and so more research is required to disentangle these 
relationships (c.f. Mast, Jonas, and Hall 2009). As with agency and blame, although the lack 




by the fact that previous studies did not include measurement of covarying variables such as 
those presented here. 
8.3 Modelling the empathic process 
As well as having implications for our understanding of the antecedents of empathy 
and sympathy, the current results also add to our understanding of the overall empathic 
process. Although context (i.e., the target‟s situation) differed across each of the studies 
reported here, combining the data to analyse the antecedents of empathy and sympathy was 
justified due to similarities in the results of Studies 2-5. However, because of the differences 
in the results between Studies 4 and 5, it would not be justified to combine results regarding 
the antecedents of helping behaviours. Nevertheless, the results presented in Chapters 6 and 7 
have resulted in novel understanding regarding how the cognitive antecedents of empathic 
responding also contribute to the development of behavioural responses, thus further 
contributing to the development of the empathic process model.   
In the original model presented in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1) it was presumed that the 
effects of cognitive antecedents on sympathy would be mediated through empathy. The 
current results, however, suggest this not to be the case. In addition, it was presumed that 
helping behaviours would be based upon sympathetic responses. However, the results 
reported in this thesis suggest that helping behaviours may be based either upon empathy 
(Study 4) or upon the salience of self-interest (Study 5). Nevertheless, the results reported 
here seem supportive of the arguments made in Chapter 2. Specifically, that functional 
differences exist between empathy and sympathy, and that feelings of empathy do not 
necessarily lead to behavioural outcomes. Based on these findings, a revised version of the 
model is presented in Figure 8.2, with changes from the original model (i.e., Figure 3.1) 




This model serves as a useful demonstration of how the cognitive antecedents of 
empathy contribute to the overall empathic process. However, researchers should avoid 
making generalisations about the model at this stage, as data informing the latter stages (i.e., 
helping responses) was gleaned from studies investigating empathic responding in a 
monetary donation context. Further research is needed to determine whether the empathic 
process as described here remains consistent across different forms of prosocial behaviours 
(e.g., in healthcare or forensic contexts). Nevertheless, the consistencies in the antecedents of 
empathy and sympathy between different contexts (i.e., highschool bullying [Study 3], the 
effects of war [Study 4], and the ending of close relationships [Study 5]) are encouraging. 
In addition to the above, further research is needed to confirm whether this model 
remains applicable in samples outside of the largely young, university educated, Caucasian 
female participants employed within the studies reported here. Nevertheless, as noted in 
Chapter 5, although differences in absolute levels of empathy have been reported between 
genders and with increasing age (Lennon and Eisenberg 1987), there is no reason to assume 
at the current time that relative effects (i.e., the relationships between cognition and emotion) 
also differ in this manner. However, more work is needed to confirm this preposition.  
8.4 Conclusions 
 The results of Studies 1-5 make important contributions to our overall understanding 
of the influences of multiple cognitions on empathy and sympathy, and how these emotions 
are affected as state variables. Although previous research (see Chapter 3) has demonstrated 
that each of the cognitions discussed above have a significant influence on empathic 
responding, each cognition has typically been examined in isolation. By combining the full 
range of influences, analyses have allowed for the identification of which cognitions are most 




prove valuable in terms of identifying the most appropriate targets for those wishing to 
enhance empathy, sympathy, and/or prosocial behaviours in others; representing an important 
novel contribution of the current research.  
 In addition, the changes represented in Figure 8.2 have implications for our overall 
understanding of the empathic process. For example, previous authors (e.g., Eisenberg 1986, 
Singer and Lamm 2009) have suggested that sympathy (rather than empathy) should be most 
important for helping behaviours. The results reported here, however, contradict this 
proposal; instead suggesting that empathy and self-interest might be more important. It was 
also initially thought that cognitions would occur early on in the empathic process (before 
empathy; see Figure 3.1), influencing later variables (e.g., sympathy) indirectly. The results 
reported here instead suggest that cognitions have an influence on all stages of the model that 
were measured. The interactions present within this process are certainly complex, and more 
research is needed to confidently determine the full nature of these relationships.  
Although the influence of mood and self-esteem was not considered beyond the 
studies reported in Chapter 5, and therefore is not included in Figure 8.2, this does not mean 
that researchers should cease to investigate the influences of mood and self-esteem on 
empathic responding and prosocial behaviours. As discussed in Chapter 5, the CAERS was 
unsatisfactory in appropriately measuring the mood states of the participants in Study 3. 
Future research using alternative methods is needed to fully determine how empathic 
responding and prosocial behaviours may vary according to mood and self-esteem, and 
therefore how mood may also contribute to the model depicted in Figure 8.2. 
The results of the current research also further supports the need to move away from 
the predominantly trait view of empathy; consistent with those suggestions made in Chapters 
2 and 3. Although individuals may differ in their tendencies to feel empathy / sympathy for 































































actual expression of these emotions. The variables reported here are far from an exhaustive 
list, as other factors such as stress, anger, and intoxication may affect the expression of 
empathy/sympathy (Keenan and Ward 2000). There is clear importance in continuing 
research into the reasons behind the variation of empathy, sympathy, and prosocial 




















Chapter 9: Implications for research 
and practice 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a number of suggestions were made with regards to the 
implications of each cognitive antecedent, and how they may be taken into account by those 
wishing to enhance empathic responding in others. In summary, the results suggested that 
those wishing to enhance emotionality towards a target‟s suffering (i.e., empathy) should 
focus upon how much that individual values or likes the target, how able the individual is to 
understand the target‟s emotional responses, and the degree of perceived need and similarity 
with the target. Those wishing to make an individual more concerned about a target‟s 
suffering (i.e., sympathy) should also focus upon the degree of valuing and perceptions of 
need, as well as encouraging a sense of morality in the individual and reducing the salience or 
importance of self-interest factors. Those wishing to encourage prosocial behaviours should 
also focus upon perceptions of agency, blame, and self-interest.  
The discussions presented within the previous chapter were kept deliberately general, 
in order to summarise the knowledge gained from this research regarding the cognitive 
antecedents of empathic responding. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, empathy (along 
with its related terms) is a concept that features across a wide range of social contexts, and is 
particularly important within offender interventions, therapeutic relationships, and the 
encouragement of charitable donation behaviours. Therefore, as the implications of the 
current research apply to each of these themes, more specific discussions are needed. 
Consequently, the purpose of the current chapter is to build upon the discussions of Chapter 
8, by providing suggestions for those wishing to enhance empathy/sympathy within these 




marketing contexts), through illustrating how the current research may be furthered within 
these specific fields of interest. 
9.2 Implications for Those Working With Offenders 
9.2.1 Cognition, empathy, and offending  
It is often assumed that a lack of empathy
12
 held by offenders towards their victims 
allows them to commit their offences, and that by fostering empathy, more socially 
acceptable behaviour may be encouraged (Brown et al. 2013; Mann and Barnett 2013). As 
such, empathy components are commonly included in offender treatment programmes. For 
example, empathy components have been included within sex offender treatment 
programmes (SOTPs) for the past 30-40 years (Brown, Harkins, and Beech 2012, Kirsch and 
Becker 2006), and empathy is included within 87-100% of programmes in the US
13
  
(McGrath et al. 2009: 66). Although sex offender research largely dominates the empathy 
literature, empathy training modules are also offered to other groups such as violent offenders 
(e.g., Lauterbach and Hosser 2007, Serin, Gobeil, and Preston 2008, Ware, Cieplucha, and 
Matsuo 2011), and in other areas where individuals hurt others, such as bullying (e.g., van 
Noorden et al. 2015).  
Before considering the implications for treatment, one first needs to address the 
question of whether offenders do indeed have deficits in empathy (i.e., do they require an 
intervention?). The literature suggests that the answer to this question is yes; at least on some 
                                                             
12 Although typically using the term ‘empathy’, the forensic intervention literature does not tend to make the 
distinction between empathy and sympathy, and so more research is needed to disentangle these concepts. 
Nevertheless, this point is perhaps rendered moot as most programmes primarily focus upon the cognitive 
antecedents that precede these emotions (see Carich et al. 2003, Ward, Polaschek, and Beech 2006), rather 
than the emotions themselves.  
 
13
 More recently these empathy modules have been revoked in the UK due to a lack of empirical support. This 
is based upon reviews such as Mann and Barnett (2013), who argued that there is no evidence that empathy 




level. Although some researchers have claimed that offenders exhibit generalised problems 
with empathy (i.e., they have overall deficits in their abilities to feel empathy), others have 
reported no such deficits (see Marshall et al. 1995 for a review). As such, the evidence for 
trait deficits has been deemed equivocal at best (Brown et al. 2013). More contemporary 
accounts have moved, therefore, towards the view that although offenders generally possess 
the ability to feel empathy
14
, they may inhibit empathy towards certain people. Marshall and 
colleagues (e.g., Fernandez et al. 1999, Marshall et al. 1997, Marshall, Hamilton, and 
Fernandez 2001) in particular have demonstrated that offenders exhibit significant deficits in 
empathy towards their own victims compared to other victims of sexual abuse and victims of 
accidents; implying that these offenders inhibit empathy towards specific individuals only.  
Given that offenders appear to show state deficits in empathic responding, calls have 
been made to abandon generalised approaches to empathy, and to take more individualistic 
approaches to understand the variation of empathic responding according to context (Barnett 
and Mann 2013a, Marshall et al. 1995). Consequently, it has been suggested that one might 
investigate the reasons why deficits in empathic responding arise, rather than targeting 
deficits in empathic responding themselves (Barnett and Mann 2013a). Indeed, several 
models of offending include a disinhibition or „blocking‟ stage (e.g., Finkelhor 1984, 
Marshall and Barbaree 1990), which might prevent „normal‟ empathic responding from 
occurring. Of importance to the current research is the suggestion that these blocks may be 
achieved via cognitions (i.e., the cognitive antecedents of empathic responding) and, as noted 
by Barnett and Mann (2013a), it is these cognitive factors that should form the key targets for 
assessment and treatment.  
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 There are some exceptions to this generalisation. For example, Smallbone, Wheaton, and Hourigan (2003) 
reported trait deficits among versatile offenders (i.e., those committing a range of crimes). Other populations 




Research into the cognitive inhibition of empathy is nothing new, and has already 
been widely investigated in terms of offence supportive beliefs
15
 (Blake and Gannon 2008). 
Such beliefs can interrupt normal empathic responding (as argued by Ward, Polaschek, and 
Beech 2006), and thus inhibit or block empathic processes in the manner discussed above. 
Should one wish to enhance empathic responding (in the effort to reduce offending 
behaviour), one would therefore need to first address any offence supportive distortions 
(Ward, Polaschek, and Beech 2006). The effectiveness of such approaches has received some 
empirical support (e.g., Bumby 1996, Watson and Stermac 1994), which has formed the basis 
of a significant proportion of offender intervention programmes. However, support is 
nevertheless equivocal at present and as such, the effectiveness of cognitive restructuring 
approaches is subject to on-going debate (e.g., see Gannon and Polaschek 2006). 
9.2.2 Implications of the current research 
Although the above certainly suggests the utility of addressing offence supportive 
cognitions, two criticisms might be raised. Firstly, popular theories of offender cognitions are 
mostly specific to offence situations, and less interest has been paid to how offenders 
perceive their victims more generally (i.e., as people, rather than simply in terms of their 
victim status). Accordingly, it has been suggested that we search for beliefs “indicating a 
more pervasive way of seeing the world outside of the offence episode” (Gannon, Polaschek, 
and Ward 2005: 240-241). Secondly, these theories often assume a static and impersonal 
approach to cognition (Ward, Polaschek, and Beech 2005), whereas cognitions vary 
according to context and persons involved. The variables investigated within the current 
thesis are not specific to offending, and are not held in common towards all people; thus they 
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 The reader is referred to the ‘cognitive distortion’ literature, although the use of this term has been 
deliberately avoided here due to confusion surrounding its definition (see Blake and Gannon 2008; Ó Ciardha 




may prove to be a useful addition to research in this area; complimenting the existing offence 
supportive beliefs literature.  
To give an example, one of the blocks to empathy-consistent behaviour occurs when 
offenders dehumanise their victims (e.g., Bandura et al. 1996), believing them to be „sub-
human objects‟ (Bandura 2002) and treating them more harshly than if they were humanised 
(see Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson 1975). Alleyne, Fernandes, and Pritchard (2014) 
have demonstrated a positive relationship between dehumanization and violence in gang 
members. Efforts have therefore been made to develop interventions that re-humanise victims 
(e.g., see Carich et al. 2003), aiming to remove this block to empathy-consistent responding. 
However, using the current research may allow one to gain a more detailed understanding of 
an offender‟s cognitive structure (i.e., exactly how the offender perceives his/her victim(s)), 
which would further inform the processes necessary for the success of such an intervention. 
To illustrate, based upon the conclusions drawn in Chapter 8, programmes may wish to 
ensure that offenders value others, perceiving them as fellow humans “with feelings, hopes, 
and concerns” (Bandura et al. 1996). Perceiving victims as fellow humans, rather than as 
objects, might also increase perceived similarity. With this increased valuing and similarity, 
offenders may be able to reintroduce victims into their „moral communities‟ (see Hills 2001), 
encouraging behaviour to align with socially accepted moral codes that would otherwise be 
disengaged (Bandura 1999, Bandura et al. 1996). Once victims are re-humanised, offenders 
may start to think about their victims‟ perspectives more (c.f. Harris and Fiske 2006), which 
may lead to increases in perceived need (as a result of this increased understanding).  
As the above example demonstrates, making use of the current research would allow 
one to glean a more detailed understanding of the complex cognitive processes occurring 
within overarching changes such as „re-humanisation‟, which provides a wider range of 




perceived need; instead of just „victims are objects‟). Such changes can be monitored using 
the CAERS, with subscale scores also providing markers for treatment success. Programme 
facilitators would need to take self-interest into account alongside any such changes, as 
suggested by the results of Study 5 (i.e., see Figure 7.2). It might be that making the above 
changes to cognition would have little effect on behaviour should self-interest take priority 
during an offence situation. Alternatively, it might be that changes to cognition (e.g., greater 
valuing) towards particular targets would minimise the salience of self-interest during future 
encounters, eliciting prosocial motivations. Future research is needed to test these hypotheses.  
All of the first-order antecedents described in Chapter 8 have been linked to offending 
behaviour to some degree, and so all have the potential to be used in the above way. For 
example, offending behaviour has been associated with lower levels of (trait) cognitive 
empathy (Jolliffe and Farrington 2004), perceived similarity (see Bandura et al. 1996), 
valuing (see Hanson 2003), perceived need (via harm denial; Brown et al. 2013), moral 
disengagement (Bandura et al. 1996); and greater pursuance of self-interest (via a lack of 
self-control; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). The influence of each second-order antecedent 
has also received support. Lower agency (via responsibility shifting) and greater victim 
blaming have both been associated with offending behaviours (e.g., Brown et al. 2013); and 
there is evidence that child molesters choose their victims based on their victims‟ lack of 
power (Howells 1978). However, these cognitions have typically been dealt with in isolation. 
Examining these antecedents in combination (similar to the approach taken in the current 
research) will allow us to identify which cognitions are the most influential on empathic 
responding, which changes in cognition can lead to the greatest behavioural change in a 




9.2.3 The use of empathy to hurt others  
One assumption that should be avoided is the view that promoting empathy will 
necessarily lead to an increase in prosocial behaviours; a pitfall that is particularly relevant to 
offending contexts. For example, the results of Nitschke et al.‟s (2012) study suggested that 
sexual sadists do not lack empathy while committing their offences, but rather made use of 
empathy to understand their victims‟ suffering, so as to increase the pleasure derived from 
such acts. Similarly, Elliott, Browne, and Kilcoyne (1995) reported that child molesters use 
elements of empathy to identify vulnerable targets. In samples such as this, enhancing 
individuals‟ abilities to perceive emotions will be unlikely to have the desired effect, and may 
even make offending behaviour worse (e.g., Hilton 1993, Rice et al. 1994). This further 
emphasises the importance of understanding each offender‟s specific cognitive structure, and 
how this relates to his/her behaviours, before enrolment into intervention programmes. 
Hanson (2003) argued for the importance of sympathy, stating that empathy (i.e., emotional 
understanding) should occur in tandem with feelings of concern (i.e., sympathy) in order to 
encourage positive, rather than negative, changes to behaviour. This again supports the 
current argument: i.e., that it is important to understand specifically how the offender 
perceives his/her victim, rather than simply focussing upon enhancing feelings of empathy 
for them. For example, enhancing cognitive empathy or perceptions of need may have little 
(or even a negative) effect on behaviour should an offender lack appropriate morals or focus 
upon self-interests (i.e., antecedents of sympathy).  
9.2.4 Suggestions for future research  
Researchers should examine the relative influence of each CAERS cognition on 
offending behaviour; as well as which cognitive changes are able to bring about the greatest 




intervention programmes designed to enhance empathy. For example, within Carich et al.‟s 
(2003) review of treatment programmes, one can see the encouragement of perceived need in 
interventions emphasising victim impact; agency in letter writing interventions where 
offenders take ownership of their actions; valuing and morality in personalisation 
interventions; and the discouragement of victim blame in belief confrontation exercises. 
However, the development of these tasks appears to have been largely based upon what 
seemed most intuitive. The current research provides more specific (and empirically 
grounded) guidance for how to change cognition in a way that may lead to greater empathic 
responding, and the individual cognitions that may serve as markers for risk assessment and 
effective treatment change.  
Should these cognitions be targeted within interventions, it is important that 
programmes be evaluated to determine which component is the most important for 
behavioural change, as currently there has been very little research carried out to examine the 
relative influence of individual components of empathy interventions (Marshall and Serran 
2000). For example, although researchers (e.g., Beggs and Grace 2010; Olver et al. 2014) 
have reported that changes in other individual dynamic risk factors (e.g., sexual deviance, 
offence supportive beliefs, treatment compliance) predict a risk of recidivism, it is often 
unclear which components of the treatment programme have caused such changes. As 
suggested by Marshall and Serran (2000: 210), each component of an intervention should be 
evaluated to establish whether it: (i) causes the desired changes (e.g., to victim empathy); (ii) 
is necessary in its own right (i.e., the desired changes are not also caused by another 
component); and, (iii) results in long term reductions in recidivism. These suggestions would 





Ultimately, more research is needed in general as to the efficacy of empathy 
intervention programmes (which is currently lacking; Brown 2005, Mann and Barnett 2013), 
and components should not be included until one can demonstrate that they predict 
recidivism, or that addressing them can reduce recidivism (Mann and Barnett 2013). In 
particular, research is needed to determine the nature of the relationship (if any) between 
these cognitions and offending behaviour. For example, targeting cognitive deficits will have 
limited effectiveness if they only occur as post-hoc excuses for behaviour (Marshall, 
Marshall, and Kingston 2011), but may have more effectiveness should they facilitate or 
maintain general criminality (Ó Ciardha and Gannon 2011). Researchers would also need to 
consider the impact of self-interest in relation to these specific cognitive deficits, as the 
results of Study 5 suggest that self-interest can act as a key mediator between cognition and 
prosocial responding (although more research is required to determine whether this also 
applies to a forensic context). As discussed previously, future research is needed to determine 
whether changes in cognition are meaningless in the face of self-interest, or whether such 
changes are able to minimise the salience of self-interest, thus promoting prosocial responses.    
Once the above themes have been more thoroughly researched, practitioners could use 
this information to identify specific thought patterns within each individual that allow blocks 
to victim-empathy to occur (i.e., that individual‟s dynamic risk factors). Treatments could 
then be individually tailored to each offender‟s cognitive shortcomings (Barnett and Mann 
2013b); consistent with the need principle of the Risk-Needs-Responsivity model (Andrews 
and Bonta 2010). The current cognitions may also tie in with Ward and Durrant‟s (2013) 
more recent suggestions to take Kitcher‟s (2010) five dimensions of altruistic responding into 
account during assessment and intervention. Adding to Ward and Durrant‟s suggestions, a 
consideration of valuing and similarity might help to explain the range of people excluded 




deficits and the salience of self-interest during sexual arousal to determine the scope of 
situations where the offender is altruistically compromised. An assessment of the offender‟s 
ability to perceive need and control self-interest could determine his/her ability in the 
discernment of the consequences of his/her behaviour. Cognitive empathy and perceived need 
could also be assessed as an indication of the offender‟s empathic skills, and the intensity of 
altruistic behaviours could be enhanced via consideration of agency (i.e., the ability to change 
one‟s behaviour) and perceptions of need.  
Future research could examine the efficacy of using the cognitive antecedents 
discussed here to complement existing practice in the manner discussed above. CAERS 
scores taken pre- and post- treatment will aid in tracking any specific changes occurring 
during intervention (although there are limitations associated with using change scores as an 
indication of treatment success; Wakeling and Barnett 2014). It is important that 
interventions remain “future focussed” (Barnett and Mann 2013b: 30), and so research is 
needed to examine whether facilitating changes in the cognitive antecedents of empathic 
responding can lead to improvements in future behaviour. An examination of interactions 
with past victims to identify pertinent cognitive deficits (e.g., low valuing) will serve as a 
useful starting point, but the challenge will be to ensure that appropriate cognitions are 
applied to future potential victims; especially when faced with barriers such as schema 
activation during strong affective states, sexual arousal, and intoxication (see e.g., Gannon, 
Polaschek, and Ward 2005), which may lead to an increased pursuance of self-interests. 
9.3 Implications for Those Working With Healthcare 
Professionals 
„Compassionate care‟ is considered to be one of the six key values for healthcare 




respect and dignity” (NHS 2012: 13). Compassionate practice is important for perceived 
quality of care in patients (Irurita 1999), can help to minimise patients‟ distress (Olson 1995), 
and can improve treatment outcomes through the creation of a „healing climate‟, enabling 
hope and confidence in patients (von Dietze and Orbe 2000). Compassionate practice is 
therefore a central interest for patient satisfaction and wellbeing. However, there have been a 
number of concerns raised in recent years by several UK agencies with regards to low levels 
of compassionate care delivered by healthcare professionals (e.g., Care Quality Commission 
2014, Department of Health 2013, Francis 2013, Keogh 2013, The Patients‟ Association 
n.d.), and so approaches are needed to instil and maintain compassion consistent values in 
those working in healthcare.  
As with other fields, the definitional issues present within the healthcare literature 
make the application of the current research somewhat difficult. Authors rarely provide 
explicit definitions for terms used, and definitions are inconsistent when provided. For 
example, definitions have focused upon what I have defined as empathy (e.g., von Dietze and 
Orbe 2000) and sympathy (e.g., Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010). Other authors 
(e.g., Low and LaScala 2014) have chosen to use the term „empathy‟, but have included 
„compassion‟ in their definition. Given the lack of distinction between these terms, authors in 
this field would be wise to consider similar investigations to that given to empathy in Chapter 
2. The results of one such study (Kneafsey et al. 2015) suggested that practitioners 
understand compassion to include empathic emotions as well as a behavioural component. 
This is consistent with von Dietze and Orbe (2000), who suggested that compassion goes one 
step further than empathic responding, and includes the desire to improve another‟s 
condition, and to work together with the patient to resolve any problems. As this means that 
therapeutic relationships are dyadic in nature (i.e., between the healthcare professional and 




professional, as well as how this is communicated to the patient. Each of these themes shall 
be considered below. 
9.3.1 Empathic responding  
Although it is generally accepted that empathic responding is important for 
compassionate care (e.g., NHS 2012, Rogers 1980), specific guidance as to how to encourage 
empathic responding is rarely provided for healthcare educators (Decety et al. 2014). As such 
(similar to the forensic literature), empathy interventions lack consistency (see Brunero, 
Lamont, and Coates 2009, Stepien and Baernstein 1997) and are seemingly based upon what 
appears most intuitive. The results of the current research can be used to draw together 
existing knowledge in this field, and provide specific suggestions for how to encourage and 
maintain empathic responding. For example, the current research is consistent with the 
suggestion that healthcare professionals should be encouraged to understand the issues faced 
by their patients (i.e., cognitive empathy) (Fox 1990). One may build upon this, and make use 
of the results presented in Table 8.5 to determine which cognitions may increase one‟s 
motivation to seek this understanding (significant correlations were reported between 
cognitive empathy and perceived need, blame, self-interest, valuing, agency, and morality).  
The other cognitive antecedents of empathy may also be considered (e.g., perceived 
need, valuing, and similarity). For example, encouraging practitioners to reflect upon their 
patients‟ levels of pain (i.e., perceived need) can lead to the appropriate delivery of 
compassionate care (see Goubert et al. 2005), which is important as evidence suggests that 
nurses routinely underestimate the amount of pain experienced by their patients (e.g., Sloman 
et al. 2005). Low empathy has also been associated with the objectification of one‟s patients 
(i.e., low valuing / similarity) (see Haque and Waytz 2012), and so educators may wish to 




received some research interest in isolation, future researchers could again follow the 
combined approach taken here, to determine which aspects of cognition are the most 
important for compassionate care, and which specific changes in cognition bring about the 
greatest changes in practice.  
Research in this field has not examined the benefits of sympathy as it has been 
defined here. However, it seems sensible to assume that healthcare professionals would be 
more motivated to help another when they are concerned for their patients‟ wellbeing; 
especially given the common association between sympathy and helping behaviours (e.g., 
Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad 2006). The antecedents of sympathy might be considered in 
addition to the above, as healthcare workers must have a strong sense of morals, and 
behaviours should be based upon these moral principles rather than the satisfaction of one‟s 
self-interest (von Dietze and Orb 2000). Downie and Calman (1994) have also suggested that 
individuals will most likely act in a compassionate manner when they believe that one should 
help others, treat others fairly, and help the majority rather than oneself. Again, research is 
needed to examine the comparative importance of empathy and sympathy in the delivery of 
compassionate care.  
„Ward culture‟ (i.e., the common values and practices held within healthcare teams) 
might also be taken into account, as this could help or hinder any cognitive changes in the 
above manner, should a healthcare professional‟s colleagues promote positive or negative 
values / practices respectively. For example, there is evidence to suggest that patient centred 
care is strongly associated with a „positive ward climate‟ (Abdelhadi and Drach-Zahavy 
2012). Hospital managers could take this into consideration and try to encourage a culture of 
positive cognition towards patients, which may encourage greater empathic responding in 
individual staff members. Healthcare professionals should also be wary of the language they 




dehumanise patients, leading to lower valuing, in turn leading to deficits in compassionate 
care. Richman and Mercer (2004) provided examples of various derogatory terms commonly 
used within modern healthcare to describe certain patient groups.  
Targeting more senior nurses (e.g., team leaders) might be a particularly effective 
approach for each of the suggestions presented in this section. Richman and Mercer (2004) 
proposed that more senior staff serve as examples of best practice, and that these examples 
are likely to be adopted within the culture of the ward. Masterson et al. (2014) also 
demonstrated that a compassion programme for band 6 and 7 nurses improved compassion 
not only in those participating in the programme, but also in their respective teams. Effective 
leadership is also able to foster greater engagement with personal professional development 
in nursing teams (e.g., Day 2014), which might again increase the success of any intervention 
targeting the cognitive antecedents of empathy. Taken together, these points suggest that 
attempts to make changes to individual nurses‟ empathy-related cognitions would have 
greater effectiveness in a culture that is conducive to change and promotes compassionate 
practices. Intervention developers may therefore be wise to also focus on improving prosocial 
cognitions at the ward culture level, which may help to support changes made within 
individual healthcare professionals. 
9.3.2 Communicating empathy  
As noted before, compassionate care goes beyond empathic responding, and involves 
a behavioural element. Compassion is about working with another person (von Dietze and 
Orbe 2000), rather than simply feeling the same as them (i.e., empathy; Hein and Singer 
2008). As such, although empathic responding may motivate the health-worker to behave 
compassionately (and so remains important), the focus should be on patient experience; 




(Doyle, Hungerford, and Cruickshank 2014; see also Barret-Lennard 1981). Accordingly, it is 
how carers behave that will determine the degree of compassionate care experienced by the 
patient (Yu and Kirk 2009); with the nature of this behaviour being at least partly determined 
by cognition. However, it seems that when opportunities arise, doctors rarely communicate 
empathy to their patients (Morse, Edwardsen, and Gordon 2008). The current research can be 
used as a starting point to examine which aspects of empathy/sympathy should be 
communicated most to patients (i.e., what would lead to the greatest improvement in patients‟ 
perceptions of care); thus facilitating the benefits of compassionate care to the greatest 
degree.  
To use empathy as an example, the model presented in Figure 8.1 suggests that 
practitioners might communicate valuing, similarity, cognitive empathy, and perceived need 
to their patients. Two processes perhaps encapsulate these four variables: Firstly, healthcare 
professionals should ensure that they humanise patients, and attempt to move away from the 
objectivity based „cure-rather-than-care‟ approach (Kelly 2007), and towards patient-oriented 
methods (see Kelly 2007, Neumann et al. 2011). Incorporating this into behaviour will make 
their patients feel valued as persons rather than mechanical objects, which enables carers and 
patients to work in partnership (as emphasised by von Dietze and Orbe 2000). Working in 
partnership may also allow patients to feel on the same level as their carers (i.e., similar, as 
they are no longer objectified). Carers may also achieve similarity by drawing upon personal 
experiences to form emotional connections with their patients (Fahrenwwald et al. 2005). 
Secondly, carers should be encouraged to reflect upon their patients‟ perspectives, to gain an 
understanding of their emotional needs (i.e., cognitive empathy and perceived need), and 
communicate this understanding back to their patients (e.g., “I understand how you feel”; 
Nightingale, Yarnold, and Greenberg 1991: 420). These approaches are perhaps already taken 




here, research has rarely examined the individual components of empathy education 
practices, and so we know little about which aspects of communication are the most 
important from a patient experience point of view. 
9.3.3 Personal distress and staff burnout 
Although empathy seems beneficial for therapeutic relationships, one should be wary 
of overexposure. Consistent with the model presented in Figure 8.2, overbearing feelings of 
empathy and a lack of emotional regulation can lead to personal distress, which can lead to 
reductions in prosocial behaviour (as suggested by the results of Study 4; also see Batson 
1991, Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade 1987). In a healthcare context this can lead to lower job 
performance (Riggio and Taylor 2000) and secondary issues such as burnout or compassion 
fatigue (Abendroth and Flannery 2006): conditions typified by emotional disengagement with 
one‟s patients (Figley 1995). Sources of stress within healthcare professions such as high 
workloads, inadequate staffing, and interpersonal conflicts (see Maytum, Bielski-Heiman, 
and Garwick 2004, Zander, Hutton, and King 2010) can also lead to burnout or compassion 
fatigue (Abendroth and Flannery 2006, Aycock and Boyle 2009). Interventions for these 
stress-based issues are likely best dealt with at a policy level (e.g., addressing staff shortages), 
or through increased resilience to stress via mindfulness training (e.g., Martín-Asuero and 
García-Banda 2010) or self-reflection (see Brown et al. 2015). However, the variables 
highlighted in the current research may be used to track specific changes in one‟s cognitive 
structure during empathic decline; which should lead to the identification of specific targets 
for prevention and intervention. For example, if decreases in empathic responding due to 
personal distress are caused primarily by deficient valuing (i.e., patient objectification and 
detachment), then patient valuing could be monitored as a risk factor for burnout and 




CAERS can be used to fulfil both these aims (e.g., the CAERS could be used to monitor 
patient valuing in nurses deemed to be at risk of burnout, and by measuring valuing before 
and after a compassion fatigue intervention).  
9.3.4 Suggestions for future research 
Future research may build upon the findings presented within this thesis by 
investigating the specific changes occurring in healthcare practitioners‟ cognitions towards 
their patients. Researchers might wish to more closely examine which of these variables 
should be both experienced and communicated to patients (e.g., cognitive empathy; 
Nightingale, Yarnold, and Greenberg 1991), which should be experienced but not 
communicated (e.g., affective empathy, which could detract focus away from the patient; see 
Ruusuvuori 2005), and which should neither be experienced nor communicated (e.g., self-
interest; Downie and Calman 1994, von Dietze and Orb 2000). Research may even examine 
whether communicating the antecedents of empathic responding (i.e., that the patient is 
valued etc.), but experiencing the affective element to a lesser degree, can effectively ensure 
patient satisfaction, while simultaneously reducing the risk of personal distress. Ward culture 
should also be taken into account, as this may allow one to make positive changes to whole 
teams, as well as support changes made at an individual level. Specific knowledge of the 
cognitive antecedents to empathic care may lead to the development of more informed (and 
specific) intervention and education strategies aiming to enhance and maintain compassionate 
care. 
Finally, although this discussion has focussed on empathy in a healthcare context, 
many of the issues discussed above are ultimately an occupational psychological concern. 
The same discussions may apply to any contexts where people are expected to care for others. 




whether an empathic environment may foster a better school experience (see Aspey and 
Roebuck 1975). The themes discussed here may also apply to maternal fatigue: a condition 
similar to compassion fatigue, typified by a lack of warmth of a mother towards her child 
(Giallo, Rose, and Vittorino 2011). The current research can be used a starting point to foster 
an understanding of the specific cognitive changes necessary to improve empathic responding 
(and behaviour) in these other areas of caring.  
9.4 Implications for Those Aiming to Encourage Charitable 
Giving 
The implications for charitable giving have already been discussed in Chapter 6, and 
so unnecessary repetition shall be avoided here. However, to remind the reader, it was 
concluded in Chapter 6 that charity advertisers should avoid notions of blame (e.g., 
victimisation due to poor decision making), while making observers aware how their 
donations can make a difference to the recipient (i.e., agency). The elicitation of empathy 
should also be encouraged; best achieved by presenting targets as valuable individuals, and 
emphasising the moral injustice of the target‟s situation. These latter findings in particular 
should prove useful to advertisers who wish to evoke empathy in their audiences, as how to 
achieve such a result is not immediately obvious. The results reported here therefore offer 
more specific guidance on how to present the targets of charitable efforts, so as to enhance 
the elicitation of empathy and donation behaviours. It is envisaged that the current findings 
will be used to develop more effective campaigns for charitable organisations, with the 
overall aim to improve income generation for those who need it. However, there are several 
avenues for further research.  
Firstly, the results of Study 5 suggested that once genuine elements of self-interest 




processes are altered. Future research could examine this idea further, and identify the factors 
that determine the threshold at which donation behaviours motivated by empathic responding 
overrule non-donation behaviours motivated by self-interest; and vice versa. This might have 
implications for charities with regards to how much they ask of their potential donors. For 
example, a common approach at present is to ask donors to make monthly payments via 
direct debit. However, this may serve to increase the perceived costs to self-interest in 
potential donors (versus asking for a single payment), which may lessen the likelihood of a 
donation (as suggested by the results of Study 5). A potential avenue for further research, 
therefore, is to examine whether requests for direct debit payments lead to a lower likelihood 
of donating compared to requests for single payments, mediated via increased perceived costs 
to self-interest.  
Secondly, perceived benefits to the self (such as pride or social approval; Fisher, 
Vandenbosch, and Antia 2008) may also encourage donation behaviours; a factor not 
investigated in the current research. Although charity advertisers should avoid emphasising 
benefits to the self (which may actually reduce the likelihood of donating; Fisher, 
Vandenbosch, and Antia 2008), it may again be interesting to investigate how perceived self-
benefits interact with perceived self-costs and empathic responding; in turn deducing the 
most important factors for generation income.  
Thirdly, the assumption that manipulating the above variables can bring about 
increases in donations needs confirming, as research to date has largely been correlational in 
nature (i.e., describing the features of existing campaigns). This is especially important 
should an overuse of these methods cause observers to down-regulate emotional engagement 
in order to avoid feelings of personal distress (e.g., see Cameron and Payne 2011). Similarly, 
organisations would be wise to avoid an overuse of these methods should they be powerful 




the results of Study 4 suggest that increasing valuing might be an effective way of increasing 
prosocial feelings of empathy, it may be that this also increases feelings of personal distress. 
This would not only reduce the likelihood of donating but would also have ethical 
implications. Future research should aim to replicate Study 4, with the inclusion of a state 
personal distress measure. This would allow one to identify which variables lead to the 
greatest elicitation of empathy (thus increasing the likelihood of a donation) but without any 
associated increases in personal distress (which could decrease the likelihood of donation, 
and have harmful effects on one‟s audience). As an example, the reader is referred to a recent 
news story illustrating the dangers of overwhelming charity campaigns (BBC 2015).  
9.5 Other Considerations 
Although the current research should prove useful as a starting point for those 
concerned with the cognitive antecedents of empathic responding, further research is 
necessary with regards to the effects of social desirability, the controlled/automaticity debate, 
and to the causal order of factors within the empathic process. 
9.5.1 Social desirability  
When measuring levels of empathic responding it is important to consider the effects 
of social desirability, as existing measures have previously been criticised for self-
presentation bias (e.g., Curwen 2003, Kampfe et al. 2013). Although efforts were taken to 
avoid social desirability correlates (see Chapter 4), the same criticism can be applied to the 
CAERS, with some subscales significantly correlating with the social desirability measure. 
Encouragingly, correlation coefficients were small (according to Cohen 1988). However, 
such effects may become more pronounced within more sensitive contexts (Fazio and Olsen 




respond in a socially desirable manner; especially when their progression through the justice 
system may be dependent upon favourable assessment scores. Indeed, those that have 
assessed scales using samples of offenders have reported social desirability correlates (e.g., 
Curwen 2003, Kampfe et al. 2013, Lauterbach and Hosser 2007, McGrath, Cann, and 
Konopasky 1998). As such, an offender‟s cognitions towards his/her victim may be 
particularly susceptible to this bias (Hanson and Scott 1995), and so validation with more 
diverse samples would be needed before adapting the CAERS for use in sensitive contexts.  
The social desirability measure employed in these studies also has its limitations, 
which may affect the interpretability of the relationships between the M-C form C (Reynolds, 
1982) and the various CAERS subscales. The scale developed by Crowne and Marlowe 
(1960) (from which the M-C form C was developed) has been extensively validated which, 
added to the fact that it can be quickly and easily administered, has resulted in it being used 
in over 1000 studies (Tatman et al. 2009). This is also why the scale was selected for use in 
the current research. However, the scale is now considered outdated by some (e.g., Ballard et 
al. 1988, Stöber 1999, 2001), as authors have questioned whether the social standards of the 
1950s (when the Marlowe-Crowne scale was first developed) remain applicable in today‟s 
society. Stöber (2001) noted that this may be particularly problematic when used with student 
samples, who have had no exposure to 1950s social norms. This may mean that some 
participants in the current research wished to portray themselves in a favourable light, but did 
not agree with some items of the M-C form C, because they do not see these statements as 
being socially desirable qualities (i.e., when these old social norms no longer apply). It may 
have been more appropriate to use a less dated version of the Marlow-Crowne scale, such as 
that developed by Stöber (1991, 2001), which will more closely represent the social norms of 
the current era. Future researchers may use such a scale to further assess the social 




As an alternative approach, several authors have called for the development of 
implicit empathy measures (e.g., the Implicit Association Task; Greenwald et al. 1998) to 
combat the potential for desirability biases (e.g., Day et al. 2012, Kampfe et al. 2013, 
Webster et al. 2005), as these are less susceptible to bias due to decreased transparency of 
scale aims. Implicit measurement may also help to reduce other issues such as inaccurate 
introspection on one‟s cognitions (e.g., Gannon and Polaschek 2006, Keown, Gannon, and 
Ward 2008). A potential avenue for further research, therefore, is to investigate the potential 
of adapting the CAERS for implicit measurement. As stated in Chapter 4, psychometric 
methods were necessary in the current context to compare a wide range of cognitions. 
However, as the possible most influential antecedents of empathy / sympathy / prosocial 
behaviour have now been identified (i.e., see Chapter 8), one can narrow the focus of the 
current research to compare and contrast the influence of a smaller number of variables at a 
time using the Implicit Association Task (Greenwald et al. 1998) or other behavioural 
measures (for example, to see whether valuing has a stronger association with empathic 
responding than perceived need).    
9.5.2 The controlled / automaticity debate 
As with other measures of empathy, the use of self-report methods is attributed with 
certain other limitations. For example, Kämpfe et al. (2009) argued that self-report tools 
(such as the one presented here) measure accessible, and consciously processed attitudes. 
However, the elicitation of empathy is largely automatic (Singer et al. 2004) and thus based 
upon unconscious cognitions. Although later (consciously controlled) cognitions may shape 
affective outcomes, it is unclear how implicative unconscious cognitions are on the elicitation 
of empathy, and how well self-report measures are able to capture these thoughts. 
Additionally, it is unclear how accurately participants are able to self-report their own 




psychometrics served as a useful starting point for the current research, the use of non-self-
report measures such as the Implicit Association Task (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 
1998) may allow for a greater understanding of the differing influences of conscious and sub-
conscious cognitions.  
Additionally, although useful in allowing one to examine the influence of each of 
these thoughts on empathy, the measures of affect (i.e., the empathy and sympathy subscales) 
may have been subject to bias. Research shows that people may have difficulty reporting 
their own emotions accurately (e.g., Quirin et al. 2009) and that introspecting on one‟s own 
emotions (in order to generate self-report responses) may alter one‟s emotional state 
(Lieberman 2007). Further work is therefore required to validate the effects of the CAERS 
subscales on more rigorous measures of affect such as behavioural or implicit methods.  
9.5.3 The causal order of cognitions and emotions 
Throughout this thesis, discussions have been based upon the preposition that 
cognitions precede empathic emotions within the empathic process model (i.e., see Figure 
3.1). This reasoning has been founded twofold: i) that previous research has demonstrated 
experimentally that manipulations of cognitions included in the CAERS lead to changes in 
empathic responding (see Section 5.6.1); and ii) that in a large number of cases (e.g., within 
relationships) individuals have had time to develop attitudes towards a particular target before 
the empathy event occurs. For example, it has been demonstrated that the amount we value 
another is an enduring attitude, and that empathic responding is partially dependent upon how 
much we like the target (Batson et al. 1995).  
However, although one can have confidence in the causal influence of cognition on 
emotion, backward influences are also a possibility. For example, as well as the above 




degree of valuing. There is no doubt that cognitions and emotions are closely linked, and 
relationships are complex in nature (deemed a “false dichotomy” by Duan and Hill 1996: 
263). However, the correlational evidence presented here is unable to establish cause and 
effect in these relationships. As such, each of the suggestions presented throughout this 
chapter should be considered preliminary, and would require extensive further research. In 
particular, researchers need to establish whether the suggested cognitive changes do indeed 
lead to changes in empathic responding, and in turn prosocial behaviours. Ultimately, 
although the current research serves as a useful starting point, the utility of putting the 
suggestions made here into practice will be dependent upon the outcome of this future 
research.  
9.6 Conclusions 
Based upon the research presented within this thesis, several recommendations have 
been made for those working in several different fields of interest. Perhaps the most pertinent 
conclusion to be drawn is that although the current research serves as a useful starting point 
for research in this area, much more is needed to examine the efficacy of the suggestions 
made within the current chapter. Nevertheless, the value of the research presented within this 
thesis lies in the fact that it grants a wider range of potential targets for enhancement than 
focussing upon the empathic emotions themselves, which has the potential to increase the 
effectiveness of prevention / intervention / enhancement strategies in a number of different 
contexts.  
Three general recommendations can be made based on the current research, which 
will apply to each of fields of practice discussed within this chapter. Firstly, it is important 
that those concerned with the enhancement of empathy are working with shared definitions of 




inconsistencies in the way empathy is understood by both researchers and practitioners. This 
has made the interpretation of research outcomes difficult (Brown, Harkins, and Beech 2012, 
Gerdes, Segal, and Lietz 2010) and has led to a mismatch between research and treatment 
(Mann and Barnett 2013). Greater consistency between research and practice is especially 
important during the development and evaluation of intervention programmes. If empathy is 
defined in a consistent manner across disciplines (e.g., current definitions of empathy differ 
between the forensic and healthcare literatures), then effective treatment / education strategies 
would be more easily shared across these different fields of interest. Secondly, it is important 
that programme developers in each of these areas understand the differences between 
empathy and sympathy. This is important given the functional differences between empathy 
and sympathy suggested in the results of Studies 3-5. Thirdly, it is important that researchers 
place a greater focus on the state antecedents of empathy than is currently given, and apply 
this knowledge into the development of intervention programmes. Specific suggestions for 
those working in forensic, healthcare, and charitable donation contexts can be summarised as 
follows.  
Firstly, in the forensic field, the fact that the current research suggests that empathic 
responding varies according to the persons involved advocates that we continue to move 
away from a trait deficit approach to offender intervention, and towards the more precise 
state and victim-specific deficits approach. However, more research is needed to more fully 
understand how an offender‟s thoughts about his/her victim(s) influence empathic 
responding, and offending behaviours. Specifically, the current research can be used in 
combination with the offence supportive beliefs literature to determine which antecedents of 
empathic responding and behaviour represent the most effective targets for intervention. This 




criminogenic needs (perhaps identified using the CAERS), and has the potential to enhance 
more favourable (and prosocial) thoughts towards victims.   
Secondly, more research is needed into the specific reasons behind the apparent lack 
of compassion exhibited within areas of modern healthcare. The CAERS can be used to 
examine how carers perceive their patients; which can be used to enhance feelings of 
empathy / sympathy towards them. Similarly, the current research may be further extended to 
investigate which aspects of empathy should or should not be communicated to patients; and 
how this impacts upon patient satisfaction. Finally, a full consideration of healthcare workers‟ 
cognitions towards their patients may help in overcoming conditions such as compassion 
fatigue. The current research therefore serves as a useful starting point for the examination of 
cognitive based deficits in compassionate practice. This research can also be further extended 
to any other social context where one individual cares for another or others.  
Thirdly, one may build upon the current research to develop more effective 
promotional materials for charitable organisations. The results of Study 4 suggested that one 
should encourage greater valuing, morality, agency, and less blame. This should serve as a 
useful starting point, but more research will be needed to determine whether the manipulation 
of these variables can generate greater income for charitable organisations, as research has 
been largely correlational to date. Future research is also needed to disentangle the separate 
influences of self-benefits, self-interest, and empathic responding.  
Finally, those wishing to extend the current research should pay consideration to 
factors such as social desirability and the causal order of cognition and emotion. Future 
investigation of these issues will allow for the development of measures such as the CAERS 
with greater validity, and will allow for a greater understanding of the overall empathic 




theoretical understanding of the empathic process, and in turn to improve our ability to 





Chapter 10: Overall Conclusions 
 
In this thesis a number of longstanding issues present within the empathic responding 
literature have been addressed. The purpose of this has been to further our understanding of 
empathy and sympathy as state variables, and to emphasise the importance of researching the 
various cognitive antecedents that underlie the variation of empathy and sympathy according 
to context. Each of the aims presented at the start of this thesis have been addressed through 
critical discussions and the analysis of empirical evidence.  
 Firstly, empathy has been defined using a rational argument and evidence-based 
approach. It is envisaged that the discussions presented in Chapter 2 will stimulate further 
debate into the definition of empathy and related terms (e.g., sympathy, compassion, 
tenderness, etc.), encouraging consistency between researchers and practitioners, and thus 
reducing the confusion that has plagued the empathy literature for more than a century. 
Defining empathy with greater consistency will ultimately enhance both research and 
practice, will allow for greater comparability between research findings, and promote 
research in often overlooked areas such as the variation of empathic responding according to 
the cognitions researched here. 
 Secondly, a new scale has been constructed and validated to measure a number of key 
state-based cognitive antecedents of empathic responding. Although the CAERS requires 
further validation before being applied to different contexts (e.g., the comprehension of scale 
items needs confirming outside of university samples), it has proved useful in allowing for 
the development of our understanding of the empathic process. The CAERS has several 
potential applications outside of the largely theoretical nature of the current research. For 
example, subscales could be used to assess and track changes in offender cognition towards 




 Thirdly, the relationships between these cognitions and empathic responding and 
helping behaviours have been examined in three studies, leading to the development of a new 
model of empathic responding. The results of Studies 3-5 have allowed for a greater 
understanding of the relationships between cognition and empathic responding, thus further 
developing our understanding of how empathy and sympathy vary as state (as well as trait) 
constructs. Studies 4 and 5 have also added to our understanding of how these cognitive 
antecedents contribute to concurrent behavioural motivations; important as previous research 
has typically focussed mainly upon empathic emotions themselves, providing limited 
knowledge of how best to evoke these emotions in practice.  
Fourthly, it has been demonstrated that not all cognitions are equally important within 
the empathic process (at least not in the contexts investigated here). This is an important 
novel contribution as these cognitions have previously been dealt with in isolation, limiting 
our understanding of which antecedents are the most influential on empathic responding. The 
development of the CAERS has allowed for a combined approach to be taken, leading to the 
development of a new model of the empathic process. In particular, valuing has been 
consistently identified as the most influential antecedent of both empathy and sympathy, 
despite the fact that it has received limited research interest to date. Other variables that have 
been deemed influential (e.g., blame, agency, and power) have been identified here as only 
having indirect influences on empathy/sympathy. The fact that not all cognitions are equally 
influential has important implications for our theoretical understanding of the empathic 
process, and for those working in practice. Nevertheless, although consistencies in the results 
between Studies 3-5 are encouraging for the generalisability of the model depicted in Figure 
8.2, further research is needed to determine whether this model remains consistent across 
different contexts (e.g., forensic and healthcare), or whether the various relationships between 




The results of Study 4 (enhanced by the results of Study 5) not only demonstrated 
how this research can be used to enhance a specific field of interest (i.e., income generation 
for charitable organisations), but has allowed for the development of more specific (and 
empirically grounded) suggestions for charity advertisers wishing to elicit empathy in their 
audiences. These findings have value in the fact that no research to date has examined which 
antecedents of empathy may bring about the greatest changes in donation likelihood. 
Similarly, a number of suggestions were made in Chapter 9 for those working in other fields 
(i.e., healthcare and forensic). Although more research is needed to test these suggestions, the 
research presented here should serve as a useful starting point in terms of the identification of 
the most pressing targets for intervention, and which cognitions may serve as markers for risk 
assessment and effective treatment change. There has currently been very little research into 
how specific cognitions can be addressed in these ways.  
In addition to the aims presented in Chapter 1, the results of Studies 3-5 have also 
built upon the arguments presented in Chapter 2 by presenting evidence of the differences 
between empathy and sympathy; important as these terms are commonly merged in the 
literature, resulting in difficulties establishing whether studies pertain to the examination of 
empathy or sympathy. The current results attest to differences in both the antecedents (see 
Figure 8.1) and outcomes (e.g., empathy contributed to the helping models but sympathy did 
not) of these concepts, further arguing for their separation in both research and practice.   
 In conclusion, the current research has demonstrated how a consideration of the 
cognitive antecedents of empathy can be used to gain a greater understanding of this 
important social emotion. By continuing to explore these themes, a better understanding of 
empathy as a state variable can be gained, which will ultimately enhance both research and 
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Appendix A: Scales 













White-British White & Black Caribbean Indian Black-African Arab 
White-Irish White & Black African Pakistani Black-Caribbean 
 
 
 Gypsy or Irish 
Traveller 
White & Asian Bangladeshi   
   Chinese   
      
 Other White Other Mixed Other Asian Other Black Any other 
 
 
[Mood & Self-Esteem Items] 
 
Please indicate your current mood according to the following scales: 
      
 Not at all Not very Neutral Somewhat Very 
      
Happy 1 2 3 4 5 
Sad 1 2 3 4 5 
Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 
Relaxed 1 2 3 4 5 
Angry 1 2 3 4 5 
Tired 1 2 3 4 5 
      
What is your current level of self-esteem? 
      
 Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 











Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 She needs help. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 She should be held accountable for this. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Her needs should take priority over my own. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 I am a more dominant person than her. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 She is in need. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 I care about her. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 She is hurt. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 I am in control of what happens. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 I didn‟t find this particularly offensive.  1 2 3 4 5 
10 I feel fondness for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 This happened due to the choices that she made. 1 2 3 4 5 
12 What happened was justifiable.  1 2 3 4 5 
13 In terms of power, she is beneath me. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 I felt empathy for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 I feel hostility towards her. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 I have greater authority than her. 1 2 3 4 5 
17 She is innocent here. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 I like her. 1 2 3 4 5 
19 She brought this on herself. 1 2 3 4 5 
20 I should focus on my own needs here.  1 2 3 4 5 
21 My choices will determine her future.  1 2 3 4 5 
22 She is upset. 1 2 3 4 5 
23 Her response is confusing to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
24 She should never have been treated this way.  1 2 3 4 5 
25 I feel warmth towards her. 1 2 3 4 5 
26 My own needs are more important here. 1 2 3 4 5 
27 I do not have control over these events.  1 2 3 4 5 
28 I find what happened to her offensive.  1 2 3 4 5 
29 She is happy. 1 2 3 4 5 
30 She had no control over these events.  1 2 3 4 5 
31 The decisions I make will have an impact.  1 2 3 4 5 
32 She resembles myself. 1 2 3 4 5 
33 I am less likely to be a leader than her.  1 2 3 4 5 
34 I am not the same as her. 1 2 3 4 5 
35 I felt little sympathy for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
36 She is a more dominant person than me. 1 2 3 4 5 
37 What happened to her was not morally wrong.  1 2 3 4 5 
38 I was puzzled by her emotional response. 1 2 3 4 5 
39 She means nothing to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
40 This is her fault.  1 2 3 4 5 
41 She is blameless for what happened. 1 2 3 4 5 
42 She is able to cope on her own. 1 2 3 4 5 
43 She is OK. 1 2 3 4 5 
44 I can imagine what she was thinking. 1 2 3 4 5 
45 I am a more powerful person than her. 1 2 3 4 5 
46 Nobody should experience what happened to her. 1 2 3 4 5 
47 I cannot change what is going to happen.  1 2 3 4 5 
48 I am very different to her. 1 2 3 4 5 
49 I am not responsible for what happens.  1 2 3 4 5 
50 I am weak compared to her. 1 2 3 4 5 
51 I am a less powerful person than her.  1 2 3 4 5 
52 The reasons for her response are clear. 1 2 3 4 5 
53 I am not able to change this situation.   1 2 3 4 5 
54 She is responsible for what happened. 1 2 3 4 5 
55 She has reacted strangely. 1 2 3 4 5 








Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
57 I should not think only of myself here. 1 2 3 4 5 
58 It is difficult to know what she was thinking. 1 2 3 4 5 
59 She didn‟t make me feel anything.  1 2 3 4 5 
60 I feel affection for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
61 What happened to her was immoral. 1 2 3 4 5 
62 Others would think that she reminds them of me.  1 2 3 4 5 
63 It is important that I meet my own needs here. 1 2 3 4 5 
64 I can see why she reacted like she did. 1 2 3 4 5 
65 She is to blame here. 1 2 3 4 5 
66 I should focus on her needs first.  1 2 3 4 5 
67 I can recognise her thought process. 1 2 3 4 5 
68 I should do what it takes to make myself happy here.  1 2 3 4 5 
69 Her emotions made me emotional. 1 2 3 4 5 
70 I need to think of myself here.  1 2 3 4 5 
71 She and I are much alike.  1 2 3 4 5 
72 In many ways, I am the same as her. 1 2 3 4 5 
73 I don‟t understand why she acted like she did. 1 2 3 4 5 
74 She reminds me of myself.  1 2 3 4 5 
75 Her emotions were appropriate. 1 2 3 4 5 
76 She couldn‟t have stopped this from happening. 1 2 3 4 5 
77 She and myself are unalike. 1 2 3 4 5 
78 What happened to her was fair. 1 2 3 4 5 
79 This hasn‟t really affected her emotionally. 1 2 3 4 5 
80 I feel ill will towards her. 1 2 3 4 5 
81 The way this situation unfolds depends on what I do.  1 2 3 4 5 
82 She is unhappy. 1 2 3 4 5 
83 I am the opposite of her. 1 2 3 4 5 
84 I should not act selfishly here. 1 2 3 4 5 
85 I felt concern for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
86 I am worried about her. 1 2 3 4 5 
87 I am able to change her future.  1 2 3 4 5 
88 I found this quite upsetting. 1 2 3 4 5 
89 She is in distress. 1 2 3 4 5 
90 I didn‟t feel any concern for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
91 The way she was treated goes against my morals.  1 2 3 4 5 
92 I am a superior person compared to her. 1 2 3 4 5 
93 The way she was treated was wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
94 The outcome will be the same no matter what I do.  1 2 3 4 5 
95 I felt sympathy for her.  1 2 3 4 5 
96 She is more powerful than me.  1 2 3 4 5 
97 I dislike her. 1 2 3 4 5 
98 It doesn‟t matter what I need here.  1 2 3 4 5 
99 I don‟t care what happens to her. 1 2 3 4 5 


















     Male                Female 
Ethnicity  
(please circle): 
White-British White & Black Caribbean Indian Black-African Arab 
White-Irish White & Black African Pakistani Black-Caribbean  
 Gypsy or Irish 
Traveller 
White & Asian Bangladeshi   
   Chinese   
      








Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 She is in need. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 I am able to change her future. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 She is hurt. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 I feel fondness for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 This happened due to the choices that she made. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 I felt empathy for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 I like her. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 She brought this on herself. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 I should focus on my own needs here.  1 2 3 4 5 








Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
11 She should never have been treated this way.  1 2 3 4 5 
12 I feel warmth towards her. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 My own needs are more important here. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 She is a more dominant person than me. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 This is her fault.  1 2 3 4 5 
16 I cannot change what is going to happen.  1 2 3 4 5 
17 I am weak compared to her. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 She is responsible for what happened. 1 2 3 4 5 
19 I am a less powerful person than her.  1 2 3 4 5 
20 I am not able to change this situation.   1 2 3 4 5 
21 She has reacted strangely. 1 2 3 4 5 
22 She did not affect me emotionally.  1 2 3 4 5 
23 I feel affection for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
24 I didn‟t feel any concern for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
25 What happened to her was immoral. 1 2 3 4 5 
26 I can see why she reacted like she did. 1 2 3 4 5 
27 I should do what it takes to make myself happy 
here.  
1 2 3 4 5 
28 Her emotions made me emotional. 1 2 3 4 5 
29 I need to think of myself here.  1 2 3 4 5 
30 She and I are much alike.  1 2 3 4 5 
31 In many ways, I am the same as her. 1 2 3 4 5 
32 I don‟t understand why she acted like she did. 1 2 3 4 5 








Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
34 Her emotions were appropriate. 1 2 3 4 5 
35 I felt concern for her. 1 2 3 4 5 
36 I am worried about her. 1 2 3 4 5 
37 I found this quite upsetting. 1 2 3 4 5 
38 She is in distress. 1 2 3 4 5 
39 The way she was treated goes against my morals.  1 2 3 4 5 
40 The outcome will be the same no matter what I do.  1 2 3 4 5 
41 The way she was treated was wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
42 I felt sympathy for her.  1 2 3 4 5 
43 She is more powerful than me.  1 2 3 4 5 
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Will every participant understand that they do not need to give you reasons for 
deciding not to take part or to withdraw themselves and their data from the 
project and that there will be no repercussions as a result? 
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If the project involves deceiving or covert observation of participants, will you 
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Is there any significant risk that your project may lead to physical harm to 
participants or researchers? 
 X 
Is there any significant risk that your project may lead to psychological or 
emotional distress to participants or researchers? 
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Is there any significant risk that your project may place the participants or the 
researchers in potentially dangerous situations or environments? 
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of participants, researchers, their employers, or other persons or organisations? 
 X 
 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions: 
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researchers. 
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to these risks. 
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if they are seriously distressed or harmed as a result of taking part in the project. 
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risk of harm? 
 X 
Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose 
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Payment of participants 
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inducements or compensation for taking part in your project? 
X  
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Is participation genuinely voluntary? 
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Are you proposing to recruit participants who are employees or students of 
Coventry University or of organisation(s) that are formal collaborators in the 
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Are you proposing to recruit participants who are employees recruited through 
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Will project work involve intervention work in a non-natural setting in relation 
to invertebrate species other than Octopus vulgaris? 
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about, living human beings? 
X  
Does the project involve collecting or analysing primary or unpublished data 
about people who have recently died other than data that are already in the 
public domain? 
 X 
Does the project involve collecting or analysing primary or unpublished data 
about or from organisations or agencies of any kind other than data that are 
already in the public domain? 
 X 
Does the project involve research with non-human vertebrates in their natural 
settings or behavioural work involving invertebrate species not covered by the 
Animals Scientific Procedures Act (1986)? 
 X 
Does the project place the participants or the researchers in a dangerous 
environment, risk of physical harm, psychological or emotional distress? 
X  
Does the nature of the project place the participant or researchers in a situation 
where they are at risk of investigation by the police or security services? 
 X 
Does the project involve the researcher travelling outside the UK?  X 
 
Does the project require Criminal Records Bureau checks? 
Questions Yes No 
Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 
with children or young people under 18 years of age? 
 X 
Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 
with adults who have learning difficulties? 
 X 
Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 





Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 
with adults who are resident in social care or medical establishments? 
 X 
Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 
with adults in the custody of the criminal justice system? 
 X 
Has a Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check been stipulated as a condition of 
access to any source of data required for the project? 
 X 
 
Is this project liable to scrutiny by external ethical review arrangements? 
Questions Yes No 
Has a favourable ethical opinion been given for this project by an external 
research ethics committee (e.g. social care, NHS or another University)? 
 X 
Will this project be submitted for ethical approval to an external research 
ethics committee (e.g. social care, NHS or another University)? 
 X 
 
More detail about the project 
What are the aims and objectives of the project? 
As part of my PhD, I wish to examine how various thoughts towards others affect the levels 
of empathy we feel, and whether this influences the likelihood of donating to charity.  
Briefly describe the principal methods, the sources of data or evidence to be used and the 
number and type of research participants who will be recruited to the project. 
I will use the Bristol Online Survey system to collect data from up to 200 members of the 
public. Participants will be recruited by distributing links to the survey via social networking 
sites and internet message boards, using a snowballing procedure. Those who decide to take 
part will be shown the participant information and will be required to give consent via a tick-
box in order to proceed. Demographic data will then be collected, followed by a social 
desirability measure, followed by a trait empathy measure (the IRI). Participants will then be 
asked to watch an audiovisual charity advert 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CK7svcKCAcQ&feature=kp). They will then be asked 
to complete my empathy scale (CAES). Finally, participants will be displayed the debrief 
information. 
What research instrument(s), validated scales or methods will be used to collect data? 





If you are using an externally validated research instrument, technique or research method, 
please specify. 
N/A 
If you are not using an externally validated scale or research method, please attach a copy of 
the research instrument you will use to collect data.  For example, a measurement scale, 
questionnaire, interview schedule, observation protocol for ethnographic work or, in the case 
of unstructured data collection, a topic list. 
The Cognitive Antecedents of Empathy Scale (CAES). Use of an external video: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CK7svcKCAcQ&feature=kp 
 
Confidentiality, security and retention of research data 
Questions Yes No 
Are there any reasons why you cannot guarantee the full security and 
confidentiality of any personal or confidential data collected for the project? 
 X 
Is there a significant possibility that any of your participants, or people 
associated with them, could be directly or indirectly identified in the outputs 
from this project? 
 X 
Is there a significant possibility that confidential information could be traced 
back to a specific organisation or agency as a result of the way you write up the 
results of the project? 
 X 
Will any members of the project team retain any personal or confidential data at 
the end of the project, other than in fully anonymised form?  
 X 
Will you or any member of the team intend to make use of any confidential 




If you answered No to all of these questions: 
Explain how you will ensure the confidentiality and security of your research data, both 
during and after the project. 
Participants will not disclose any personal information (e.g., their name) when completing the 
questionnaire. Their data can be identified via self-generated participant codes should they 






Questions Yes No 
Will all participants be fully informed why the project is being conducted and 
what their participation will involve and will this information be given before 
the project begins? 
X  
Will every participant be asked to give written consent to participating in the 
project before it begins? 
X  
Will all participants be fully informed about what data will be collected and 
what will be done with these data during and after the project? 
X  
Will explicit consent be sought for audio, video or photographic recording of 
participants? 
 X 
Will every participant understand what rights they have not to take part, and/or 
to withdraw themselves and their data from the project if they do take part? 
X  
Will every participant understand that they do not need to give you reasons for 
deciding not to take part or to withdraw themselves and their data from the 
project and that there will be no repercussions as a result? 
X  
If the project involves deceiving or covert observation of participants, will you 
debrief them at the earliest possible opportunity? 
 X 
 
If you answered No to any of these questions: 
Explain why it is essential for the project to be conducted in a way that will not allow all 
participants the opportunity to exercise fully-informed consent. 
Explain how you propose to address the ethical issues arising from the absence of 
transparency. 
Attach copies of your participant information sheet and consent form as evidence of your 
plans. 
Participant information will be displayed on screen to participants, and consent will be 
required (by pressing continue) before participants begin filling out the questionnaire. This 
study does not require consent for audio/video/photographic recording and contains no 







Risk of harm 
Questions Yes No 
Is there any significant risk that your project may lead to physical harm to 
participants or researchers? 
 X 
Is there any significant risk that your project may lead to psychological or 
emotional distress to participants or researchers? 
X  
Is there any significant risk that your project may place the participants or the 
researchers in potentially dangerous situations or environments? 
 X 
Is there any significant risk that your project may result in harm to the reputation 
of participants, researchers, their employers, or other persons or organisations? 
 X 
 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions: 
Explain the nature of the risks involved and why it is necessary for the participants or 
researchers to be exposed to such risks. 
Explain how you propose to assess, manage and mitigate any risks to participants or 
researchers. 
Explain the arrangements by which you will ensure that participants understand and consent 
to these risks. 
Explain the arrangements you will make to refer participants or researchers to sources of help 
if they are seriously distressed or harmed as a result of taking part in the project. 
Explain the arrangements for recording and reporting any adverse consequences of the 
research. 
Due to the emotional nature of the video 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CK7svcKCAcQ&feature=kp), it is possible that 
participants may experience some distress. However, the stimulus (charity advert) used was 
designed to be shown on television and so the potential for distress should be no greater than 
usually posed by watching television adverts. Participants are advised in the information 
sheet not to continue should they find this subject matter upsetting. Participants are directed 
towards a support service in the debrief.  
 
Risk of disclosure of harm or potential harm  




Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose 
evidence of previous criminal offences or their intention to commit criminal 
offences? 
 X 
Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose 
evidence that children or vulnerable adults have or are being harmed or are at 
risk of harm? 
 X 
Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose 
evidence of serious risk of other types of harm? 
 X 
 
Payment of participants 
Questions Yes No 
Do you intend to offer participants cash payments or any other kind of 
inducements or compensation for taking part in your project? 
 X 
Is there any significant possibility that such inducements will cause participants 
to consent to risks that they might not otherwise find acceptable? 
 X 
Is there any significant possibility that the prospect of payment or other rewards 
will systematically skew the data provided by participants in any way? 
 X 
Will you inform participants that accepting compensation or inducements does 
not negate their right to withdraw from the project? 
 X 
 
Capacity to give informed consent 
Questions Yes No 
Do you propose to recruit any participants who are under 18 years of age?  X 
Do you propose to recruit any participants who have learning difficulties?  X 
Do you propose to recruit any participants with communication difficulties 
including difficulties arising from limited facility with the English language? 
 X 
Do you propose to recruit any participants who are very elderly or infirm?  X 
Do you propose to recruit any participants with mental health problems or other 
medical problems that may impair their cognitive abilities? 
 X 
Do you propose to recruit any participants who may not be able to understand 







Is participation genuinely voluntary? 
Questions Yes No 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are employees or students of 
Coventry University or of organisation(s) that are formal collaborators in the 
project? 
X  
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are employees recruited through 
other business, voluntary or public sector organisations? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are pupils or students recruited 
through educational institutions? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are clients recruited through 
voluntary or public services? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are living in residential 
communities or institutions? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are in-patients in a hospital or 
other medical establishment? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are recruited by virtue of their 
employment in the police or armed services? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are being detained or sanctioned 
in the criminal justice system? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who may not feel empowered to refuse 
to participate in the research? 
 X 
 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions: 
Explain how your participants will be recruited. 
Explain what steps you will take to ensure that participation in this project is genuinely 
voluntary. 
Participants will be recruited from the general public via a snowballing procedure. Links to 
the survey will be distributed via social networking and other internet message board sites 
(e.g., university forums). Participants will be informed by the consent form / participant 




the browser window at any time to terminate participation. 
 
On-line and Internet Research 
Questions Yes No 
Will any part of your project involve collecting data by means of electronic 
media such as the Internet or e-mail? 
X  
Is there a significant possibility that the project will encourage children under 18 
to access inappropriate websites or correspond with people who pose risk of 
harm? 
 X 
Is there a significant possibility that the project will cause participants to become 
distressed or harmed in ways that may not be apparent to the researcher(s)?  
 X 
Will the project incur risks of breaching participant confidentiality and 
anonymity that arise specifically from the use of electronic media? 
 X 
 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions: 
Explain why you propose to use electronic media. 
Explain how you propose to address the risks associated with online/internet research. 
Ensure that your answers to the previous sections address any issues related to online 
research. 
Online data collection will make recruitment much easier as I intend to use members of the 
public. It is important to use members of the public rather than student samples because this 
better reflects the range of people who donate to charity. Risks are accounted for by fully 
anonymising data and through the consent / debrief procedure. 
 
Other ethical risks 
Question Yes No 
Are there any other ethical issues or risks of harm raised by your project that 







Research with non-human vertebrates 
Questions Yes No 
Will any part of your project involve the study of animals in their natural 
habitat? 
 X 
Will your project involve the recording of behaviour of animals in a non-natural 
setting that is outside the control of the researcher? 
 X 
Will your field work involve any direct intervention other than recording the 
behaviour of the animals available for observation? 
 X 
Is the species you plan to research endangered, locally rare or part of a sensitive 
ecosystem protected by legislation? 
 X 
Is there any significant possibility that the welfare of the target species or those 
sharing the local environment/habitat will be detrimentally affected? 
 X 
Is there any significant possibility that the habitat of the animals will be 
damaged by the project such that their health and survival will be endangered? 
 X 
Will project work involve intervention work in a non-natural setting in relation 
to invertebrate species other than Octopus vulgaris? 
 X 
 
Blood Sampling / Human Tissue Analysis 
Questions Yes No 
Does your project involve blood sampling or human tissue analysis?  X 
If your study involves blood samples or body fluids (e.g. urine, saliva) have you 
clearly stated in your application that appropriate guidelines are to be followed 
(e.g. The British Association of Sport and Exercise Science Physiological 
Testing Guidelines (2007) or equivalent) and that they are in line with the level 
of risk? 
  
If your study involves human tissue other than blood and saliva have you clearly 
stated in your application that appropriate guidelines are to be followed? (e.g. 




Note:  This checklist is based on an ethics approval form produce by Research Office of the 
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 B.3 Study 5 
Medium to High Risk Research Ethics Approval Checklist 
Project Information 
Project Ref:  P26937 
Full name:  Benjamin Cuff 
Faculty:  [HLS] Faculty of Health and Life Sciences 
Department:  [AA] FRC Psychology, Behaviour & Achievement 
Module Code:   
Supervisor:  Sarah Brown 
Project title:  Self vs. Other need in Empathic Helping Situations 
Date(s):  01/10/2014 - 31/01/2015 
Created:  22/09/2014 16:21 
 
Project Summary 
I am interested in how our own needs (self-interest) interacts with perceptions of another 
person's needs, and what effects this interaction has on feelings of empathy and helping 
behaviours. Previous research has suggested that perceptions of another's emotional needs 
can influence helping decisions in a one-trial prisoners dilemma (Batson & Ahmad, 2001). 
However, there is a lack of research into whether our own needs may alter this relationship.  
 
Names of Co-investigators (CIs) and their 
organisational affiliation: 
 
How many additional research staff will 
be employed on the project? 
0 
Names and their organisational affiliation 
(if known):  
 
Who is funding the project?  




Code of ethical practice and conduct most 
relevant to your project: 
British Psychological Society 
 
Does this project need ethical approval? 
Questions Yes No 
Does the project involve collecting primary data from, or about, living human 
beings? 
X  
Does the project involve analysing primary or unpublished data from, or 
about, living human beings? 
X  
Does the project involve collecting or analysing primary or unpublished data 
about people who have recently died other than data that are already in the 
public domain? 
 X 
Does the project involve collecting or analysing primary or unpublished data 
about or from organisations or agencies of any kind other than data that are 
already in the public domain? 
 X 
Does the project involve research with non-human vertebrates in their natural 
settings or behavioural work involving invertebrate species not covered by the 
Animals Scientific Procedures Act (1986)? 
 X 
Does the project place the participants or the researchers in a dangerous 
environment, risk of physical harm, psychological or emotional distress? 
 X 
Does the nature of the project place the participant or researchers in a situation 
where they are at risk of investigation by the police or security services? 
 X 
Does the project involve the researcher travelling outside the UK?  X 
 
Does the project require Criminal Records Bureau checks? 
Questions Yes No 
Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 
with children or young people under 18 years of age? 
 X 
Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 
with adults who have learning difficulties? 
 X 
Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 





Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 
with adults who are resident in social care or medical establishments? 
 X 
Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team 
with adults in the custody of the criminal justice system? 
 X 
Has a Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check been stipulated as a condition of 
access to any source of data required for the project? 
 X 
 
Is this project liable to scrutiny by external ethical review arrangements? 
Questions Yes No 
Has a favourable ethical opinion been given for this project by an external 
research ethics committee (e.g. social care, NHS or another University)? 
 X 
Will this project be submitted for ethical approval to an external research 
ethics committee (e.g. social care, NHS or another University)? 
 X 
 
More detail about the project 
What are the aims and objectives of the project? 
I wish to examine how our pre-existing self-interests (need for money) affect our perceptions 
of another's emotional needs. In addition I am interested in whether perceiving another 
person's emotional needs can affect perceptions of our own needs (i.e., self-interest). Finally, 
I am interested in the effect that this interaction between self-interest and perceived-need has 
on feelings of empathy, along with effects on helping behaviours.  
Briefly describe the principal methods, the sources of data or evidence to be used and the 
number and type of research participants who will be recruited to the project. 
Participants will be divided in to 2 conditions: They will be told that they are competing for 
tickets to a prize draw worth £5 (condition 1) or £50 (condition 2). So that I can advertise the 
same prize value to all students, participants will be told that this is a two-phase study, and 
that in phase 2 they will be able to compete for the remaining prize value (i.e., £50 in 
condition 1; £5 in condition 2). However, there will only be one phase, and all participants 
will be entered into the £55 draw (one entry per participant). 
Participants will be asked to fill in a questionnaire measuring demographics, trait empathy 
levels, and social desirability. They will also be asked to complete a manipulation check (to 
see whether those in the £50 condition believe this money is more important than those in the 
£5 condition).  




In essence, participants will be told that they have been partnered up with another participant 
(this partner does not actually exist). Participants will receive a note from their „partner‟ 
designed to evoke empathy, and they will have to decide whether to donate some of their 
prize tickets to their partner (as predicted by perceived need) or hold on to the tickets 
themselves (as predicted by self-interest).  
After making this decision, participants will be asked to complete my cognitions scale and 
will then be fully debriefed.  
What research instrument(s), validated scales or methods will be used to collect data? 
The Cognitive Antecedents of Empathy Scale: A scale developed during my PhD that 
examines the effects of cognitions (e.g., perceived need and self-interest) on empathic 
responding.  
If you are using an externally validated research instrument, technique or research method, 
please specify. 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index: A trait empathy scale. 
Marlow-Crowne social desirability scale.  
If you are not using an externally validated scale or research method, please attach a copy of 
the research instrument you will use to collect data.  For example, a measurement scale, 
questionnaire, interview schedule, observation protocol for ethnographic work or, in the case 
of unstructured data collection, a topic list. 
 
 
Confidentiality, security and retention of research data 
Questions Yes No 
Are there any reasons why you cannot guarantee the full security and 
confidentiality of any personal or confidential data collected for the project? 
 X 
Is there a significant possibility that any of your participants, or people 
associated with them, could be directly or indirectly identified in the outputs 
from this project? 
 X 
Is there a significant possibility that confidential information could be traced 
back to a specific organisation or agency as a result of the way you write up the 
results of the project? 
 X 
Will any members of the project team retain any personal or confidential data at 





Will you or any member of the team intend to make use of any confidential 




If you answered No to all of these questions: 
Explain how you will ensure the confidentiality and security of your research data, both 
during and after the project. 
Data will be entered only in reference to participant numbers. All forms will be kept in 
locked filing cabinets during and after the study. 
 
Informed consent 
Questions Yes No 
Will all participants be fully informed why the project is being conducted and 
what their participation will involve and will this information be given before 
the project begins? 
 X 
Will every participant be asked to give written consent to participating in the 
project before it begins? 
X  
Will all participants be fully informed about what data will be collected and 
what will be done with these data during and after the project? 
X  
Will explicit consent be sought for audio, video or photographic recording of 
participants? 
 X 
Will every participant understand what rights they have not to take part, and/or 
to withdraw themselves and their data from the project if they do take part? 
X  
Will every participant understand that they do not need to give you reasons for 
deciding not to take part or to withdraw themselves and their data from the 
project and that there will be no repercussions as a result? 
X  
If the project involves deceiving or covert observation of participants, will you 
debrief them at the earliest possible opportunity? 
X  
 
If you answered No to any of these questions: 
Explain why it is essential for the project to be conducted in a way that will not allow all 




Explain how you propose to address the ethical issues arising from the absence of 
transparency. 
Attach copies of your participant information sheet and consent form as evidence of your 
plans. 
Some deceit in the participant information sheet is necessary regarding the purpose of the 
study. If participants are aware that we are interested in self-interest, empathy, and helping 
behaviours, then participants may be inclined to present themselves as selfless, empathic, and 
helpful individuals (distorting the results). Participants will be fully debriefed at the end of 
the study regarding the true nature of the project.  
 
Risk of harm 
Questions Yes No 
Is there any significant risk that your project may lead to physical harm to 
participants or researchers? 
 X 
Is there any significant risk that your project may lead to psychological or 
emotional distress to participants or researchers? 
 X 
Is there any significant risk that your project may place the participants or the 
researchers in potentially dangerous situations or environments? 
 X 
Is there any significant risk that your project may result in harm to the reputation 
of participants, researchers, their employers, or other persons or organisations? 
 X 
 
Risk of disclosure of harm or potential harm  
Questions Yes No 
Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose 
evidence of previous criminal offences or their intention to commit criminal 
offences? 
 X 
Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose 
evidence that children or vulnerable adults have or are being harmed or are at 
risk of harm? 
 X 
Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose 






Payment of participants 
Questions Yes No 
Do you intend to offer participants cash payments or any other kind of 
inducements or compensation for taking part in your project? 
X  
Is there any significant possibility that such inducements will cause participants 
to consent to risks that they might not otherwise find acceptable? 
 X 
Is there any significant possibility that the prospect of payment or other rewards 
will systematically skew the data provided by participants in any way? 
 X 
Will you inform participants that accepting compensation or inducements does 
not negate their right to withdraw from the project? 
X  
 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions:  
Explain the nature of the inducements or the amount of the payments that will be offered. 
Explain the reasons why it is necessary to offer payments. 
Explain why you consider it is ethically and methodologically acceptable to offer payments. 
The prize draw is necessary to introduce a genuine element of self-interest (i.e., participants' 
helping decisions will be influenced by how important this prize is to them). To keep things 
fair, all participants will receive one entry each into the prize draw. Participants will be 
informed that their right to withdraw does not affect their entry into the draw (and vice 
versa). Where applicable, students may also earn research credits as part of the research 
participation scheme. The above conditions apply.  
 
Capacity to give informed consent 
Questions Yes No 
Do you propose to recruit any participants who are under 18 years of age?  X 
Do you propose to recruit any participants who have learning difficulties?  X 
Do you propose to recruit any participants with communication difficulties 
including difficulties arising from limited facility with the English language? 
 X 
Do you propose to recruit any participants who are very elderly or infirm?  X 




medical problems that may impair their cognitive abilities? 
Do you propose to recruit any participants who may not be able to understand 




Is participation genuinely voluntary? 
Questions Yes No 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are employees or students of 
Coventry University or of organisation(s) that are formal collaborators in the 
project? 
X  
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are employees recruited through 
other business, voluntary or public sector organisations? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are pupils or students recruited 
through educational institutions? 
X  
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are clients recruited through 
voluntary or public services? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are living in residential 
communities or institutions? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are in-patients in a hospital or 
other medical establishment? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are recruited by virtue of their 
employment in the police or armed services? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who are being detained or sanctioned 
in the criminal justice system? 
 X 
Are you proposing to recruit participants who may not feel empowered to refuse 
to participate in the research? 
 X 
 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions: 
Explain how your participants will be recruited. 
Explain what steps you will take to ensure that participation in this project is genuinely 
voluntary. 
Coventry University undergraduate students shall be recruited via advertisements given at the 
end of usual university lectures. All participants will be informed that participation is 






On-line and Internet Research 
Questions Yes No 
Will any part of your project involve collecting data by means of electronic 
media such as the Internet or e-mail? 
 X 
Is there a significant possibility that the project will encourage children under 18 
to access inappropriate websites or correspond with people who pose risk of 
harm? 
 X 
Is there a significant possibility that the project will cause participants to become 
distressed or harmed in ways that may not be apparent to the researcher(s)?  
 X 
Will the project incur risks of breaching participant confidentiality and 
anonymity that arise specifically from the use of electronic media? 
 X 
 
Other ethical risks 
Question Yes No 
Are there any other ethical issues or risks of harm raised by your project that 
have not been covered by previous questions? 
 X 
 
Research with non-human vertebrates 
Questions Yes No 
Will any part of your project involve the study of animals in their natural 
habitat? 
 X 
Will your project involve the recording of behaviour of animals in a non-natural 
setting that is outside the control of the researcher? 
 X 
Will your field work involve any direct intervention other than recording the 
behaviour of the animals available for observation? 
 X 
Is the species you plan to research endangered, locally rare or part of a sensitive 
ecosystem protected by legislation? 
 X 
Is there any significant possibility that the welfare of the target species or those 
sharing the local environment/habitat will be detrimentally affected? 
 X 
Is there any significant possibility that the habitat of the animals will be 





Will project work involve intervention work in a non-natural setting in relation 
to invertebrate species other than Octopus vulgaris? 
 X 
 
Blood Sampling / Human Tissue Analysis 
Questions Yes No 
Does your project involve blood sampling or human tissue analysis?  X 
If your study involves blood samples or body fluids (e.g. urine, saliva) have you 
clearly stated in your application that appropriate guidelines are to be followed 
(e.g. The British Association of Sport and Exercise Science Physiological 
Testing Guidelines (2007) or equivalent) and that they are in line with the level 
of risk? 
  
If your study involves human tissue other than blood and saliva have you clearly 
stated in your application that appropriate guidelines are to be followed? (e.g. 




Note:  This checklist is based on an ethics approval form produce by Research Office of the 
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Reviewer Approved Reviewer Fri, 03 Oct 2014 01:02 PM 
Finalizer Approved Sophie Krumins  Fri, 03 Oct 2014 01:25 PM 




Appendix C: Participant Information 
Sheets 
 




Developing a new measure of empathy 
Participant Information Sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is 
important that you understand the purpose and nature of the study. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
I am developing a new measure of empathy and the purpose of this study is to examine the face 
validity of scale items, including whether items make sense and whether you think items belong 
to their intended subscale. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this 
information and you will be asked to sign a consent form. You are however, free to withdraw at 
any time, without any consequences, should you change your mind. 
What do I have to do? 
You will be asked to assign items to descriptions of subscales and identify any problems with 
comprehension and spelling etc. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The only disadvantage of taking part is the impact on your time. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will be contributing to the development of a new empathy scale, which has the potential to 
be applied to several different subject areas.  
What will happen to my data? 
Your data will be used to test the validity of this new measure, and to develop it for further 





responses, however, will not.  
What will happen if I don’t want to continue with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time up to four weeks after today, without giving 
any reason. In the top corner of this page you have been allocated a participant number so that 
your data can be identified should you want to do this. Please contact the lead researcher 
(stating your participant number) to request that your data be withdrawn, at which point your 
data will be destroyed.  
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Participants who complete the forms will be allocated unique participant codes and data will be 
entered with reference to these participant codes. The researcher will not know you by name 
and no reference to the participant number will be made in the official write up of the results. 
Consent forms and data will be kept in locked filing cabinets and will be stored for up to 3 years 
before being destroyed. Signed consent forms will be stored separately from your data. 
 
Contact details: 
Lead Researcher’s name: Benjamin Cuff 










Developing a new measure of empathy 
Participant Information Sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is 
important that you understand the purpose and nature of the study. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
I am developing a new measure of empathy and the purpose of this study is to test how it 
performs (validity and reliability). I am interested in the way people’s thoughts and attitudes 
influence how much empathy they feel.  
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this 
information and you will be asked to sign a consent form. You are however, free to withdraw at 
any time, without any consequences, should you change your mind. 
What do I have to do? 
You will be required to watch a short (1 minute) video of a high school bullying victim describing 
her experiences. You will then be asked to complete a questionnaire examining the thoughts you 
had about the girl in the video.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The greatest disadvantage of taking part is the impact on your time. In addition, it is possible that 
the video may raise issues that you find difficult to deal with. You are advised not to take part 
should you find this subject (i.e., bullying) particularly distressing.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will be contributing to the development of a new empathy scale, which has the potential to 
be applied to several different subject areas. You will also receive credits towards the research 
participation scheme. This does not negate your right to withdraw from the project 
What will happen to my data? 








may be reported at conferences and in journal articles. Your individual responses, however, will 
not.  
What will happen if I don’t want to continue with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time up to four weeks after today, without giving 
any reason. In the top corner of this page you have been allocated a participant number so that 
your data can be identified should you want to do this. Please contact the lead researcher (stating 
your participant number) to request that your data be withdrawn, at which point your data will 
be destroyed.  
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Participants who complete the forms will be allocated unique participant codes and data will be 
entered with reference to these participant codes. The researcher will not know you by name and 
no reference to the participant number will be made in the official write up of the results. 
Consent forms and data will be kept in locked filing cabinets and will be stored for up to 3 years 





Lead Researcher’s name: Benjamin Cuff 











Empathy and Charitable Donations 
Participant Information Sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is 
important that you understand the purpose and nature of the study. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
I am interested in the way people’s thoughts and attitudes influence how much empathy they 
feel, and in turn, how likely they are to donate to charity. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to 
complete a consent form on the following page. You are however, free to withdraw at any time, 
without any consequences, should you change your mind. 
What do I have to do? 
You will be asked some questions about yourself and will then be asked to watch a short (1 
minute) video depicting a man who has been traumatised as a result of his time in the army. You 
will then be asked to complete a questionnaire examining the thoughts you had about the man in 
the video.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The greatest disadvantage of taking part is the impact on your time. In addition, it is possible that 
the video may raise issues that you find difficult to deal with. You are advised not to take part 
should you find this subject (i.e., the effects of war on soldiers) particularly distressing.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will be contributing to novel research into the relationship between empathy and charitable 
giving. 
What will happen to my data? 
Your data will be used to test the impact of thoughts and attitudes on feelings of empathy and 








journal articles. Your individual responses, however, will not.  
What will happen if I don’t want to continue with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any by closing your browser window, without giving 
any reason. In the top corner of this page you have been allocated a participant number so that 
your data can be identified should you want to do this. Please contact the lead researcher (stating 
your participant number) to request that your data be withdrawn, at which point your data will 
be destroyed.  
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
You will be asked to create a unique participant code and data will be entered with reference to this 
code. The researcher will not know you by name and no reference to the participant code will be 
made in the official write up of the results. Data will be kept on secure servers and will be stored 
for up to 3 years before being deleted.  
 
Contact details: 
Lead Researcher‟s name: Benjamin Cuff 












A study on decisions involving the exchange of goods 
Participant Information Sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is 
important that you understand the purpose and nature of the study. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
We are interested in the effect of four factors on reactions to the exchange of goods: whether the 
two participants in a session started with the same or a different number of tickets (balance of 
initial resources), whether exchange was required or optional (choice), whether the exchange was 
simultaneous or sequential (timing of exchange), and whether the exchange was face-to-face or 
indirect (form of interaction). 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this 
information and you will be asked to sign a consent form. You are however, free to withdraw at 
any time, without any consequences, should you change your mind. 
What do I have to do? 
You will be paired up with another participant and play a game where you will exchange tickets 
for a prize draw. This is a two phase study. In one stage you will be competing for a £5 prize, and a 
£50 prize in the other (vouchers of your choice, should you win).  
You will be asked to fill out some questionnaires about yourself and thoughts towards your 
participant partner.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The only disadvantage of taking part is the impact on your time.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will be contributing to our understanding of an important area of psychology, which has the 
potential to be applied to several different subject areas. You will also earn research credits (if 
applicable) and can earn tickets for a prize draw worth up to £55 (vouchers of your choice, should 








What will happen to my data? 
Group level data may be reported at conferences and in journal articles. Your individual 
responses, however, will not.  
What will happen if I don’t want to continue with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time up to four weeks after today, without giving 
any reason. This will not affect your entry into the prize draw. In the top corner of this page you 
have been allocated a participant number so that your data can be identified should you want to 
do this. Please contact the lead researcher (stating your participant number) to request that your 
data be withdrawn, at which point your data will be destroyed.  
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Participants who complete the study will be allocated unique participant codes and data will be 
entered with reference to these participant codes. The researcher will not know you by name and 
no reference to the participant number will be made in the official write up of the results. 
Consent forms and data will be kept in locked filing cabinets and will be stored for up to 3 years 

















Project Title:  [Study Title] 
Name of researcher: Ben Cuff 
By signing below I confirm that I agree with the following statements: 
I have read and understand the participant information sheet and by continuing on with the 
study I will be consenting to participate in this study. 
I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these 
questions answered satisfactorily. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving a reason. 
I understand that the data will be treated according to the British Psychological Society Code of 
Ethics and the study has been reviewed by Coventry University’s ethics committee. I also 
understand that this data will be securely stored for up to 3 years before being destroyed 
I understand that the answers I give in this study will be analysed with the hope to publish any 
findings.  
I understand that my anonymity will be maintained in any report of the research.  
I understand that I also have the right to change my mind about participating in the study and 
withdraw from the study up to 4 weeks after participation in the study. 
 









Appendix E: Debrief Sheets 
E.1 Study 1, 2, & 3  
 




Please do not read this page until after you have completed your responses. Feel free to detach this 
page and keep for your own records.  
The purpose of this study was to pilot a new empathy measurement scale. While there are several 
different measurement scales already in use, the vast majority of these are „trait‟ measures, i.e., 
they measure stable individual differences in typical displays of empathy. However, we know that 
certain „state‟ (changeable) factors can change levels of empathy in different situations. For 
example, we hold different attitudes about different people. The effects that these attitudes have on 
empathy are what this new measurement scale examines.  
If you feel that you would like to withdraw from the study you have 4 weeks following the 
completion of this research in which to do so. In order to withdraw from the study please contact 
the lead investigator, Benjamin Cuff at cuffb@uni.coventry.ac.uk If you require any additional 
information about the study or have any other queries that you would like to ask please do not 
hesitate to get in touch. 
If taking part in this research led you to feel distressed or you would like to speak to someone 
about your thoughts and access advice, please contact one of the following: 




Beatbullying support service 
http://www.beatbullying.org/ 
 
If you are interested in this area of research, you may wish to read the following references: 
 
Davis, M. H. (1996). Empathy. A social psychological approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
 
Duan, C., & Hill, C. E. (1996). The current state of empathy research. Journal of Counselling 











E.2 Study 4 
 
 
Empathy and Charitable Donations 
Debrief 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how our thoughts and attitudes towards individuals 
depicted in charity adverts affect the amount of empathy we feel, and how that impacts on 
donation behaviours. For example, if an individual depicted in a charity advert is not very likeable, 
then we may not feel as much empathy for that person and that may mean that we are less likely to 
donate to that charity. This research has the potential to be used to develop more effective 
promotional campaigns for charitable organisations.  
If you feel that you would like to withdraw from the study you have 4 weeks following the 
completion of this research in which to do so. In order to withdraw from the study please contact 
the lead investigator, Benjamin Cuff at cuffb@uni.coventry.ac.uk stating your unique participant 
code.    
If you require any additional information about the study or have any other queries that you would 
like to ask please do not hesitate to get in touch. 
 
 If you would like more information about the charity depicted in the video, you can find 
more information here: http://www.combatstress.org.uk/ 
 
 If taking part in this research led you to feel distressed or you would like to speak to 




 If you are interested in this area of research, you may wish to read the following resources: 
o http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/ulterior-motives/201205/why-empathy-
makes-you-more-helpful 
o Basil, D.Z., Ridgway, N.M., & Basil, M.D. (2007). Guilt and giving: A process 










E.3 Study 5 
 
  




It is important that you read the following information as it was necessary to withhold some 
information from you at the start of this study. 
It is important to note that your “partner” in this study did not exist, and the “partner‟s” actions 
had been pre-determined by the researcher. Because of this fact, you (and all other participants in 
this study) will receive one entry into a £55 prize draw, regardless of the decisions you made.  
The purpose of this study was to examine how perceptions of our own needs (self-interest) interact 
with perceptions of another person‟s emotional needs. In addition we are interested in how this 
interaction influences the amount of empathy we feel for another person and how likely we are to 
provide help to that person.  
 
To avoid compromising future data collection, please do not discuss the nature of this 
research with your fellow students. 
 
If you feel that you would like to withdraw from the study you have 4 weeks following the 
completion of this research in which to do so. In order to withdraw from the study please contact 
the lead investigator, Benjamin Cuff at cuffb@uni.coventry.ac.uk If you require any additional 
information about the study or have any other queries that you would like to ask please do not 
hesitate to get in touch. 
 
If you are interested in this area of research, you may wish to read the following references: 
 
Batson, C.D., & Ahmad, N. (2001). Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II: 
what if the target of empathy has defected? European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 25-36.  
 









Appendix F: Sender’s Note (Study 5) 
 
Sender’s Note 
Please write a brief note describing something interesting of a personal nature that has happened to 
you recently. 
Once you have written your note, please select the relevant ‘Thoughts Questionnaire’ from the pile 
and give these to the assistant. 
 
Message to the receiver:  
The sender wrote this note before learning anything about what this study involved so that she would 
not be influenced by such knowledge . . . . The content of the note is entirely confidential; only you 
will read it. The note will be delivered in a sealed envelope and not read by the assistant. 
 
 
I'm supposed to write about something interesting that's 
happened to me lately. Well, I don't know if this will be 
interesting to anybody else, but the only thing I can think of is 
that two days ago I broke up with my boyfriend. We've been 
going out together since school and have been really close, and 
it's been great being at Cov Uni together. I thought he felt the 
same, but things have changed. Now, he wants to see other 
people. He says he still cares a lot about me, but he doesn't want 
to be tied down to just one person. I've been real down. It's all I 
think about. My friends all tell me that I'll meet other guys and 
they say that all I need is for something good to happen to cheer 
me up. I guess they're right, but so far that hasn't happened. 
 









Balanced / Required / Sequential / Indirect 
 
In this first stage, you will be competing for tickets in a raffle for a £50 prize.  
 
 
In this condition you will not meet your partner face-to-face, but you will receive information in the 
form of written communication. This will be written by your partner, and given to you by the researcher 
in a short while. You will not be required to write anything yourself. 
 
 
In this condition, both you and your partner have the same initial resources: 







Each of the cards indicates a number of raffle tickets that you will receive at the end of the 
experiment. At present, you both have a total of 5 tickets (+5 +5 -5 = 5) for the £50 prize. The more 
tickets you end up with, the more chances you have to win the prize. 
 
In this condition you will be required to exchange one card with your partner one after another (i.e., 
not at the same time). The person with the red cards will first give one red card to the person with 
blue cards. After receiving that card, the person with blue cards will give one blue card to the person 



































An important additional consideration: 
As can be seen above, a combination of two +5 cards, one red and one blue, is worth double its face 
value. Thus, if you (or your partner) end with a +5/+5 red-blue pair, that pair is worth 20 raffle 
tickets, not 10 . . . .  
If one participant ends with a negative total, that person's final outcome is 0 raffle tickets. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
